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Abstract 
Over the years, an extensive body of literature has emerged on the role that financial structure, the 
blend of bank-based and market-based intermediation, plays in economic growth. However, there has 
been no general agreement on this role.  Some studies find that financial intermediaries and markets are 
both important for growth while some other studies claim the superiority of one type of financial system 
(bank-based or market based) over the other. There are also studies that argue that financial structure 
does not matter while some more recent studies show that too much finance may harm growth. The 
debate is important, as having some idea of the form of financial structure that is growth promoting can 
help policy makers take informed decisions. It is also a particularly important issue for developing 
countries, as choosing the wrong financial structure can hold back growth and development. The existing 
literature tends to focus on developed countries, however, with only a few studies considering developing 
countries or regions. Even fewer consider Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). In the past, this was mainly because 
of inadequate stock market data, as most SSA countries did not have stock markets. Since the 1980s, 
however, this has changed, with stock markets being established in many SSA countries.   
This thesis contributes to the financial structure and economic growth literature by providing 
empirical evidence from SSA. The thesis is structured around three related studies. The first study uses 
dynamic panel estimation techniques to investigate both the short and long-run effects of financial 
structure on growth, focusing on 14 SSA countries over the period 1980-2014. The results indicate that 
financial structure is not significant in explaining growth in the region.  This could be attributed to the 
idiosyncratic nature of SSA banks, which are reluctant to lend to the private sector and prefer to invest 
in safe, risk-free government securities. It could also be a result of stringent stock market listing 
requirements that prevent most small and medium enterprises from raising funds.  Cross country panel 
studies are valuable to investigate this further. However, it is important to consider the heterogeneous 
nature of countries in a panel, and the limits that cross country studies put on the variables that can be 
considered. For this reason, the second study focuses on a single country from SSA, Kenya, and offers a 
more detailed analysis using quarterly data for the period 2002-2014. Kenya has not been analysed in the 
relevant literature. The country is an interesting case study, as it has experienced a number of financial 
innovations and has a relatively well-developed financial system, but still faces low levels of 
development. Our study employs the Autoregressive Distributed Lag approach to cointegration, and 
considers the independent role of banks and of markets, along with the role of financial structure. Our 
findings are consistent to those of the panel study concerning the role of financial structure.  Stock market 
development is, however, found to have a significantly positive effect on the country’s economic growth. 
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This is possibly because Kenya was one of the first SSA countries to develop an alternative investment 
market aimed at small and young firms. The role of banking sector development has a negative effect.  
This finding can be partly explained by the large proportion of non-performing loans accumulated by 
Kenyan banks in the 1980’s and the 1990’s, along with a weak legal and regulatory framework.  
The development of stock markets could have impacted upon growth in SSA economies through the 
provision of more financing choices for firms. This could influence their productivity and growth. To 
consider this channel in detail, the third study uses firm level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(WBES) to investigate the effect of different financing choices on the productivity of SSA firms. Using 
data for the period 2005 - 2013 from 26 countries, the study employs a linear Cobb-Douglas production 
function to estimate total factor productivity (TFP.) It then uses both parametric and non-parametric 
methods to analyse the effect of financing choices on TFP. The results indicate that firms that rely on 
bank debt rather than other forms of financing (e.g. internal finance, informal finance, private and public 
equity) are, on average, more productive. This can be partly attributed to the monitoring activities of 
banks and the threat of bankruptcy faced by firms.  
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1.1 Introduction and background 
Most countries in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) inherited their financial systems from their colonisers, and 
these were mainly banking institutions. Stock markets did not exist in most SSA countries before 1980. 
The establishment of stock markets followed financial reforms from the late 1980s. These were part of 
the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) promoted by multilateral financial organisations, mainly the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Financial reforms in the region were considered 
incomplete without the establishment and development of stock markets (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). Prior 
to 1989, there were only five1 stock markets in SSA. Between 1988 – 1998, a further 9 countries2 
established stock markets, to keep pace with the reforms, and to promote economic growth. This brought 
the total number of stock markets in SSA in 1998 to 14 out of 48 countries in the region. The addition of 
stock markets to these financial systems was considered necessary, because research showed that stock 
markets are instrumental in promoting economic growth in both developed and developing countries 
(Levine, 1996; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001). 
However, stock markets were established while the banking systems inherited by these countries were 
underdeveloped and underperforming.  In the 1980s, many SSA countries were facing deteriorating 
economic conditions, macroeconomic and financial instability, fiscal imbalances, and financial distress 
(Marchettini, Mecagni and Maino, Rodolfo, 2015). Critics questioned whether   African stock markets 
were established at the right time and for the right reasons, with some describing them as “casinos” 
(Levine, 1996). Pouncy (2002) notes that stock markets in SSA were a replication of existing stock 
markets in the west, and not a response to the need for capital by the real sector. They argued that these 
markets would not perform efficiently, given their huge costs and poor financial structures, and that such 
markets would not benefit the economies of some SSA countries (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). Evidence 
exists to show that stock markets are only beneficial to growth in a country where there is recognition 
and protection of property and contractual rights. 
Stock markets are also presented as institutions that can contribute to firm growth by expanding available 
sources of finance. However, firm performance in SSA is still currently constrained by lack of access to 
finance (Beck and Cull, 2014). Financing patterns differ across countries due to differences in the 
                                                 
1 South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Cote d’Ivoire 
2 Mauritius, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland 
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development of banks and stock markets, as well as differences in legal institutions (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999). Small and medium enterprises have not benefited much from the existence of stock 
markets because of stringent listing requirements. The majority of the stock markets in SSA have been 
in existence for over two decades. However, they are still characterised as immature, thin, and inactive, 
and banks still constitute a large proportion of the SSA financial sector.  
Stock markets and banks are the main sources of finance in SSA economies. They are therefore thought 
to play an important role in determining the speed and character of economic growth (Goldsmith, 1969). 
A branch of the finance-growth literature has emerged that aims to evaluate the role of financial structure 
in economic growth.  Financial structure is described as the extent to which a country’s financial system 
is either bank based or market-based. The main question that these empirical studies address is whether 
financial structure matters for growth. However, much of the research has concentrated on developed 
countries, mainly because there is more data available for these countries, given the fact that stock 
markets have been in existence in these countries longer than in developing countries, and particularly 
in SSA.   
Despite empirical studies spanning decades on the effect of financial structure on economic growth, there 
is still no general agreement on whether financial structure matters for growth. The focus of early studies 
was the US and UK, as market-based economies, and Germany and Japan, as bank-based economies 
(Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Morck and Nakamura, 1999). These 
studies made use of country specific indicators of financial structure, and concluded that financial 
structure matters for growth. For example, the indicator used to determine if Germany was bank-based 
is whether banks own shares in companies. For research on Japan, the indicator used is whether a 
company has a “main bank”. For the investigation of the US and UK, the role of market takeovers as 
corporate control devices is used to determine the extent of a market-based economy (Arestis, Luintel 
and Luintel, 2004). These studies emphasize that the structure of financial systems is important in 
explaining growth, and suggest that Germany and Japan grew because their financial systems were bank-
based, while the US and UK grew because their financial systems were market-based. Generalizations 
were thus reached regarding the relevance of financial structure for economic growth. Subsequent 
studies, however, show that the evidence drawn from analysing these countries cannot not be generalised 
because of the shortcomings of these studies. That is they make use of country specific indicators, and 
evaluate countries with similar growth rates, as well as similar real per capita income levels (Beck and 
Levine, 2002; Luintel et al., 2008). It is argued that Japan performed better than the US in the 1980s 
because the former’s economy was more bank-based. However, this view changed in the 1990s when 
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poor performance was recorded in the Japanese economy (Stulz, 2001). This pointed to the possibility of 
drawing misleading conclusions from studies based on country specific indicators. In addition, previous 
studies have analysed countries with similar growth rates, which means more empirical evidence is 
needed. Studies have been carried out that focus on developed countries. However, Africa, and 
specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, has not been widely studied. This is mainly because of the unavailability 
of comparable data on the nature of financial systems, and also because, prior to 1989, a few countries 
in SSA had functioning stock markets. 
Existing evidence shows that different methods of analysis and different sample groupings provide 
conflicting results on the effect of financial structure on growth (Levine and Zervos, 1996; Pinno and 
Serletis, 2007; Luintel et al., 2008, 2016). The failure to account for sample heterogeneities, for example, 
is a major criticism of panel based studies. For example, even after accounting for panel heterogeneities, 
Luintel et al. (2008) show the lack of consistency between panel based parameter estimates and time 
series parameter estimates. This inconclusive evidence does not however diminish the important role that 
finance plays in an economy. Neither does it diminish the positive role of finance found in some empirical 
studies (see for example (King & Levine (1993a); King & Levine (1993b); Bittencourt (2012) among 
others).  
Thus, differences in approaches in the existing research on financial structure, will continue to yield 
different results. These will lead to varying conclusions on the importance of financial structure for long-
run economic growth. This thesis contributes to the literature on financial structure and growth by 
focusing on SSA, a region that has largely been neglected in previous studies. First, to provide evidence 
from the region based on panel estimation methods. Second, it provides time series evidence based on 
Kenya, and compares results from panel and time series estimates for this country. Lastly, it investigates 
the role of financial structure at firm level, by analysing the effect of firm financing choices on firm 
productivity. 
Chapter 2 investigates the role of financial structure in economic growth in SSA. The limited number of 
studies on SSA informs the choice of the region, as well as the availability of an updated dataset on 
financial system characteristics for economies across the globe (Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and 
Levine, 2012). The first cross country study by Levine (2002) assumes homogeneity across all countries, 
which includes both developed and developing countries. Results from this study led to the conclusion 
that financial structure does not matter, and that the overall level of financial development is what matters 
for long-run growth. However, using the same database as Levine (2002), Pinno & Serletis (2007) allow 
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for heterogeneity across the countries. The latter study classified countries based on the statistical 
properties and the multidimensional structure, extracted using Bayesian methods. This resulted in a loose 
classification of countries as either developed or developing. Their results lead to a different conclusion 
from that of Levine (2002). They support the view that financial structure matters, and conclude that 
market-based financial systems benefit developed countries economically, while bank-based systems 
benefit developing countries.  
Thus,  there is hardly any consensus in the literature on the relative importance of bank-based vs market-
based finance (Luintel et al., 2008). There are a number of reasons for this, including the use of different 
variables to define financial structure, as well as different methodological approaches used. While some 
studies make use of time series data, others make use of panel or cross-sectional data. Critics of the latter 
method claim  that the heterogeneous nature of countries means they cannot be pooled together in panel 
or cross sectional studies (Luintel et al., 2008). Initial theories on financial structure pointed to the lack 
of an accepted definition of financial structure, and methods for its quantitative measurement (Goldsmith, 
1959). It has been noted in the literature that the evaluation of a financial structure should include its 
size, breadth and composition, and should cover the key institutional players. These include, inter alia, 
central banks, commercial banks, development finance institutions, insurance funds, pension schemes, 
and financial markets (International Monetary Fund, 2005). However, as data from development finance 
institutions, insurance funds, and pension schemes is very limited, empirical studies tend to rely heavily 
on data from banks and stock markets. The lack of data from the above mentioned institutions is more 
pronounced in SSA countries. Thus, chapter two of our research, which covers our investigation of the 
role of financial structure on growth in selected countries in SSA from 1980 to 2014, also relies on 
indicators from commercial banks and stock markets. 
Specifically, the study employs dynamic panel data estimation methods that include the pooled mean 
group (PMG), mean group (MG), and the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimators proposed by Pesaran, 
Shin, Smith, & others (1997) and Pesaran, Shin, & Smith (1999). PMG imposes homogeneity of group 
coefficients in the long-run, but allows the short-run coefficients, intercepts, and error variances to differ 
across groups. The MG averages the long-run and short-run coefficients over groups, while the DFE 
pools separate regressions by imposing a common slope. To justify homogeneity in the long-run, we 
make the assumption that these countries have access to the same technologies, and therefore their long-
run growth patterns are similar. Our results show that financial structure is of no economic significance 
in explaining growth in the long-run, for the sample countries in our study. However, the short-run effects 
of financial structure are country specific, showing that financial structure matters in some countries, but 
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not in others. The next chapter is motivated by the discrepancy observed between panel/cross sectional 
estimations and time series estimations as noted by Luintel & Khan (2002). Thus, the chapter focuses on 
a single country. 
The third chapter provides a more rigorous case study analysis of the role of financial structure on growth, 
focusing on Kenya. We use quarterly data for the period 2002 - 2014 and employ the Auto Regressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds approach to cointegration of (Pesaran & Shin (1998). Kenya is selected 
as a case study because it has a well established financial system3 relative to other developing countries 
in the region, and the data we need is available. Studies on financial structure in Kenya are based on cross 
sectional or panel studies which include Kenya in the sample e.g. in Levine (2002). Luintel et al. (2008) 
find that panel estimates do not correspond to time series estimates. Levine & Zervos (1996) also note 
that cross sectional studies and panel based studies mask specific features of different countries. There 
is therefore a need for a country specific study to further examine results from cross section studies and 
panel studies. This study extends the analysis by considering the role of banks and stock markets 
independently, before evaluating the influence of financial structure on growth. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study that has been carried out on Kenya in a time series setting. The findings 
from the study concur with those from the panel based analysis, and we find support for the view that 
financial structure is not economically important in explaining growth in Kenya both in the short-run and 
in the long-run. 
One of the ways in which the development of stock markets is likely to have an impact on growth in SSA 
economies is through the provision of more financing choices to firms, which could have an impact on 
their productivity and growth. Chapter four therefore takes a microeconomic approach to addressing the 
effect of firm financing choices on firm productivity. Lack of finance is one of the impediments to firm 
growth, and lack of access to finance is one of the most important constraints to firm growth (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). As Girma & Vencappa (2015) note, financial systems can stimulate economic 
efficiency and offer more profitable growth opportunities. But for this to happen, firms should be able to 
access finance optimally from the financial system. The sources of firm finance vary from one region to 
another, and are dependent on a number of factors including costs, benefits, accessibility (Myers, 1984), 
institutional differences (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008), and the legal and financial 
environment (Porta et al., 1998; Allen et al., 2012). The choice of firm financing is not a random act, but 
a consequence of conscious financing choices made by firms (Mallick and Yang, 2011). Firms’ funding 
                                                 
3 Although less well developed than those of South Africa and Mauritius 
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choices, and their effect on firm performance, have been the focus of a number of studies, which have 
not reached consensus (see for example Jensen, Michael & Meckling (1976); Mallick & Yang (2011); 
Rahaman (2011)). These choices include debt, equity, internal funds, trade finance, and borrowing from 
friends and family (informal funds), among others. We add to the existing literature on the role of firm 
financing choices in firm productivity, by providing evidence from SSA, a region characterised by a 
large proportion of small and medium enterprises. 
Using cross sectional data on firms from 26 countries obtained from the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(WBES), this study employs both parametric and non-parametric approaches to determine the role of 
firms’ financing choices on firm productivity. The parametric approach follows a cross section fixed 
effect regression estimation analysis. The non-parametric approach examines the distributional 
differences between and within groups that rely on different sources of finance that go beyond a 
description of statistical summaries of the data. The study follows Handcock & Morris (1998) for the 
non-parametric approach, and compares the distribution of firm productivity corresponding to the 
different financial choices. This way, the study is able to establish the stochastic dominance as well as to 
provide a ranking for the compared distributions. The measure of productivity is obtained using the 
traditional approach of estimating a production function following Ghosh (2009). In line with studies 
that evaluate the effect of financing choices on firm productivity (See Girma & Vencappa (2015); Nucci 
et al. (2005)), we quantify a firm’s productivity as the Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The findings from 
the study support the agency cost theory of firm financing. This theory postulates that firms that rely on 
bank debt rather than other forms of financing (e.g. internal finance, informal finance, and private and 
public equity finance) are, on average, more productive. This leads us to conclude that bank finance is 
an important source for firm financing in SSA.  This is not surprising, given that banks dominate most 
financial systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the majority of firms not qualified to participate in the 
stock markets due to the stringent listing rules. Furthermore, banks’ monitoring activities ensure that 
firms remain profitable, to guarantee repayment of debt.  
1.2 Organisation of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two investigates the role of financial structure in 
economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, using dynamic panel estimation methods. This is done for a 
sample of 14 countries, from 1980 to 2014. Chapter three follows, with a country case study on the role 
of financial structure on growth, but also considers the independent roles of banks and stock markets. 
The objective is to compare panel estimates with time-series estimates, which have been shown to differ 
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in previous studies. The ARDL approach to cointegration is employed on quarterly data from 2002 to 
2014. The fourth chapter uses firm level data from 26 countries and analyses the effect of financial 
structure on firm performance, using productivity as the measure of performance. The study makes use 
of ordinary least squares analysis using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). The final 
chapter provides a conclusion, with a discussion of the findings from the thesis, including policy 




Financial Structure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
2.1  Introduction and background 
Since the early 1990s, there has been an increase in empirical research on the finance-growth nexus, with 
some studies employing formal growth models (see Levine 2005; King & Levine 1993a; King & Levine 
1993b; Beck, Levine, et al. 2000) and others investigating the causal relationship between finance and 
growth (see Hassan et al. 2011; Christopoulos & Tsionas 2004; Demetriades & Hussein 1996; Levine et 
al. 2000 inter alia). A recent study that makes use of extended data (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) does 
not find very strong support for the widely held view that there is a positive relationship between finance 
and growth, or that countries grow faster when they have a well-developed financial system, as postulated 
in Levine (2005). Some more recent studies even show that too much finance may harm growth (Law 
and Singh, 2014). 
Stock markets and banks are the main sources of finance in an economy. It is widely believed that they 
play an important role in determining the speed and character of economic growth (Goldsmith, 1955). 
As a result, a branch of the finance-growth literature has emerged that aims to evaluate the role of 
financial structure on economic growth. Financial structure is broadly defined as the mix of financial 
instruments, financial markets, and financial institutions in a country. A financial system with more 
reliance on the banking system is characterised as bank-based, while one that relies more on the stock 
market is characterised as market-based. More formally, financial structure is defined as the degree to 
which a country has a bank-based or market-based financial system (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). 
The empirical literature on the effect of financial structure on economic growth is not as extensive as the 
empirical literature on the role of financial development in economic growth. Goldsmith (1959) notes 
the lack of an accepted conceptual definition of financial structure, and how it should be measured. 
Recent studies on financial structure and economic growth featuring Germany and Japan as bank-based 
financial systems, and the United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) as market-based 
financial systems therefore made use of country specific definitions of financial structure (Luintel et al., 
2008). Generalizations were then reached on the relevance of financial structure, after these studies 
showed that financial structure was important in explaining growth in these four economies. However, 
Beck & Levine (2002) note that the evidence from analysis of these countries cannot be generalised, 
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because of their shortcomings. The studies argue that Japan performed better than the US in the 1980s 
because it was more “bank-based”. However, this view changed in the 1990s when poor economic 
performance was recorded in Japan (Stulz, 2001). Most subsequent empirical studies investigated 
developed countries because of the availability of data and the existence of functional stock markets.  
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has not been widely studied, given the nonexistence of stock markets in many 
countries in the region. Stock markets in SSA are relatively new, with the majority established after 1989 
(Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). Prior to this, there were only five stock markets in SSA4. This is not the case 
for developed countries, with established stock markets, which have been shown to play a positive role 
in promoting growth in these countries (Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001). This positive 
contribution of stock markets to economic growth is one of the reasons why countries in SSA were 
encouraged to set up stock markets. There was also the idea that establishment of stock markets was a 
global pattern and Africa needed to follow suit. Kenny & Moss (1998) note that stock markets were seen 
as a prestige project that every country needed to have at the time. 
To date, despite numerous studies on the topic, there is hardly any consensus on the relative importance 
of bank-based vs market-based financial systems (Luintel et al., 2008). This has been attributed to a 
number of reasons which include the use of different indicators to define financial structure, the sample 
groupings of panel based studies, as well as the methodological approaches used. Panel/cross sectional 
studies, for example largely show that financial structure does not matter. However, the failure to account 
for sample heterogeneities is one of the major criticisms of panel based studies. But even if one accounts 
for panel heterogeneities as in Luintel et al. (2008), there is a lack of consistency between panel based 
parameter estimates and time series parameter estimates.  
This study contributes to the literature by providing additional evidence from SSA on the role of financial 
structure on economic growth. This is made possible by the availability of the Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD), an extensive dataset of financial system characteristics for economies 
across the globe (Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, Levine, et al., 2012). The contribution of this study is 
therefore fourfold. First, it provides empirical evidence from SSA, a region that has not attracted much 
research interest on the topic. Second, it considers both the short-run and the long-run dynamics of 
financial structure on economic growth. Third, it accounts for the level of financial development in the 
analysis. Finally, it accounts for cross country heterogeneity by making use of the Pooled Mean Group 
                                                 
4 South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire 
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(PMG) estimation method of long-run relationships in dynamic heterogeneous panels proposed by 
(Pesaran et al., 1997, 1999).  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on financial structure and growth, section 2.3 covers financial structure in SSA, 
section 2.4 discusses the data and methodology, while our empirical results are given in section 2.6. 
Finally, section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
Theoretically, there are a number of avenues through which development in the financial sector can boost 
economic growth. First, the financial sector can increase savings, and thereby increased resources 
available for investment. Second, it could increase productivity of investment as a result of efficient 
allocation of saving. Third, through monitoring of investments as well as ensuring corporate governance 
once finance has been provided by financial institutions. Fourth, it can lead to reduction in transaction 
cost which promotes specialisation, technological innovation and eventually growth (Murinde 2012; 
Levine 2005; Ghirmay 2004). Both banks and stock markets mobilise savings for eventual allocation to 
investments. They are also involved in enhancing productivity by pooling consumers’ liquidity risk, so 
that consumers have no need to hold savings in liquid but unproductive investments. 
Although they provide similar services, banks and stock markets differ in the way they offer these 
services. For example, bank-based systems provide inter-temporal risk sharing, whereas cross-sectional 
risk sharing is provided in market-based systems (Boot and Thakor, 1997). Such differences have led to 
arguments for a well-developed banking system, while others favour a well-developed market based 
system. Another difference is in the way banks and markets conduct their transactions. While markets 
are more arm’s length in their transactions with firms, banks closely monitor firms and identify promising 
entrepreneurships to fund. Banks are therefore directly involved in project selection, making capital from 
the banking sector more expensive (Ray and Chakraborty, 2003). Despite these differences, there is no 
theoretical consensus on the merits that accrue to a country in having a bank-based or a market-based 
financial system (Luintel et al., 2008).  
Financial structure is commonly evaluated on the basis of the main competing theories, which include 
the bank-based theory, market-based theory, financial services theory, and the law and finance view 
(Levine, 2002; Arestis, Luintel and Luintel, 2004; Luintel et al., 2008). Incorporating financial structure 
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in modelling growth entails augmenting the classical growth model with measures of financial structure. 
We explain each theory below. 
Bank based theory is anchored in the dominance of the banking system in a country. The advantages of 
having a bank based system differ for given levels of economic development. For example, it has been 
argued that, at the early stages of development5, banks outperform markets (Ray and Chakraborty, 2003). 
This is because banks are in a better position to resolve agency problems in a system characterized by 
asymmetric information. This theory therefore advocates for stronger bank based systems rather than 
market based systems because banks play a more effective role in financing development than financial 
markets, and more so in developing countries. The argument here is that market based systems reveal 
information publicly, and therefore investors have no incentive to seek and acquire information. Bank 
based systems, instead, focus on forming long term relationships that guide their engagements with 
agents. This results in better resource allocation for banks (Levine, 2002, 2005; Allen and Carletti, 2008). 
It is also shown that markets are prone to free riders. That is, an outsider may spend time and money 
looking for information for decision making, and this information is then easily passed on to other 
investors, making the outsider incur more costs than the rest.  
Characteristics to take into account when recommending bank based financial systems include, inter alia, 
the political organisation of the society and the legal and regulatory framework. For example, 
Bhattacharyya (2013) argues that non-democratic societies have bank based financial systems. This is 
because non-democratic political rulers can use their power to create monopolistic banks that are 
beneficial in providing credit to them. Thus, non-democratic societies tend to push for a bank based 
system. This results in a dominant underdeveloped banking system that is detrimental to growth 
(Bhattacharyya, 2013). Studies also show that bank based systems tend to dominate in countries with 
weak legal systems (Rajan and Zingales, 1996). 
Market based theories emphasize the dominance of financial markets. The advantages of having a stock 
market based system is that it encourages specialisation as well as acquisition and dissemination of 
information. This reduces the costs of mobilising savings and encourages investment (Arestis, 
Demetriades and Luintel, 2001). Proponents of this type of theory capitalize on the weaknesses of bank 
based theory, which is pegged on the inefficiencies of large powerful banks. Such banks can hinder the 
progress of innovation by extracting informational rents and protecting firms with close bank ties from 
                                                 
5 When a country is transitioning from a traditional economy to an industrialized one 
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competition, colluding with firm managers against other creditors, and impeding efficient corporate 
governance (Levine, 2002). These theories claim that such inefficiencies are reduced in market based 
systems, and, thus, markets are better at enhancing economic growth and development. Another 
advantage of markets stressed by these theories is that, through the pricing system, they provide 
information feedback. For example, in equilibrium, prices provide firms with information, which in turn 
is used by firms to affect future market prices. This is a form of market governance, which has a positive 
effect on economic performance (Boot and Thakor, 1997). 
When stock markets are well developed, they enhance corporate governance by mitigating against 
principal-agent problems (Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001). Managers cannot divert funds from 
the core business of the firm for private gains, and therefore work more towards ensuring profitability. 
As such, markets rely more on contracts, and the strength of the legal system in enforcing contracts 
(Tadesse, 2002). However, as noted earlier, in the presence of weak legal systems, banks are preferred. 
According to Porta, et al. (1998) British legal systems protect private property rights, and thus encourage 
the development of a market based system. They compare this to the French legal system, which supports 
a bank based system through supporting a judicial system that is close to redundant, with no protection 
for private property rights. 
The financial services view is based on the premise that the source of finance does not matter but instead 
what matters is the availability and the efficient provision of financial services (Levine, 2002; Arestis, 
Luintel and Luintel, 2004). This minimizes the importance of the role of banks and financial markets. 
When the financial system is functioning efficiently, it reduces information asymmetries and risk, and 
boosts the mobilisation of savings, and leads to efficient capital allocation (Peia and Roszbach, 2014). 
However, if banks and financial markets are not efficient, the positive effect of finance on the economy 
cannot be guaranteed. As Beck et al. (2008) note, “...on the debate between banks and markets, the 
suggestion that one type of system is clearly better than the other no longer has much support in the 
literature, whether for access or for financial sector development” (p.70). The authors further argue that 
it is far much better to create an environment in which both systems optimise their activities. At the same 
time, they acknowledge that long term financing is better accessed from relatively large securities 
markets, while banks are more associated with the availability of short term financing. This suggests that 
banks and financial markets are not in competition with one another. Given that they  are different 
components of the financial system, they ameliorate different costs, facilitate different transactions and 
provide different information in the system (Levine, 1997; Boyd and Smith, 1998; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
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and Levine, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). Governments should therefore be concerned with 
creating better functioning banks and markets (Levine, 2002). 
The literature also shows that banks and markets are substitute sources of corporate finance because, 
when a firm raises capital by issuing new equity, it reduces its need to borrow from a bank (Arestis, 
Demetriades and Luintel, 2001). As alluded to earlier, what determines the development of one system 
as opposed to another is the characteristics and circumstances in a country, and this has a bearing on the 
effectiveness of the financial system. If banks are better able to handle agency problems than markets, 
then development of the stock market may hamper growth, especially if the market develops at the 
expense of the banking system. Whatever system emerges, given country specifics, ought to be able to 
provide adequate financial services. Therefore, the theory states, the type of financial structure is 
irrelevant. 
A a subset of the financial services view is the law and finance view, which borders on enforcement of 
financial contracts. It emphasizes the need for a strong legal and regulatory framework that can protect 
the rights of financial players. Theory postulates that an efficient legal system is far better placed to 
support financial transactions, regardless of whether they are being provided by banks or markets. When 
property rights are protected and rules and regulations are rightfully enforced, a country’s financial 
system benefits and develops (Porta, et al. 1998; Rajan & Zingales 1996). This development can stem 
either from the banking system or from the market system, or from both, and the source of financial 
development is irrelevant. This view therefore concludes that financial development is more likely to 
occur in an environment that protects the property rights of players in the financial system. 
The above theories have given rise to numerous empirical studies that seek to test the validity of each 
view. The results vary depending on the approach, as well as the indicators used to measure the 
different aspects of financial structure. These include measures of size, activity, and efficiency of both 
markets and banks (Beck and Levine, 2002; Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2002) as well as indicators of laws 
and regulations (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000). 
2.2.2 Empirical literature 
Overall, cross-sectional studies tend to show that financial structure does not matter for growth (Luintel 
et al., 2008). Their critics make the observation that these studies do not take account of cross country 
heterogeneity. These studies show that financial structure is irrelevant in explaining growth, noting that 
what matters is the level of financial development (See for example Levine (2002)).  This view is 
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supported by results obtained from studies on the effect of financial structure on industry level growth 
(Beck and Levine, 2002), as well as from studies on the effect of financial structure on investment 
(Ndikumana, 2005). These studies support the view that banks and stock markets are complementary and 
not competitors. However, other studies (Tadesse, 2002; Luintel et al., 2008) show that financial structure 
matters. We explain and evaluate these findings below. 
A study by Levine (2002), of 48 developed and less developed countries shows that financial structure 
is irrelevant in explaining growth, and these results were robust to a number of sensitivity tests, that 
included different measures of financial structure. This is among the earliest cross-country studies on 
financial structure and growth, with four countries from SSA, South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and 
Zimbabwe included in the study. The author defines overall financial structure as the first principal 
component of three components of financial structure, namely activity, size, and efficiency. Activity is 
measured as the activity of the stock market compared to the activity of banks. Size is measured as the 
size of stock markets compared to that of banks, Efficiency is measured as efficiency of stock markets 
relative to that of banks. Pinno & Serletis (2007) use the same dataset and variables defined by Levine 
(2002), and  account for cross country heterogeneity by employing Bayesian classification, and find that 
financial structure matters. Their findings lead them to conclude that market-based systems are more 
advantageous for developed countries, while bank-based systems benefit developing countries. They 
explain that their findings differ from those of Levine (2002) because they account for cross country 
heterogeneity, unlike Levine (2002) who assumes equality of parameters across countries in his study.  
The same financial structure indicators are used in Beck & Levine (2002)6. Their study examines whether 
a country’s financial structure influences the formation of new establishments, capital allocation, and the 
growth of industries with different dependence on external finance. Their study is a cross country/cross 
industry analysis of developed and developing countries. Their sample consists of data from 42 countries 
and 36 industries averaged between 1980 - 1989, with four countries from SSA, Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, and Nigeria, included in the sample. The authors find that financial structure has no 
significant impact on industry growth patterns. Rather, industries that rely heavily on external finance 
grow faster in countries with well-developed financial systems. Classifying a country’s financial 
structure as either bank based or market based is thus not useful for the purpose of promoting industry 
growth or efficient capital allocation. Countries seeking to promote industry growth should instead focus 
on ensuring overall financial development, regardless of the source. Ndikumana (2005) comes to a 
                                                 
6 This is in addition to regulatory restrictions of banks and state ownership of the assets of the ten largest banks 
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similar conclusion that it is overall financial development that matters, and not whether a country’s 
financial system is bank based or market based. 
Contrary to the above findings, Tadesse (2002) using industry level data for a panel of both developed 
and less developed countries finds that financial structure matters. The author notes that the effectiveness 
of financial architecture (financial structure) depends on the level of development of the financial sector, 
and the prevalence and severity of agency problems in the country. Thus, the superiority of a financial 
system is dependent upon its effectiveness in performing the functions it has been mandated to perform. 
This means that, in some countries, banks will have a comparative advantage, while in others, markets 
will have a comparative advantage. The study shows that banks outperform markets in countries with 
underdeveloped financial systems and in countries dominated by small firms. The opposite holds true, 
that is, countries with well-developed financial systems do better economically if they are market based 
than if they are bank based. 
Likewise, Luintel et al. (2008) find that financial structure matters in some countries in their sample7.  
Their study compares results from time series analysis with those from panel estimates of the same 
countries. Using a dynamic heterogeneous panel approach, they estimate the within-dimension parameter 
estimates and find that financial structure matters for growth. Specifically, their results show that market-
based financial systems are more important for growth than bank-based financial systems. Noting the 
differences between their findings and those of other cross sectional studies, including Beck & Levine 
(2002); Levine (2002), the authors point to the differences in methodologies and the treatment of cross 
country heterogeneity, which, if taken into consideration could reconcile the distinctly different sets of 
results (Luintel et al., 2008) 
A number of time series studies on financial structure and economic growth show that financial structure 
matters for growth (Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001; Arestis, Luintel and Luintel, 2004; Luintel 
et al., 2008; Peia and Roszbach, 2014). It has been shown that conclusions from cross country growth 
regressions may lead to incorrect inferences for the different panel units included in the sample (Arestis, 
Demetriades and Luintel, 2001). This is because panel based studies mask important country specific 
characteristics. Parameter heterogeneity across the panel units can also lead to wrong conclusions 
(Luintel et al., 2008). The authors posit that countries “exhibit different production structures, levels of 
banking, financial and capital market development” (pg.5) necessitating country specific analysis. 
                                                 
7 Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Philippines. 
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From an empirical analysis of five developed economies, Arestis, et al. (2001) conclude that the effect 
of banks on growth is more powerful than that of stock markets. They posit that the effect of stock 
markets may have been exaggerated by studies that utilize cross country growth regressions. They use 
the log of stock market capitalisation and the log of domestic bank credit as ratios of GDP, to account 
for stock market and banking sector development respectively. They argue that cross country growth 
regressions can only provide a general view on the relationship between finance and growth, and this can 
vary when considering individual countries. Arestis, et al. (2004) conclude that financial structures can 
have a significant effect on the level of output in some countries but not in others, in their analysis of a 
sample of six developing countries. They show that market based systems were more conducive for 
growth in Greece, Taiwan, South Korea and India, while a bank-based system was more conducive for 
growth in South Africa. Their study showed that, in the case of Philippines, however, financial structure 
was insignificant in explaining growth. 
Reviewing the empirical literature, it becomes obvious that conflicting conclusions have been reached, 
based on the methodologies used as well as the assumptions of either homogeneity or heterogeneity made 
concerning the countries used in study samples. This study takes into consideration the shortcomings of 
previous studies, including cross country heterogeneity overlooked by Levine (2002) and Beck & Levine 
(2002), but considered in Luintel et al. (2008) and Pinno & Serletis (2007). It also takes into account both 
long-run and short-run dynamics. The study focuses on SSA countries, classified as predominantly bank-
based and influenced by similar technologies, and makes the assumption of a common long-run 
relationship between financial structure and economic growth plausible, while allowing the convergence 
dynamics of the long-run and the short-run to differ. This is made possible by the use of the pooled mean 
group estimation method by Pesaran et al. (1999) and Pesaran & Smith, (1995), which combines average 
and pooling methods of panel data estimation. 
2.3 Financial structure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
SSA consists of 48 countries most of which are characterised by underdeveloped financial systems. The 
majority of the financial systems were inherited from the countries’ former colonies. South Africa and 
Mauritius are exceptions, given their more developed financial systems. In the years after independence8, 
many of the financial systems were characterised by financial repression, directed credit and state 
ownership of financial institutions, mostly banks. The majority of the countries did not have stock 
markets and non-bank financial institutions like insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, and 
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development banks. Most stock markets in Sub Saharan Africa were established after 1989 (Yartey and 
Adjasi, 2007). Prior to this date, there were only five stock markets in SSA (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, and Cote d’Ivoire). A large proportion of the population was un-banked, and in those 
countries with stock markets, Africans were not allowed to participate in these markets (Allen et al., 
2011). This changed with the extensive privatisation of state-owned banks, following the structural 
adjustment programmes of the World Bank in the mid-1980s, and the liberalisation of financial systems, 
which led to financial deepening, emergence of new products as well as the use of new technologies 
(Honohan and Beck, 2007). 
The financial structure of the majority of SSA countries is still dominated by the banking sector, with 
very low trading activity in financial markets (Standley, 2010). The stock markets are still characterised 
as immature, despite having been in existence for over two decades. In the last decade however, effort 
has been geared towards developing, deepening and integrating existing stock markets, as well as 
creating new markets. Even though the financial sector in SSA is characterised as bank-based, this is not 
because the banking sector is significantly well developed. Nyantakyi & Sy (2015) note that banks in 
Africa are shallower, with a limited network presence compared to other regions. Financial development, 
measured by the ratio of domestic credit available to the private sector by deposit taking institutions 
compared to economic activity, was estimated at an average of 24 percent in 2014. The observation that 
the financial sector in SSA is bank-based is therefore in relation to the underdevelopment in the financial 
markets. 
Beck, et al. (2009) compare financial structures in developing countries with those in high income 
countries. They note that the trend in high income countries is towards market-based financial systems, 
where markets are seen to deepen more than banks. However, they note that there has been no such trend 
in the bank-based financial systems in developing countries. Financial sectors in SSA countries are 
among the least developed in the world. Foreign banks have played a major role in the development of 
the SSA banking sector (Allen, Otchere and Senbet, 2011) while stock markets play a minimal role.  
 Information technologies, especially the use of mobile phones for mobile banking, are revolutionising 
banking in countries like Kenya, Uganda and Ghana. Thus, financial systems in SSA are experiencing 
changes in quality as well as quantity, leading researchers to evaluate the impact that this might have on 
economic growth. As banks and stock markets constitute the bulk of financial systems in SSA, we 
provide a detailed description of their evolution within the region. To put the regions’ financial structure 
into perspective, we present a comparative analysis of the characteristics of financial structures of 
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developing regions over 1988 -2014, as well as those of the financial structures of the OECD, as a 
representative of high income developed countries. 
2.3.1 Banking in SSA 
Many countries in the SSA region inherited financial systems from their colonisers, and are dominated 
by foreign banks that were largely designed to serve colonial interests. Post-colonial governments 
embarked on nationalisation of existing banks, and set up new banks to address the developmental needs 
of their independent countries. To achieve this, interest rates were kept low and credit was directed to 
priority sectors (Fowowe, 2013). However, by the early 1990s, after on average more than 20 years of 
independence, their financial systems were described in the 1990s as shallow, narrow, and undiversified 
(Popiel, 1994). This was after financial reforms in the mid 1980s. Low lending rates, credit ceilings, and 
credit directed to priority areas meant that bank profit margins were low and credit was not being 
efficiently allocated. Many countries faced deteriorating economic conditions, macro-financial 
instability, fiscal imbalances, and financial distress. 
The banking sector in SSA expanded rapidly from the early 2000s. Reforms, including financial 
liberalisation, the reduced role of government in deciding pricing, and allocating credit, and 
improvements in the institutional environment are among the major contributors to these changing 
dynamics (Marchettini, Mecagni and Maino, Rodolfo, 2015). In the recent past, the region has 
experienced rapid economic growth given the prevailing favourable macroeconomic policies. Increased 
financial activity in SSA, coupled with improved regulation, has led to significant growth in the financial 
sector, with marked expansion of access to financial services. A major feature of the financial sector in 
SSA is the dominance of banking services, with commercial banks forming the backbone of financial 
services (KPMG, 2015; Marchettini, Mecagni and Maino, Rodolfo, 2015; Nyantakyi and Sy, 2015). A 
notable feature among banking systems in Africa is their preference to purchase government securities 
rather than provide credit to the private sector (Allen, Otchere and Senbet, 2011; KPMG, 2015). While 
banks do this mainly to avoid bad credit and remain profitable, it is seen as a hindrance to financial 
development, measured by the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP. However, country specific 
conditions influence the flow of private credit. These include the size and diversification of the economy, 
macroeconomic conditions and the availability of natural resources (Marchettini, Mecagni and Maino, 
Rodolfo, 2015). We therefore expects to see large heterogeneities in lending flows across SSA. 
Foreign banks still have a strong presence in SSA, and the recent years have seen a rapid growth in Pan 
African banks (Marchettini, Mecagni and Maino, Rodolfo, 2015). Reports show that foreign banks play 
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a significant role in strengthening competition and promoting good governance and innovations in 
domestic banks. Foreign banks have also increased lending activities in SSA (Allen, Otchere and Senbet, 
2011; Nyantakyi and Sy, 2015). This is because foreign and private banks are considered more efficient 
than public domestic banks in SSA. Pan African banks, on the other hand, have been instrumental in 
bridging the financing gap created by the scaling back of European banks caused by the global financial 
crisis. The increased role of Pan African banks is also reflected in their taking the lead in the arrangement 
of syndicated loans in the region (Marchettini, Mecagni and Maino, Rodolfo, 2015).  
The penetration of the banking sector has deepened, albeit at a slow pace, in many countries in the region. 
Figure 2-1a shows trends in the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP for selected 
countries9. This ratio is often used as an indicator for the level of development in the banking sector. It 
is evident that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a rapid development of financial systems in 
the sample countries, largely attributed to financial liberalisation policies. However, it was not until 2001 
that a remarkable increase in financial development was seen in the region. Mauritius and South Africa 
are more financially developed than other countries in the region, as seen in figure 2-1b. With ratios of 
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP averaging at 51% and 59% respectively, their financial 
sectors are substantially more developed than the other countries in the sample. Financial development 
in South Africa dominated the region until about 2008. However, since the global financial crisis of 
2007/2008, South Africa has experienced a decline in the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks 
to GDP, while Mauritius has continued to recorded increases. The growth in credit to the private sector 
has largely been attributed to an increase in prices of commodity exports from SSA and an increase in 
private capital flows. This is in addition to macroeconomic stabilisation. The rising trend in credit to the 
private sector is expected to continue, alongside stable macroeconomic environments and continued 





                                                 
9 The selection of countries was limited to countries with functional stock markets, to enable comparison of stock 
market developments  
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Figure 2-1: Ratio of Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to GDP (%) 
(a) Excluding South Africa and Mauritius 
 
 
(b) South Africa and Mauritius 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) - 2016 
Despite the growth in banking in SSA, the gap between SSA and the rest of the world, in terms of the 
depth of the financial sector, seems to have widened (KPMG, 2015). Figure 2-2 shows how the ratio of 
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP in SSA compares to that of other developing regions, and 
the OECD as a representative of high income developed countries. It can be seen that countries in SSA 
perform worse than the OECD and developing countries in East Asia & Pacific. However, the region 
compares well with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and performs better than Latin 
America, the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia until 2009. Overall, though, the depth of the financial 
sector in SSA is the shallowest, and has been declining since 2009. 
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Reasons for the decline in the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP in SSA is the absence 
of strong legal institutions, and a lack of support for creditor rights. These lead to shallow financial 
sectors, with limited penetration of banking services (Nyantakyi and Sy, 2015). To address the limited 
penetration of banking services, countries have resorted to innovative approaches to banking, which 
include mobile money accounts facilitated by the penetration of mobile telephony in the region. Kenya 
leads the way in mobile money accounts, which has allowed financial institutions in the country to reach 
a wider clientele. Other countries that have high usage of mobile money accounts include Botswana, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The practice is, however, 
spreading across the region as countries have embraced it in a bid to expand financial inclusion. It is also 
expected that the rapid rise in Pan African banking, that is replacing the vacuum left by European banks 
after the global financial crisis will reverse this decline in credit to the private sector (Marchettini, 
Mecagni and Maino, Rodolfo, 2015).  
Figure 2-2: Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%): Comparison with other developing 
regions and OECD 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015 
2.3.2 Stock markets in SSA 
 As noted earlier, not all countries in SSA have stock markets and many of the stock markets in SSA 
were only established in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Exceptions are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, 
Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire10  whose markets were established in 1887, 1946, 1954, 1961, and 1976 
respectively. A number of reasons have been given to justify establishing stock markets in SSA. Besides 
                                                 
10 Cote d’Ivoire currently serves as a regional stock market for the West African region 
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the view that establishment of stock markets is a global trend and SSA countries should not be left behind, 
stock market development  is seen as a natural progression of a financial sector development (Singh, 
1991). It is also an avenue through which developing countries can attract foreign portfolio investments. 
Nevertheless, stock markets in SSA have not experienced the same developments as developed and 
emerging economies. This has partly been attributed to a weak financial infrastructure, fear of political 
upheavals, bureaucratic inertia with weak regulation and slow clearance procedures, limited choice of 
companies to invest in due to limited listings and a lack of domestic participation. Domestic participation 
is thought to be one way to boost credibility of stock markets and act as a cushion against external capital 
flows (Kenny and Moss, 1998). Addressing the above issues could lead to investor confidence, thus, 
boosting active participation in the stock markets. 
Figures 2-3a and 2-3b show the trend in market capitalisation and value traded as ratios of GDP 
respectively. There has been an increase in the total value of the shares listed in the various stock markets, 
as seen by the ratio of stock market capitalisation. For example, the ratio increased from around 7 percent 
to 29 percent in Botswana between 1992 and 2012. During the same period, it increased from 6 percent 
to 25 percent in Kenya and 1.2 percent to 8 percent in Ghana. However, there was a significant drop in 
stock market capitalisation for most countries in 2007/2008, which coincides with the global financial 
crisis. South Africa dominates other countries, with an average of 176% during the same period (see note 
for the figure). The average stock market capitalisation relative to economic activity for the sample 
countries (including South Africa and Mauritius) is 30 percent. However, it is a mere 18 percent when 
we exclude South Africa and Mauritius. 
Stock market activity (measured by the ratio of stock market value traded to GDP) is also dismal in 
almost all markets. Figure 3b shows that, on average, stock market value traded relative to GDP is below 
5 percent. South Africa is exceptional, with an average ratio of stock market value traded relative to GDP 
of 39 percent (not shown on graph). Kenya has an average of 1.2 percent, while in Nigeria, the average 
is 2.13 per cent. Another feature of stock markets in SSA is the high volatility of trades. For example, 
while the average for the whole period in Nigeria is 2.13 per cent, it recorded a value traded of 9 percent 
of GDP in 2008, but this fell to 1.3 percent in 2010. Likewise, Zimbabwe had an average value traded of 




Figure 2-3: Ratio of Stock Market Capitalisation and Value traded to GDP (%) 
(a) Ratio of Stock Market Capitalisation to GDP (%) 
 
(b) Ratio of Stock Market Value Traded to GDP (%) 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database, 2016 
We have excluded South Africa and Zimbabwe in fig 3a because i) South Africa has very high values and ii) Zimbabwe has 
two extreme data points, making the graph unreadable. In Fig 3b, we also exclude South Africa and Zimbabwe for the same 
reasons, and exclude Swaziland for an extreme data point in 1997 that distorts the graph. These graphs for South Africa are 
presented in appendix A.4. We also allow one data point for Nigeria to extend above the graph to make the graph readable. 
These data points, are however, not excluded from the analysis 
Compared to other developing regions and the OECD (see figures 2-4a and b), SSA seems to be better 
capitalised than the other developing regions but less so than the OECD. What is most notable is that 
even though SSA is better capitalised than East Asia and the Pacific, the latter has more active markets 
than SSA, as seen in the ratio of stock market value traded to GDP (figure 2-4b). This illustrates the 
observation that countries can have large but relatively inactive stock markets (Levine and others, 1999). 
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Figure 2-4: Comparison of stock market indicators 
(a) Stock market capitalisation (% of GDP): Comparison with other developing regions and OECD 
 
(b) Stock market value traded (% of GDP): Comparison with other developing regions and OECD 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
From the figure 2.4, it is evident that countries in SSA have seen a remarked increase in the size of their 
stock markets (as measured by the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP), which has been higher 
than other developing countries. However, excluding South Africa and Mauritius, banking sector 
development is more rapid, with the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP averaging 
21%, compared to the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP, which has an average ratio of 18%. 
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This implies that the financial sector in the region is more bank-based. When we compare stock market 
activity with banking sector activity, we also find that the dismal activity in stock markets, despite their 
size, is an indication of more reliance on the banking sector. It is because of the underdevelopment of the 
stock markets in most of the countries that banks tend to play the primary role in their financial systems. 
Should developments in the stock markets continue at the pace recorded after 2000, there is a possibility 
that countries could see a move towards more market-based financial systems. However, this has to go 
hand in hand with a strengthened financial infrastructure, enforcement of financial laws and regulations, 
and macroeconomic and political stability. 
The above analysis also shows that, despite the generalisations of financial sectors in SSA, there are 
marked heterogeneities, with South Africa and Mauritius having more developed financial systems 
relative to the other countries in the sample. It will therefore be important in our analysis to exclude the 
two countries, for a robustness check. 
2.4 Model specification, Methodology and Data 
2.4.1 Model specification and methodology 
To empirically examine the long-run relationship between growth and financial structure, we adopt a 
standard growth model, following the work of Levine (2002). The standard growth model establishes a 
behavioural relationship among the variables of interest, from which we can derive a production function. 
Where A is a measure of technological efficiency. In order to identify the role of financial structure (FS), 
we augment the above equation with indicators of financial structure. Expressing the relationship 
between economic growth and financial structure in equation form gives us equation (2-1) below. 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2-1) 
 
Where;  𝑖 = 1,2......N and t = 1,2......T                      
 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡= financial structure 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = control variables  
 𝑖𝑡  = the error term.  
Equation (2-1) is our estimation equation and, from it, we are interested in both the sign and significance 
of β1 as 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡  is our key indicator variable for financial structure. A significant β1 implies that financial 
structure matters for growth. A positive and significant coefficient implies that a market based system is 
more important for growth than a bank based system. A negative and significant sign implies that a bank 
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based system is more important for growth than a market based system (Levine, 2002; Luintel et al., 
2008). 
Several indicators have been used in the literature as proxies for the banking sector and stock market 
development. Given the lack of consensus on the best measures of bank and stock market development, 
studies have relied on indicators that approximate different aspects of these two channels (Gambacorta, 
Yang and Tsatsaronis, 2014). The indicator of financial structure captures the development of both the 
banking system and the stock market. The most commonly used indicator from the banking sector is the 
ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) (PCR). The ratio of stock market capitalisation 
to GDP (%) (Mktcap) as a measure of the size of the stock market, and the ratio of stock market value 
traded to GDP (%) (Vtraded) as a measure of stock market activity are the most commonly used 
indicators for the stock market (See for example Arestis et al. (2004); Beck & Levine (2002); Levine 
(2002); Luintel et al. (2008)). 
The two components of the financial structure used in this study are financial structure size (FSsize) and 
financial structure activity (FSactivity) and are derived as shown below: 
 










𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 is the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP 
𝑣𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 is the ratio of stock market value traded to GDP  
𝑃𝐶𝑅 is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
There are different ways to obtain the overall index from the above components, including taking the 
first principal component as done by (Beck, Maksimovic, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, (2000); Levine, 
(2002); Luintel et al. (2008). For this study, we use equation (2-4) below, adopted from D. S. Allen & 
Ndikumana (2000)11. This method is preferred to the first principal component method, as the latter 
assumes that the direction with the largest variance is the most important. It is thus difficult to tell which 
component is contributing the most to the index. 
                                                 













Where j = 1, 2; i = 1 ,2.....,N 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the respective component of financial structure (size and activity) 
𝐹𝑆̅̅̅̅ 𝑗
 is the sample mean of 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 
m is the total number of indicators used to generate the overall financial structure. Larger values for the 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 indicate a more market-based financial system. 
Establishing the determinants of growth is an open ended research agenda, and Levine & Renelt (1992) 
note that there is no consensus on a conditioning set of explanatory variables in growth regressions. They 
highlight over 50 explanatory variables identified in the literature. However, researchers generally use 
only a small subset of these. Growth related empirical studies predict that, besides capital and labour, as 
used in the Solow model (Solow, 1956), there are other factors that affect growth in a country. These 
explanatory variables include fiscal policy variables, e.g. government expenditure, investment, trade 
policy indicators, e.g. exports, imports and exchange rate, and monetary and political indicators e.g. 
inflation, coups and revolutions, black market premium. (Mankiw, Romer, & Weil (1990) and Romer, 
(1990) also include human capital in their estimation. For example, in Africa the lack of trade openness, 
low levels of social capital, poor infrastructure, and high risk environment have been found to slow 
growth (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Other indicators include extent of democracy and rule of law, 
fertility rates, life expectancy, infrastructure, ethnic strife, restrictive financial infrastructure, and human 
and physical capital (Kenny and Moss, 1998; Kodongo and Ojah, 2016). It is therefore important that 
our control variables include these specific indicators.  
Hence, for this study, and based on data availability, we include life expectancy (lexpectancy) to proxy 
human capital, and democracy and rule of law (polity), government consumption (Govcons) to proxy for 
the size of government, degree of openness in a country (Openness), and inflation (infl) to proxy for 
macroeconomic stability. From equation (2-1), and incorporating our conditioning set, the empirical 
model to be estimated is expressed as; 




The literature suggests that more financially developed countries tend to be more market-based. We 
therefore control for the level of financial development in our estimation, to check if financial 
development absorbs some of the effects of financial structure. This will be tested by estimating equation 
(2-6) below. 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 
(2-6) 
𝐹𝐷 𝑖𝑡  captures the level of financial development and, as in Levine (2002), this study makes use of the 
ratio of credit to the private sector by deposit money banks to GDP as a proxy for financial development. 
In choosing the most appropriate estimation method, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and 
the Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) were considered due to their applicability in dynamic panel 
estimation. However, the GMM method yields inconsistent estimates when the variables are non-
stationary compared to the ARDL method, which produces consistent results, irrespective of whether the 
variables are I (0) or I (1). Moreover, while the GMM method is most suitable in panels with small T 
compared to the ARDL, Pesaran et al. (1999) consider the application of the ARDL method when both 
panel dynamics (N and T) are small, and point out that the choice of the lag order is very important for 
such an application. For these reasons, the ARDL method was the most preferred and was therefore used 
for the study.  
The ARDL specification allows for a dynamic structure of the model, and is commonly used for 
estimating both short run and long run dynamics. To determine the appropriate lag length, we make use 
of the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). Based on these 
lag selection criteria, and assuming an ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1), equation (2-1) can be rewritten in its dynamic 
form to yield equation (2-7) (For notation purposes, we denote all the control variables as X). 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿20𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿21𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡  (2-7) 
Expressing the above equation in its error correction form yields; 
 Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0 − 𝜃1𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿10Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20Δ𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2-8) 
Where; 
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𝜙𝑖 = −(1 − 𝜆); 𝜃0 =
𝛼
1−𝜆
 ; 𝜃1 =
𝛿10+𝛿11
1−𝜆
 ; 𝜃2 =
𝛿20+𝛿21
1−𝜆
 ; Δ Denotes first differences; 𝑖𝑡 = the 
error term; and 𝜑  = Error correction term (ECT); 𝜃  = long-run elasticities, and 𝛿𝑖  = the short-run 
coefficients. 
For a long-run relationship to exist, 𝜑 ≠ 0 (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999). Its magnitude represents the 
speed of adjustment back to the long-run after a change in one of the explanatory variables. 
The above model requires that the error term, 𝑖𝑡 is independently distributed across time and across the 
group, and that it bears the usual assumption of zero mean and constant variance. A number of procedures 
have been developed that enable researchers to estimate the average long-run effects in panel data, as 
discussed in (Hsiao, Pesaran, Lahiri & Lee (Eds) (1999). These methods include i) Estimating separate 
regressions for each group and averaging the long-run coefficients over groups (Mean Group (MG) 
Estimation), ii) Pooling separate regressions by imposing a common slope, where the long-run 
relationship is estimated using fixed or random effects pooled regression, iii) Averaging the data over 
groups and estimating aggregate time-series regressions based on group averages, and iv) Averaging the 
data over time and estimating cross section regressions based on long time averages. However, these 
methods face a number of shortcomings. Pesaran & Smith (1995) show that the pooled and the aggregate 
time-series estimators are not consistent in dynamic heterogeneous panels even for large T and large N. 
Furthermore, Pesaran, Smith, & Im, (1996) show that the MG estimator does not take into account the 
panel dimensions of the data, and could therefore be seriously biased for small T, especially when T is 
small relative to N. Similarly, the pooled estimation methods can produce inconsistent and potentially 
misleading estimates of the average values of the parameters in dynamic models, unless the slope 
coefficients are identical. 
Pesaran et al. (1999) propose an intermediate method, the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. This, 
considers both pooling and averaging so that it allows the short-run coefficients to vary across countries, 
while restricting the long-run coefficients to homogeneity. The rationale for this estimator is that there 
are good enough reasons to expect the long-run equilibrium relationships between variables to be similar 
across groups. Its applicability in the Solow growth model is justified by the assumption that countries 
are exposed to the same technologies, making the long-run production function parameters similar. The 
estimator is based on maximum likelihood estimation and assumes that variables are either I (1) or I (0). 
The PMG estimator is suitable when both the number of cross sections and time periods are large. 
However, Pesaran et al. (1999) consider its application when both panel dynamics (N and T) are small, 
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and point out that the choice of the lag order is very important for such an application. These features of 
the PMG estimator thus make it more appealing for application in this study. Nevertheless, the 
homogeneity restrictions of the long-run coefficients will be tested using the Hausman specification test. 
This will entail comparing the MG and the PMG coefficient estimations. Pesaran et al. (1999) note that 
the PMG estimator is consistent and more efficient than the MG estimator, provided the homogeneity 
assumption holds. If this assumption does not hold, the MG estimator is more efficient. In both cases, 
the MG estimators are consistent. 
Panel unit root test 
The ARDL method does not require pretesting the data for the presence of unit roots, because the PMG 
estimator produces consistent results, irrespective of whether the variables are I (0) or I (1). But this is 
not the case if integration is higher than 1. In order to confirm the absence of I (2) variables, we use the 
Fisher-Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Fisher-Phillips Perron (PP) tests to test for panel unit roots. 
The advantage of the Fisher type test is that it does not require a balanced panel required by other tests12. 
The basic framework is given by; 
 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡 (2-9) 
Where; 
 𝐻0: 𝜌𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖   and  𝐻1: 𝜌𝑖 < 0;  
 𝑖 = 1,2, … . . 𝑁; 𝜌𝑖 = 0, 𝑖 = 𝑁1 + 1, 𝑁1 + 2, … . . 𝑁 
The Fisher type test entails combining the ρ values from the individual panels using the method proposed 
by Choi (2001) and Maddala and Wu (2001) as cited in Baltagi (2005), to obtain an overall test statistic. 
The test is then given by; 
 




                                                 
12 For example, the test by Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), Levin-Lin-chu (LLC).  
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The combined 𝜌-values from the unit root tests for each cross section are then used to test the unit root 
for the panel. If the 𝜌-value obtained is less than 0.05, then we reject the null hypothesis that the series 
is stationary at the 5% level of significance.  
2.4.2 Data 
The data used in this study is for a panel of 14 countries from SSA for the period 1980 - 2014, obtained 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Global Financial Development 
Database (GFDD). As stock market data for some countries is not available for the whole time period, 
the actual length of data ranges from 15 to 34 years, with an average of 22 years. As noted by (Pesaran 
et al. (1999), the time period must be long enough to allow for time-series estimations for each country, 
but need not be the same time period for each country. We therefore proceed with an unbalanced panel. 
The list of countries included in the study is provided in appendix A.2. 
 
Our estimation includes economic and financial variables. Economic data, which constitutes our control 
variables, is obtained from WDI, while financial data is obtained from GFDD. The advantage of 
obtaining financial data from the GFDD is that it has already been adjusted to account for stock and flow 
variables, which has been a flaw in previous literature on financial structure and growth, e.g Levine, 
(2002). The main variables of interest for this study include logged real per capita GDP, which is our 
proxy for economic growth, private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) (PCR) from the banking 
sector, stock market capitalisation to GDP (%) (Mktcap), and stock market value traded to GDP (%) 
(Vtraded) from the stock market. Variables from the banking sector and the stock market will be used in 
the construction of our financial structure indicator. Our measure of democracy and rule of law (polity) 
is obtained from Polity IV, and is a measure of a country’s governance system. 
Further details about the data, sources and descriptions are provided in appendix A.1. 
2.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
As noted earlier, SSA is characterised by low levels of financial development, and this can be seen from 
the low ratios of the financial variables displayed in table 2-1. For example, the average ratio of private 
credit by deposit money banks to GDP (PCR) is 25% and ranges from 3% to 102%. This wide disparity 
is because the sample includes 5 countries13 with averages of less than or equal to 10%, and South Africa 
and Mauritius, which have average ratios of 58% and 62% respectively. This is a reflection of the wide 
                                                 
13 Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia 
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disparities in the levels of financial development in the region. The same disparities are displayed in the 
level of stock market development, as seen in the ratios of stock market capitalization (Mktcap) and stock 
market value traded to GDP (Vtraded). For example, Mktcap ranges from 0.01% to 488%. It is important 
to note that this extreme maximum value reflects an extreme value in Zimbabwe recorded in 2006 which 
will exaggerate the average stock market capitalisation. Stock market value traded, on the other hand, 
ranges from 0% (no activity) to the active South African stock market. The sample used in this study 
therefore consists of countries with different characteristics driven by different policies, and diverse 
historical backgrounds. The standard deviations show high variation in the real per capita GDP which 
further implies large differences in the income levels of the sample, which accounts for heterogeneity in 
our estimations. 
Table 2-1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
RPCGDP 323 2,082.78 2,050.86 205.43 7,116.59 
PCR 323 25.06 20.41 2.59 102.54 
Mktcap 323 35.78 56.53 0.01 487.82 
Vtraded 323 4.58 12.39 0 75.47 
FSindex 323 3.82 1.3 -0.27 7.59 
Inflation 323 94.23 1,359.00 -0.81 24,411.00 
Life expectancy 323 54.9 7.48 40.68 74.19 
Govcons 321 15.63 5.01 2.05 30.07 
Openness 323 77.01 30.79 30.89 202.85 
Polity 323 2.46 5.9 -9 10 
 
RPCGDP=Real per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars, PCR = private credit by deposit money banks to GDP(%), 
Openness=trade openness (ratio of exports + imports to GDP), Polity=measure of democracy ranging from -10 (least 
democratic) to 10 (most democratic), Mktcap=Stock market capitalisation to GDP(%), Vtraded= Stock market value 
traded to GDP(%) 
The correlation coefficients (appendix A.3) display the relationship between the explanatory variables 
and per capita GDP. Real per capita GDP and private credit by deposit money banks (PCR), stock market 
value traded (Vtraded) and stock market capitalization (Mktcap) are positively and significantly 
correlated. This positive correlation implies that developments in the banking sector as well as in the 
stock markets may have a positive effect on growth. However, correlation may not always imply 
causation, and further analysis is required to establish if this positive correlation is indeed an indication 
of positive effects of finance on growth. 
The results of the stationarity test shown in table 2-2 show that our data contains both I(0) and I(1) 
variables. This is an indication that we have both stationary and non-stationary variables. We employ 
both the ADF and the PP tests, with the ADF showing that FSindex, inflation, life expectancy, and 
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government consumption are all stationary with real per capita GDP, PCR and openness 1st difference 
stationary. The Phillip-Perron, however, shows that FSindex and life expectancy are not stationary. 
Table 2-2: Unit root test results 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
RPCGDP=Real per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars, PCR = private credit by deposit money banks to GDP(%), 
Govcons= government final consumption expenditure to GDP(%), Openness=trade openness (ratio of exports + imports to 
GDP), Polity=measure of democracy ranging from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic), Mktcap=Stock market 
capitalisation to GDP(%), Vtraded= Stock market value traded to GDP(%) 
2.5 Estimation results 
Four sets of results using the PMG, MG and DFE estimation procedures are discussed in this section. 
Tables 2-4 and 2-5 depict the results including the full sample, first excluding and then including the 
indicator of financial development. On the basis that South Africa and Mauritius appear as outliers, 
results excluding these two countries are presented in tables 2-6 and 2-7, first excluding and then 
including an indicator of financial development.  
Our sample of countries with stock markets is small and the time period of available data fairly 
narrow.(Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999) show that the choice of the lag order is very important in 
estimations with small T. This section thus covers our attempt to establish the optimal lag length using 
Variable Level Level




-1.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000









-0.149 0.000 -0.2536 0.000
INFLATION -5.9001*** I(0) -6.8754*** I(0)
0.000 0.000
LIFE EXPECTANCY -22.0226*** I(0) 3.6064 0.7133
0.00 -0.9998 -0.7622
GOVCONS -3.0730*** I(0) -3.0924*** I(0)
-0.0011 -0.001
OPENNESS -1.2404 -10.4536 I(1) -1.8357** I(0)
-0.1074 0.000 -0.0332
POLITY 0.5594 -8.3915 I(1) 0.9919 -11.0103 I(1)
-0.7121 0.000 -0.8394 0.000
ADF PP
1st di fference Order of
integration
1st di fference Order of
integration
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the AIC and BIC selection criteria. Table 2-3 shows that a maximum lag of 1 has the smallest AIC and 
BIC values, implying that an ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1) is the preferred model. 
Table 2-3: Lag selection criteria 
 
Columns (1), (2) and (3) of table 2-4 present the first set of results. To correct for heteroscedasticity, the 
DFE results in column (3) have been adjusted with robust standard errors. The MG and DFE results 
(columns 2 and 3) indicate that the error correction term is negative and significant at the 1 percent 
significance level. This confirms that there is cointegration. The PMG results (column 1) are, however, 
inconsistent with the MG and the DFE results, with the results indicating an insignificant error correction 
term. The Hausman specification aids in selecting the preferred model, and the results shown at the 
bottom of the table reject the null hypothesis of simultaneity bias of the DFE that could arise due to the 
relationship between the error term and the lagged dependent variable. This implies that the DFE results 
are preferred to the MG results. 
The results show that financial structure has no significant effect on growth, implying that financial 
structure does not matter for long-run growth. These results are consistent with existing literature (see 
Levine 2002; Beck & Levine 2002) which suggests that there is no economic significance of classifying 
a country’s financial system as either bank-based or market-based. The control variables (of column 3) 
have the expected signs and significance. For example, inflation has a negative and significant effect on 
growth and a 10 percent increase in inflation leads to a 0.03 percent decline in growth. This is significant 
at 1 percent. An improvement in life expectancy, which is a proxy for human capital, has a positive effect 
on growth at 1 percent significance level, and likewise, an improvement in political governance will lead 
to a positive effect on growth. This is similar to findings by Kodongo & Ojah (2016), who show that 
democracy and rule of law have a positive and significant effect on growth, moreso in SSA. Government 
expenditure has a negative and significant effect on growth and a 10 percent increase in government 
expenditure leads to a 6 percent decline in growth.  
Estimator Lag selection N AIC BIC N AIC BIC
ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1) 307 -1621.8 -1569.63 250 -1304.3 -1254.998
ARDL (2,2,2,2,2,2) 307 -1371.63 -1326.95 238 -1105.55 -1056.937
ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1) 307 -1892.71 -1847.99 250 -1610.2 -1571.466
ARDL (2,2,2,2,2,2) 307 -1610.2 -1565.52 238 -1254.6 -1216.405
MG
Including South Africa and 
Mauritius




Table 2-4: Financial structure and economic growth for the full sample excluding financial 
development 
 PMG MG DFE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
FSINDEX 0.008 0.0353 -0.0825 
 (0.0103) (0.0259) (0.0719) 
Inflation 0.0000158 0,00861    -0.00034*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0083) (0.0001) 
Life expectancy 1.636*** 2.503** 2.525*** 
 (0.1600) (1.1560) (0.8370) 
Govcons 0.301*** 0.936 -0.599* 
 (0.0799) (0.8400) (0.3240) 
Openness 0.458*** 0.0156     0.481 
 (0.0999) (0.5860) (0.3820) 
Polity 0.00973* 0.00847 0.0976*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0074) (0.0350) 
ECT -0.0573 -0.550***    -0.0374*** 
 (0.0371) (0.1040) (0.0123) 
Constant -0.161 -1.175 -0.108 
 (0.1000) (1.3980) (0.1250) 
Hausman 3.61 0.02  
Prob>chi2 0.7295 1.0000  
Observations 307 307  
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
RPCGDP=Real per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars, FSIndex =conglomerate measure of financial structure 
comprising of FS_activity and FS_Size, Govcons= government final consumption expenditure to GDP(%), Openness=trade 
openness (ratio of exports + imports to GDP), Polity = political governance 
 
Columns (1), (2) and (3) of table 2-5 depict results, including an indicator of financial development. The 
ratio of credit to the private sector by deposit money banks to GDP has been used in the literature to 
measure financial development (see King & Levine 1993; Levine 2002). However, we suspect that there 
could be a high correlation between the financial structure indicator and the measure of financial 
development. However, the correlation coefficient results (appendix A.3) show that this is not the case, 
and the ratio of credit to the private sector by deposit money banks to GDP (PCR) is thus used. 
Furthermore, PCR represents the productive aspect of finance that is used for investment purposes and 
is therefore more closely linked to economic growth than other variables that have been used in the 
literature to measure financial development. These include the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio 
of broad money to GDP (M3/GDP), and the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP (see, for example, 
Allen & Ndikumana 2000). 
The PMG, MG and DFE results are depicted in columns (1), (2) and (3) respectively of table 2-5. Like 
in the previous estimation, the DFE results are corrected for heteroscedasticity with robust standard 
errors. The PMG and DFE results depict an insignificant effect of financial structure on growth, 
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consistent with the results shown in table 2-4. Column (2) however depicts a significant a significant 
effect of financial structure on growth. The Hausman specification test aids in establishing the most 
preferred model based on efficiency and consistency of the estimates.  
Table 2-5: Results on financial structure and economic growth for the full sample including financial 
development 
VARIABLES PMG MG DFE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
FSindex -0.00612 0.0405*** -0.0521 
 (0.0065) (0.0149) (0.0783) 
PCR -0.139*** -0.0363 0.082 
 (0.0222) (0.1830) (0.2200) 
Inflation -0.0000219 -0.00452 -0.000351** 
 (0.0000) (0.0028) (0.0001) 
Life expectancy 2.328*** 0.567 2.565** 
 (0.0987) (0.8540) (1.1710) 
Govcons 0.132*** 0.0111 -0.604* 
 (0.0185) (0.2230) (0.3600) 
Openness 0.0687** -0.0116 0.47 
 (0.0277) (0.0912) (0.4630) 
Polity 0.0251*** 0.0167* 0.0879** 
 (0.0073) (0.0089) (0.0408) 
ECT -0.160* -0.601*** -0.0356** 
 (0.0943) (0.1560) (0.0144) 
Constant -0.532 0.459 -0.118 
 (0.3350) (1.7960) (0.1490) 
Hausman 7.65 0.00  
Prob>chi2 0.3647 1.0000  
Observations 307 307 307 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
RPCGDP=Real per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars, FSIndex =conglomerate measure of financial structure 
comprising of FS_activity and FS_Size, Govcons= government final consumption expenditure to GDP(%), 
Openness=trade openness (ratio of exports + imports to GDP), Polity = political governance 
 
As shown in the table, the Hausman test indicates that the PMG results are more efficient than the MG 
results, and the null hypothesis of no difference between PMG and MG cannot be rejected. Likewise, the 
Hausman test between the MG and the DFE indicates that the DFE is preferred to MG. 
Despite the consistent results showing insignificant effects of financial structure on growth, the results 
also show that financial development has a negative and significant effect on growth (column 1). This is 
inconsistent with existing views, which postulate that the provision of financial services is what matters 
for economic growth, and not whether these services are provided by banks or stock markets. The 
expectation from literature, therefore, would be a positive and significant effect of financial development 
on growth, and an insignificant effect of financial structure. This expectation supports the financial 
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services view. We argue that, while the results on column 1 of table 2-5 are contrary to expectations, it 
has been shown that a restrictive financial infrastructure can be a barrier to development (Kenny and 
Moss, 1998). Given the low levels of financial development in SSA, it is therefore not surprising to see 
a negative effect of financial development on growth. A well functioning financial sector is a necessary 
condition for positive gains to be felt on the economy. Furthermore, emerging evidence points to limited 
support for the relationship between financial sector development and growth in Africa (Gries, Kraft and 
Meierrieks, 2009; Menyah, Nazlioglu and Wolde-Rufael, 2014). Moreover, Favarra (2009) concludes 
that the relationship between financial development and growth is at best weak, and that finance matters 
for growth at the intermediate level, where financial sectors are relatively well development. 
The results also indicate that an improvement in life expectancy and political governance has a positive 
and significant effect on growth (columns 1 and 3). Inflation on both columns has the expected negative 
sign, but it is insignificant from the PMG results. Likewise, trade openness has the expected positive sign 
from the PMG and DFE estimations, implying that it has a positive effect on growth. However, DFE 
results (column 3) depict an insignificant effect.  
The error correction term is negative and significant in all the estimations, albeit with different speeds of 
adjustment. The negative and significant coefficient implies that there is cointegration with the PMG 
results, showing that 16 percent of the disequilibrium is eliminated in each short-term period. The DFE 
results in column 3, however, depict a slower rate of convergence to long-run equilibrium at 3 percent.  
Excluding South Africa and Mauritius yields results consistent results with those shown in tables 2-4 and 
2-5. These results are depicted in columns (1), (2) and (3) of table 2-6. Financial structure still shows an 
insignificant effect on growth from all three estimations (PMG, MG and DFE). The Hausman 
specification test shows that PMG is preferred over MG and that DFE is preferred over MG. The DFE 
results have been corrected for heteroscedasticity with robust standard errors. In all the estimations, the 
error correction term is negative and significant, implying that there is cointegration. Comparing the DFE 
results in tables 2-4 and 2-6 (column 3 in both tables), reveals that the results in table 2-6 depict slightly 
smaller magnitudes, with a faster speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. While results in table 






Table 2-6: Financial structure and economic growth excluding South Africa and Mauritius 
VARIABLES PMG MG DFE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
FSindex 0.0132 0.0192 -0.0821 
 (0.0111) (0.0276) (0.0555) 
Inflation 1.57E-05 0.0115 -0.000236*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0090) (0.0001) 
Life expectancy 1.519*** 1.837* 2.492*** 
 (0.1630) (1.0600) (0.6850) 
Govcons 0.307*** 1.118 -0.418* 
 (0.0840) (0.9910) (0.2320) 
Openness 0.468*** -0.127 0.204 
 (0.1020) (0.6350) (0.2900) 
Polity 0.0113** 0.0107 0.0680*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0083) (0.0229) 
ECT -0.0754* -0.567*** -0.0518*** 
 (0.0403) (0.1180) (0.0151) 
Constant -0.170* -1.145 -0.118 
 (0.0966) (1.4260) (0.1370) 
Hausman 4.37 0.02  
Prob>chi2 0.6261 1.000  
Observations 250 250 250 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
RPCGDP=Real per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars, FSIndex =conglomerate measure of financial structure 
comprising of FS_activity and FS_Size, Govcons= government final consumption expenditure to GDP(%), 
Openness=trade openness (ratio of exports + imports to GDP), Polity = political governance 
 
The signs and significance of the control variables are consistent with those obtained when we include 
South Africa and Mauritius. For example, an improvement in life expectancy and political governance 
has a positive and significant effect on growth. Including South Africa and Mauritius therefore does not 
alter the DFE results. However, the PMG results (column 1) depict a negative and significant error 
correction term, which is inconsistent with the results in table 2-4 that exclude South Africa and 
Mauritius. Nevertheless, the insignificant effect of financial structure on growth is consistent with 
previous estimations.  
The final set of long-run results are presented in table 2-7, which exclude South Africa and Mauritius, 
but include financial development. As in previous results, financial structure has an insignificant effect 
on growth, as shown in columns (1) and (3) of table 2-7. Even though the results in column (2) show a 
significant effect of financial structure on growth, the Hausman results indicate that the PMG results 
(column 1) are preferred to the MG results (column 2), and that the DFE results (column 3) are preferred 
to the MG results. Comparing table 2-7 and table 2-5, the results indicate a faster adjustment speed to the 
long-run when South Africa and Mauritius are excluded, and financial development is included. The 
effect of financial development is found to be insignificant in the long-run. The results are inconsistent 
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with the financial services view that predicts a positive and significant effect of financial development 
on growth and an insignificant effect of financial structure on growth.  
The short-run results show that financial structure is consistently insignificant in 1014 of the 14 countries 
(appendix A.5 – A.7). In Zimbabwe, financial structure has a significant effect on growth, implying that 
financial structure matters in the short-run, as depicted in all the tables. The positive coefficient implies 
that the stock market is more conducive to growth in Zimbabwe than the banking sector. This is different 
for Malawi, where financial structure also has a significant effect on growth in the short-run, but the 
banking sector is found to be more conducive for growth than the stock market. It can be argued that the 
stock market in Malawi is young (established in 1996) compared to that of Zimbabwe (established in 
1946). Activity in the stock market in Malawi is also very low (at less than 1 percent) with stock market 
capitalisation of less than 10 percent (see figures 2-3a and 2-3b). Financial structure is also found to be 
significant in Swaziland, but this is only after including financial development in the estimation 
(appendix A.5 and A.7). In both tables, the positive sign implies that the stock market is more conducive 
to growth than the banking sector. 
Overall, the long-run results do not support the theories of financial structure. Specifically, the results do 
not support the bank-based view, the market-based view, or the financial services view. (See table 2-8 
for a summary of the long-run results). Financial structure does not matter for economic growth in the 
long-run, and this is consistent across all the estimations. Similar conclusions are found in Levine (2002) 







                                                 
14 Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia 
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Table 2-7: Financial structure and economic growth excluding South Africa and Mauritius and 
including financial development 
 PMG MG DFE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
FSindex 6.69E-05 0.0371** -0.0777 
 (0.0026) (0.0169) (0.0588) 
PCR -0.00527 -0.0615 -0.0511 
 (0.0094) (0.2070) (0.1530) 
Inflation -3.34e-05* -0.00324 -0.000247** 
 (0.0000) (0.0031) (0.0001) 
Life expectancy 1.687*** 0.495 2.657*** 
 (0.0267) (0.9830) (0.6600) 
Govcons -0.00801*** 0.0876 -0.431** 
 (0.0029) (0.2520) (0.2180) 
Openness 0.0836*** -0.0141 0.247 
 (0.0151) (0.1050) (0.2670) 
Polity -0.000123 0.0200* 0.0688** 
 (0.0012) (0.0105) (0.0278) 
ECT -0.241** -0.629*** -0.0498** 
 (0.1090) (0.1890) (0.0225) 
Constant -0.129* 0.124 -0.146 
 (00683) (21190) (0.1040) 
Hausman 6.38 0,00  
Prob>chi2 0.4967 1,000  
Observations 250 250 250 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
RPCGDP=Real per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars, FSIndex =conglomerate measure of financial structure 
comprising of FS_activity and FS_Size, Govcons= government final consumption expenditure to GDP(%), 
Openness=trade openness (ratio of exports + imports to GDP), Polity = political governance 
 
 
Table 2-8: Summary of the long-run results 
 Including South Africa and 
Mauritius 
Excluding South Africa and 
Mauritius 
Variable PMG results PMG results 
 Without FD With FD Without FD With FD 
FSINDEX Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
FD na - na Not significant 
Inflation Not significant Not significant Not significant - 
Life 
expectancy 
+ + + + 
Govcons + + + - 
Openness + + + + 
Polity + + + Not significant 





Robustness check  
Our results are robust to various sensitivity checks that include estimating the equations using the 
different components of financial structure (appendix A.4), sample grouping and exclusion/inclusion of 
financial development. From the summary on table 2-8, our results show that financial structure is 
consistently insignificant in all the four estimations, leading us to conclude that financial structure does 
not matter for the sample countries in our study. The PMG estimates in appendix A.4 also show that 
financial structure does not matter. These results were obtained from the individual components of 
financial structure (FS_activity and FS_size). Even though the FS_activity appears significant, the error 
correction term is not significant, and therefore we conclude that there is no long-run relationship. The 
results also show that FS_size has an insignificant effect, in line with the results obtained using the 
FSindex. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The effect of financial structure on growth has been widely researched, with inconclusive results. There 
has, however, been very little research on the effect of financial structure on growth in SSA, mainly 
because of the scarcity of data. Moreover, many stock markets in SSA are young compared to stock 
markets in developed countries. Using data from the recently updated GFDD, an extensive dataset of 
financial system characteristics for economies across the globe, this study tries to fill this gap in the 
literature by providing empirical evidence from SSA.  
The study was carried out using data from 14 countries covering 1980 – 2014. Using dynamic panel 
estimation methods, financial structure was found to have an insignificant effect on growth in the long-
run. This supports existing literature that shows that financial structure does not matter for growth, 
implying that there is no economic significance in classifying a country’s financial system as either bank-
based or market-based. The growth control variables used in the study were also found to have the 
expected sign and significance. For example, an increase in life expectancy and improvement in political 
governance were found to have a positive effect on growth, while high inflation was found to have a 
negative and significant effect on growth.  
Including financial development, or excluding Mauritius and South Africa as outliers in the model did 
not alter the results. The results that financial structure does not matter were consistent across all the 
long-run estimations.  As has been noted in the literature, stock markets in SSA are mainly a replication 
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of stock markets in the west, and therefore their establishment was not to meet the financial needs of the 
region. This could explain why financial structure does not matter in the long-run in the SSA region. 
Financial structure was also found to be consistently insignificant in the short-run for 10 of the 14 
countries (Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zambia). Furthermore, while a market-based system was found to be more conducive to 
growth in Zimbabwe, a bank-based system was found to be more beneficial for growth in Malawi. This 
finding from the short-run estimates implies that forcing equality of parameters by assuming 
homogeneity (as was done for the long-run results) may lead to misleading generalisations about the 
effect of financial structure on growth based on regional studies.  
The heterogeneous results found in the short-run provide evidence that results can vary considerably 
across countries depending on the institutional characteristics of the countries, as well as other country 
circumstances. The literature on cross country growth regressions reveals some scepticism around the 
robustness of econometric results derived from cross country regressions, and points out that there are 
econometric advantages in examining results from time-series analyses, as they provide useful insights 
from details that are hidden in averaged out cross country regressions. (see Levine & Renelt 1992; Arestis 
et al. 2001; Jones 1995 among others). This is the motivation for our research covered in chapter three, 
which provides evidence from Kenya.  
These results have important policy implications. While finance is important for economic growth, it is 
important for governments in SSA to focus on developing the banking sector to a level where it is able 
to support the financial needs of the economy, especially for small and micro enterprises, which are the 
engine for growth in the region. These enterprises have been shown not to participate in stock markets, 
because they do not meet the listing requirements. They therefore do not benefit from the existence of a 
stock market. However, the London Stock Exchange Alternative Investment Market (AIM) has in the 
past offered a platform for the listing of smaller growing firms from SSA looking to raise capital through 
Initial Public Offers (IPOs) (Tyson, 2015). The Exchange has also established partnerships with regional 
exchanges in SSA to provide technical support for capital market development in the region. Most 
recently, stock markets in SSA have begun establishing market segments that cater for SMEs. For 
example, Kenya, Zambia and Ghana opened up market segments for listing of SMEs in 2013, 2015 and 
2013 respectively. 
43 
For example, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa set up the AltX market for SMEs in 
2003, the Mauritius Stock Exchange set up a development and enterprise market for SMEs in 2006, 
Kenya, and Ghana15 opened up market segments for the listing of SMEs in 2013, and Zambia did the 
same in 2015. 
In countries with underdeveloped banking sectors, the priority should be to develop the banking sector 
first, and later on develop the stock market, with a focus on the alternative investment market segments 
targeted for SMEs. It is important to remove the bottlenecks that have hindered the banking sector from 
contributing to growth. 
A limitation of this study is the lack of a large enough sample size, due to data limitations. This restricted 
the analysis to 14 countries in a region that consists of 48 countries. As more data becomes available 
from countries with existing stock markets, and as countries expand access to finance, further research 
will be needed on the economic benefits of bank-based vs market-based financial systems in SSA. 
The study did not incorporate information from the recently established alternative investment market 
segments in some stock markets in the region, established to cater for SMEs in the region, again due to 
data limitations.  
 
  
                                                 




Appendix A   
A.1  Variable definition and data sources 
Variable abbreviation Description Source 
RPCGDP Real per capita GDP (constant 2005 USD) WDI, 2016 
PCR Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) GFDD, 2016 
Mktcap Stock market capitalisation to GDP (%) “ 
Vtraded Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) “ 
Inflation Inflation, Consumer price (annual %) WDI, 2016 
Life Expectancy Life expectancy at birth (years) “ 
Govcons General government final consumption expenditure (% GDP) “ 
Openness Trade (% GDP) “ 
Polity A measure of the system of a country’s system of governance. 
It ranges from -10 (total autocracy) to 10 (total democracy)        Polity IV 
 
WDI =World Development Indicators and GFDD = Global Financial Development Database 







Country Period RPCGDP PCR Mktcap Vtraded
Botswana 1990 - 2014 5,120.04 17.53 20.56 0.8
Cote d’Ivore 1989 - 2014 1,008.72 19.37 14.68 0.39
Ghana 1992 - 2014 513.78 10.34 9.76 0.39
Kenya 1989 - 2014 546.28 24.66 20.71 1.23
Malawi 1999 - 2014 235.93 7.11 16.38 0.52
Mauritius 1991 - 2014 4,929.19 62.8 42.86 2.25
Namibia 1994 - 2014 3,552.10 44.53 5.07 0.28
Nigeria 1989 - 2014 722.13 13.6 15.92 1.49
South Africa 1980 - 2014 5,302.59 58.68 152.11 28.53
Swaziland 1994 - 2014 2,302.29 16.9 9.57 2.64
Tanzania 1998 - 2014 456.94 10.05 4.1 0.11
Uganda 1999 - 2014 353.56 10.09 10.95 0.09
Zambia 1995 - 2014 731.7 8.46 12.84 0.14
Zimbabwe 1988 - 2014 557.28 16.83 76.34 8.9
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A.3  Correlation coefficients 
 
* denotes p<0.05 
 
A.4  Ratio of stock market capitalization and Value traded to GDP for South Africa 
 





Govcons  Openness Pol i ty
RPCGDP 1
Fs index 0.01 1
PCR 0.7517* 0.02 1
Mktcap 0.3213* 0.8274* 0.4615* 1
Vtraded 0.3811* 0.7529* 0.5297* 0.7705* 1
Inflation -0.06 0.1138* 0 0.08 0.09 1
Li fe expectancy 0.4629* -0.1394* 0.5414* 0.1513* 0.2031* -0.1 1
Govcons 0.4628* -0.09 0.3419* 0.02 0.1704* -0.2336* 0.2363* 1
Openness 0.4426* -0.08 0.2652* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.1902* 0.1739* 1
Pol i ty 0.4071* 0.1747* 0.3838* 0.3087* 0.4256* -0.0682 0.5324* 0.1404* 0.0507 1
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A.5  Long-run Estimation results using different components of FS_activity and FS_size 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
VARIABLES PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FS_Activity 0.107*** 0.053 -0.011 FS_Size 0.000353 0.0322* -0.0956
(0.0328) (0.0592) (0.0704) (0.0021) (0.0192) (0.0711)
Inflation -0.00741*** 0.0047 -0.000372** Inflation -1.90E-05 0.00764 -0.000363***
(0.0024) (0.0054) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0273) (0.0001)
Expectancy 0.851*** 2.723** 2.632*** Expectancy 1.672*** 2.175 2.399***
(0.1690) (1.2650) (0.8050) (0.0140) (4.0470) (0.8420)
Govcons 0.404*** 0.798 -0.637* Govcons -0.00860*** -3.411 -0.634*
(0.1230) (0.6790) (0.3720) (0.0025) (2.4730) (0.3430)
Openness 0.368*** -0.0436 0.426 Openness 0.0889*** -1.305 0.512
(0.1290) (0.4030) (0.3580) (0.0106) (2.2230) (0.3970)
Polity 0.00818 0.0316 0.0930** Polity 4.45E-05 -0.0148 0.0969***
(0.0062) (0.0267) (0.0389) (0.0011) (0.0202) (0.0355)
ECT -0.0377 -0.455*** -0.0362** ECT -0.189** -0.523*** -0.0360***
(0.0275) (0.1190) (0.0163) (0.0955) (0.1020) (0.0122)
Constant 0.0408 -0.264 -0.12 Constant -0.114** -1.178 -0.0982
(0.0371) (1.3890) (0.1610) (0.0566) (1.3750) (0.1250)
Hausman 12.64 0.00 Hausman 10.44 0.03
Prob>chi2 0.0492 1.000 Prob>chi2 0.1074 1.000
Observations 311 311 311 Observations 311 311 311
Estimation results using FS_Activity Estimation results using FS_SIZE
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A.6  Individual country short-run estimation results controlling for the level of financial 
development
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A.7  Individual country short-run estimation results estimated, excluding South Africa 
and Mauritius 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Variables Botswana Cote d'ivore Ghana Kenya Malawi Mauritius Namibia Nigeria
South 
Africa
Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
ECT -0.025 -0.256*** 0.0751** -0.0278 -0.113*** -0.00899 0.0703 -0.133** 0.0578*** -0.0438*** -1.325*** -0.289*** -0.105** -0.116*** 
(0.0195) (0.0589) (0.0349) (0.0392) (0.0304) (0.0115) (0.0688) (0.0581) (0.0202) (0.0111) (0.2100) (0.0628) (0.0471) (0.0263)
D.FSindex 0.0613*** 0.0243 -0.0019 -0.00316 -0.0259** 0.00832 0.0048 0.0355* 0.00597 0.00435*** 0.00986* -0.00396 -0.00883 0.0358** 
(0.0231) (0.0153) (0.0060) (0.0116) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0095) (0.0215) (0.0194) (0.0017) (0.0059) (0.0033) (0.0129) (0.0143)
D.PCR 0.0817* 0.048 -0.0727** -0.0661 -0.0627 -0.0281 -0.0111 -0.0202 -0.0164 0.0806*** 0.0705*** 0.0838** 0.0116 -0.0311
(0.0443) (0.0843) (0.0302) (0.0534) (0.0397) (0.0640) (0.1120) (0.0365) (0.0643) (0.0126) (0.0265) (0.0355) (0.0304) (0.0358)
D.Inflation 0.00792*** -0.00214** -0.000324 -0.000873** -0.00435*** -0.000195 -0.00134 -0.000632 -0.00228 0.000344 0.000884 0.000576 -0.000688 5.17e-06** 
(0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0051) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0000)
D.Expectancy -0.0504 -3.597*** -0.412 0.671* 2.907*** 1.216 0.49 6.683*** -0.391 0.187 -0.359 -2.239* 0.623 -0.852** 
(0.1810) (1.1230) (1.1320) (0.4040) (0.8600) (1.3000) (0.4630) (2.0580) (0.2630) (0.1420) (1.2970) (1.2220) (0.5570) (0.4030)
D.Gov -0.234*** -0.0335 0.0914*** -0.0299 0.0539* -0.171** 0.00676 0.0157 -0.0385 -0.0543*** -0.0889*** -0.024 -0.0224** 0.0258
(0.0590) (0.0475) (0.0236) (0.0548) (0.0312) (0.0700) (0.0872) (0.0306) (0.0934) (0.0135) (0.0243) (0.0147) (0.0097) (0.0314)
D.Openness 0.416*** 0.0411 -0.0077 -0.00734 0.0242 -0.0898* -0.0936 -0.0931** 0.157*** -0.0317** -0.0599*** 0.0129 0.0397 -0.0193
(0.0621) (0.0840) (0.0303) (0.0362) (0.0249) (0.0507) (0.1160) (0.0384) (0.0435) (0.0129) (0.0201) (0.0341) (0.0372) (0.0732)
D.Polity -0.0277 -0.00595** -0.00284 -0.00339** 0.0252*** Omitted Omitted -0.00617 -0.00413 Omitted omitted -0.00986*** -0.00468** -0.00303
(0.0219) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0049) 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0071) (0.0082) 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0117)
Constant -0.0159 -0.608*** 0.314** -0.0816 -0.533*** 0.0171 0.141 -0.368** 0.0669** -0.0502** -4.721*** -0.977*** -0.288** -0.346*** 
(0.0298) (0.1580) (0.1310) (0.1270) (0.1280) (0.0215) (0.1170) (0.1630) (0.0273) (0.0209) (0.6290) (0.2250) (0.1280) (0.0821)
Observations 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
Variables Botswana Cote d'ivore Ghana Kenya Malawi Namibia Nigeria Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
ECT -0.0395 -0.319*** 0.0964*** -0.0159 -0.0804*** 0.0984* -0.0428 -0.0821*** -0.0391 -0.331*** 0.0325 -0.183*** 
(0.0292) (0.0595) (0.0372) (0.0525) (0.0261) (0.0588) (0.0385) (0.0248) (0.0432) (0.0568) (0.0312) (0.0382)
D.FSindex 0.0362* 0.0126 -0.0031 0.00475 -0.00653 0.00531 0.0335 -0.00062 0.00208 -0.00760** -0.00425 0.0399*** 
(0.0205) (0.0146) (0.0061) (0.0114) (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0229) (0.0022) (0.0080) (0.0031) (0.0115) (0.0121)
D.Inflation 0.00813*** -0.00204** -0.000302 -0.000808** -0.00287*** -0.00133 -0.000725 0.000175 -0.00088 -0.000233 -0.000241 2.10E-06
(0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0048) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0000)
D.Expectancy 0.0846 -4.404*** -0.128 0.874*** 2.396*** 0.236 6.604*** 0.812*** 0.4 -0.532 1.805*** -1.588*** 
(0.2300) (1.0430) (1.1760) (0.2860) (0.4640) (0.4780) (2.0550) (0.2910) (0.8400) (1.1980) (0.3970) (0.4680)
D.Gov -0.194*** -0.045 0.108*** -0.0213 -0.00202 0.0328 -0.00166 -0.0357* 0.0176 0.00506 -0.00273 0.0138
(0.0561) (0.0484) (0.0274) (0.0553) (0.0232) (0.0866) (0.0306) (0.0210) (0.0269) (0.0134) (0.0106) (0.0276)
D.Openness 0.361*** -0.0474 -0.0311 -0.0284 -0.00782 -0.077 -0.104** -0.0202 0.028 -0.0634* 0.0393 -0.0729
(0.0599) (0.0733) (0.0293) (0.0365) (0.0218) (0.1120) (0.0431) (0.0192) (0.0264) (0.0336) (0.0384) (0.0664)
D.Polity -0.0238 -0.00607** 0.000666 -0.00338** 0.0326*** Omitted -0.00514 Omitted Omitted -0.00618** -0.00554** -0.00181
(0.0232) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0016) (0.0055) 0.0000 (0.0075) 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0106)
Constant -0.00934 -0.604* 0.312** -0.0345 -0.318*** 0.146 -0.0951 -0.0913 -0.0797 -0.860*** 0.0686 -0.474*** 
(0.0475) (0.3160) (0.1470) (0.1370) (0.0791) (0.1130) (0.0853) (0.0856) (0.1040) (0.2870) (0.0703) (0.1630)






A.8  Individual country short-run estimation results estimated, excluding South Africa 
and Mauritius, and controlling for the level of financial development 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Variables Botswana Cote d'ivore Ghana Kenya Malawi Namibia Nigeria Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
ECT -0.0308 -0.222*** 0.0623*** 0.00346 -0.147*** 0.0302 -0.120** -0.0509*** -0.262 -0.740*** -1.233*** -0.183*** 
(0.0238) (0.0755) (0.0224) (0.0658) (0.0368) (0.0948) (0.0527) (0.0135) (0.2400) (0.1210) (0.0825) (0.0324)
D.FSindex 0.0600** 0.0162 -0.00229 0.00132 -0.0250** 0.00346 0.0274 0.00400** -4.70E-05 -0.00244 0.00723** 0.0326*** 
(0.0233) (0.0185) (0.0055) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0099) (0.0218) (0.0016) (0.0079) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0126)
D.PCR 0.0837* -0.00401 -0.0665** -0.06 -0.0656* -0.0268 -0.0318 0.0740*** -0.0278 0.0269 -0.00254 -0.0507
(0.0454) (0.1000) (0.0288) (0.0536) (0.0381) (0.1260) (0.0367) (0.0125) (0.0359) (0.0334) (0.0108) (0.0323)
D.Inflation 0.00808*** -0.00209** -0.000267 -0.000899** -0.00448*** -0.000969 -0.000653 0.00039 -0.00071 0.000747* -0.00109*** 7.08e-06*** 
(0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0052) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000)
D.Expectancy -0.0744 -0.827 -0.912 0.908*** 2.834*** 0.676 9.212*** 0.0935 1.106 -4.854*** -4.321*** -1.147*** 
(0.1760) (1.0350) (1.0550) (0.2190) (0.8270) (0.5960) (2.2470) (0.1280) (0.9610) (1.4800) (0.4230) (0.3700)
D.Gov -0.233*** 0.0283 0.0809*** -0.0338 0.0660** -0.0112 0.0178 -0.0491*** 0.0235 -0.00177 0.00102 0.0224
(0.0589) (0.0547) (0.0224) (0.0573) (0.0305) (0.0875) (0.0304) (0.0134) (0.0300) (0.0148) (0.0031) (0.0280)
D.Openness 0.414*** 0.0115 -0.00257 -0.0118 0.0212 -0.0952 -0.0929** -0.0318** 0.0144 0.00228 -0.0229* -0.0403
(0.0626) (0.1020) (0.0289) (0.0367) (0.0240) (0.1190) (0.0385) (0.0131) (0.0314) (0.0317) (0.0125) (0.0657)
D.Polity -0.0262 -0.00249 -0.00296 -0.00332** 0.0271*** Omitted -0.00379 Omitted Omitted -0.00720** -0.000479 -0.00546
(0.0222) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0047) 0.0000 (0.0067) 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0105)
Constant 0.0609* -0.00272 0.1000*** 0.0112 -0.280*** -0.00536 -0.0632** 0.0503*** -0.251 -0.733*** -0.324*** -0.112*** 
(0.0315) (0.0150) (0.0237) (0.0513) (0.0528) (0.0881) (0.0275) (0.0120) (0.2470) (0.1360) (0.0834) (0.0236)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
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Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Kenyan Case Study  
 
3.1 Introduction 
As noted in chapter two, panel and cross sectional based studies on the effect of financial structure on 
economic growth generally conclude that financial structure does not matter for growth. However, 
Levine (1996) notes that cross sectional and panel based studies mask specific features of different 
countries. There is therefore a need for country-specific studies to augment results from cross sectional 
and panel studies. Research has shown that institutional characteristics and country-specific 
circumstances are instrumental in driving the effects that financial institutions have on economic growth 
(Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001), and that  a country must have the most suitable financial 
system, to benefit from it (Tadesse, 2002)16 .  One can therefore conclude that the effect of financial 
structure on economic growth is context-specific, which gives rise to the need for country specific case 
studies. This  is further motivated by findings from a study by Luintel et al. (2008) on 14 low and middle 
income countries. These showed that panel estimate parameters did not correspond to country specific 
estimates. To the best of my knowledge this is the first similar study, focused on Kenya in a time series 
setting. 
There are a limited number of empirical country case studies on financial structure and growth especially 
for developing countries, as well as a lack of consensus on the issue. This study therefore aims to 
contribute to the ongoing debate by focusing on Kenya, a developing country that has various features 
that make it an interesting case study. The contribution of this study is threefold. First, it provides 
empirical evidence for Kenya, a country that has not been the focus of any previous study. Second, it 
provides evidence on the independent role of banks on growth, the independent role of the stock market 
on growth and the role of financial structure on growth. Third, it makes use of an extended period of 
annual data as well as quarterly data that covers a more recent period.  
 
                                                 
16 The Growth and Enterprise Market (GEM) in Kenya, Lusaka Stock Exchange Alternative Market in Zambia and Ghana 
Alternative Market (GAM) in Ghana 
16 While banks and capital markets are not the only institutions that make up the financial sector, they have received the 
most attention in studies assessing the role of financial structure and growth.  
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Kenya has an extensively developed financial system by the standards of developing countries in Sub 
Saharan Africa (Beck, 2004)17 . Banking in its naïve form existed in Kenya long before formal banking 
was introduced during the colonial period, with the first bank established in 1896. Rapid expansion of 
the banking system occurred after independence, especially between 1966 – 1980.  The penetration of 
mobile banking into rural areas has also helped deepen the banking system by offering an easily 
accessible platform for bank transactions. The Kenyan stock market, established in 1954, has also seen 
tremendous growth, especially after 2002, following the establishment of a democratically elected 
government. This stock market is one of the oldest in the region, making Kenya a good case study. 
Besides consideration of the characteristics of the financial system, data availability was also important 
in the selection of country. 
Our study employs the Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds approach to co-integration by 
Pesaran & Shin, (1998) on Kenyan quarterly time-series data over the period 2002-2014, to establish if 
there exists a relationship between financial structure and economic growth, both in the short-run and the 
long-run. Like in previous studies, we first construct indicators of financial structure that stem from both 
the banking sector and the stock market 18  based on two aspects of financial structure, namely, size and 
activity. Three scenarios are considered, including, first, the independent role of the banking sector. 
Second, we investigate the independent role of the stock market. Finally, we ascertain the effect of the 
financial structure on economic growth.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 highlights both the theoretical and empirical 
literature, while section 3.3 provides an overview of the evolution of the financial system in Kenya. The 
methodology is presented in section 3.4, and results and discussion follow in section 3.5. Finally, section 
3.6 concludes.  
  
                                                 
17 See also, United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa (1966 – 04). 
A framework agenda for building and utilising critical capacities in Africa: A discussion draft. UN. 22nd  ECA Technical 
preparatory committee of the conference of ministers (1996, May 6 – 8, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), UN. ECA (31st session)  
18 We limit our investigation to banks and the stock market, because data is available on these institutions in Kenya. 
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3.2  Literature Review 
Banks and markets engage in a number of services geared towards provision of finance to the economy. 
Their services include mobilisation and pooling of savings, allocation of capital, risk management and 
diversification, enhancing corporate governance, and easing the exchange of goods and services (Levine, 
2005). The effectiveness of these services in promoting growth is dependent on the level of financial 
intermediation, the efficiency of this intermediation, and the composition of financial intermediation 
(Mwega, 2014). However, financial systems emerge and operate differently within and between 
countries. From the literature, there are various determinants of financial systems that explain why 
different structures emerge in different countries, and why structures change over time. These 
determinants include the political system, the legal origin of the institutions, the level of economic 
development, and social capital (Bhattacharyya, 2013). For example, Boot & Thakor, (1997) suggest that 
bank based systems provide inter-temporal risk sharing, whereas cross-sectional risk sharing is provided 
in market based systems. Such differences have led to arguments in favour of a well-developed banking 
system by some authors, while others favour a well-developed market based system. Another difference 
is found in the way banks and markets conduct their transactions.  
Empirical analyses have been undertaken on the independent role of stock markets in promoting growth 
(Atje and Jovanovic, 1993; Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001), the independent role of banks (King 
and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Petkovski and Kjosevski, 2014), and the combined role of both (Levine and 
Zervos, 1998; Beck and Levine, 2004). Using various indicators, these studies have broadened our 
understanding of the link between stock markets, the banking sector and economic growth, without 
concluding which one is more important.  
As mentioned earlier, conclusions from panel based studies may lead to incorrect inferences for the 
different panel units19 used (Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001). This is because panel based studies 
mask country specific characteristics, and also because of parameter heterogeneity across the panel units 
(Luintel et al., 2008). These heterogeneities are brought about by the different production structures, 
levels of banking, financial and capital market development, thus necessitating country specific analysis.  
To overcome these limitations, a number of time-series based studies have been carried out. Evidence 
from these studies shows that financial structure matters, not just for growth (Arestis, Luintel and Luintel, 
2004; Luintel et al., 2008) but it also influences the direction of causality between financial development 
                                                 
19 Countries, industries, and firms 
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and growth (Peia and Roszbach, 2014). Analysing five developed economies 20, Arestis et al. (2001) 
conclude that the effect of banks on growth is more powerful than the effect of stock markets, and that 
the effect of stock markets may have been exaggerated by studies that utilize cross country growth 
regressions. They use the log of stock market capitalisation and the log of domestic bank credit as ratios 
of GDP to infer stock market and banking sector development indicators, respectively. They argue that 
countries’ diverse institutional characteristics and circumstances mean that cross country growth 
regressions can only provide us with a general view of the relationship between finance and growth, and 
this can vary when considering individual countries. Furthermore, Arestis et al. (2004) conclude that 
financial structures exert a significant effect on the level of output in some countries, but not in others, 
in a sample of six developing countries. They show that market based systems have been more conducive 
for growth in Greece, Taiwan, South Korea and India, while bank based systems have favored growth in 
South Africa. In the Philippines, financial structure was insignificant in explaining growth.  
Case studies with a specific focus on Africa are scarce,21 and, like those from other regions, yield 
inconclusive results. Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa are among the most widely studied African 
countries, because of data availability, and also because stock markets in these countries have been in 
existence longer than in other countries in the region. In Nigeria, evidence shows that the effect of 
financial structure on growth is at best weak (Rateiwa & Aziakpono, 2016) or that it does not matter for 
economic growth (Olofin and Afangideh, 2008). These studies, however, use different indicator variables 
for financial structure, and different methodologies22 . Financial structure has been shown to be of 
economic significance in South Africa and Egypt, in research by (Rateiwa and Aziakpono, 2016). This 
study shows that this effect is positive and significant, and runs from financial structure to economic 
growth when FS_activity is used as a measure of financial structure in South Africa. This shows that a 
market-based financial system is more important in promoting growth in South Africa. In Egypt, 
however, the effect is negative and significant, and runs from economic growth to financial structure, 
implying that a bank-based system is more important for growth in that country, than a market-based 
system. These contradictory results call for additional evidence from other countries. 
Overall, a survey of the literature shows that there is no consensus on whether financial structure matters. 
As mentioned earlier, this lack of consensus could be attributed to the dynamic nature of financial 
                                                 
20 France, Germany, Japan, UK and USA 
21 A major reason for this is the absence of comprehensive data  
22 The study by Rateiwa & Aziakpono, 2016 is based on causality analysis using the Johansen Cointegration approach 
and Vector Error Correction method, while Olofin & Afangideh, 2008 use a macroeconometric method to capture 
relationships among the variables.  
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systems, as well as the lack of uniformly accepted measures of financial structure. This study adds to the 
literature by providing empirical evidence from Kenya, a developing country that is a particularly 
interesting case for analysing the financial structure and growth relationship as it is one of the most 
financially developed countries in SSA23. Its financial sector has experienced many reforms as well as 
financial innovations that have contributed to developing the financial system. These reforms are 
discussed in the overview of the Kenyan financial system in the section that follows.  
3.3  Institutional context of the financial system in Kenya  
This section highlights the structure of the Kenyan financial system, and developments in this system. 
Like other financial systems, the Kenyan financial system has undergone tremendous changes in terms 
of number and type of institutions, services offered, as well as supervision and regulatory frameworks, 
particularly from the early 1990s.  
3.3.1 An overview of the financial system   24 
Banking in its native form existed in Kenya long before formal banking was introduced during the 
colonial period, even though there was no formal currency. The first bank was established in 1896 and 
two others were introduced between 1910 and 1920, along with 3 Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(NBFIs), all foreign. These institutions dominated the banking sector during the time when Kenya was 
under the British rule. Upon independence in 1963, the government sought to loosen dominance of these 
banks and expand credit facilities to the local population (Ahmed & Islam, 2009).  
As a result, there was a rapid expansion of the banking system between 1966 – 1980, following 
nationalization of institutions, and increased local participation in the banking system. There was an 
increase in both banks and NBFIs and, as before, banks mainly dealt with trade. Both public and private 
NBFIs were established to cater for sectors such as housing, agriculture, and industry, that were not 
thought profitable enough to be funded though commercial banking. The laws and regulations governing 
these banks were inherited from the British system.  
Despite the rapid expansion of the sector soon after independence until the early 1980s, the sector was 
not instrumental in promoting development in the country as it suffered from several deficiencies. These 
included non-compliance with regulatory requirements, poor supervision and regulation by the central 
                                                 
23 Besides Mauritius, Nigeria, and South Africa 
24 This section borrows heavily from 1) CBK (1994), and 2) UNECA (1996) 
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banks, partly due to lack of technical skills of the supervisory team, excessive control over deposits and 
lending rates, distortions through unequal incentives between banks and non-bank financial institutions, 
and an increase in the volume of non-performing assets (United Nations, 1996). This led to institutional 
failures of both banks and NBFIs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, causing the financial system to 
weaken and lose credibility with the public. The main cause of the weak financial system at the time was 
the privileged treatment that was given to NBFIs by the government, which led to a proliferation of weak 
NBFIs that was not matched with strengthened capacity in the Central Bank to supervise these institutions 
(Brownbridge, 1996). It was therefore not surprising that the period was characterized by bank failures 
and mergers and acquisitions, which saw the number of financial institutions decline from 74 in the 1990s 
to 54 by 2002, and eventually to 44 by 2014 (CBK, 2007, 2015). By 1995, under the directive of the 
government, and with revision of the banking Act, NBFIs were required to convert into banks or merge 
with their parent banks if they were owned by commercial banks.  
Reforms were thus inevitable to revamp and liberalise the sector to make it better placed to contribute to 
the country’s development process. As Beck (2004) notes, Kenya had high interest rates that were a 
barrier to credit access by the private sector. This was partly due to a deficient legal and institutional 
framework characterised by fraud and insecurity, and the small size of Kenyan banks. At the same time, 
loan loss provisions were large, an indication of expected credit defaults. The reforms included both 
policy and institutional reforms, and were mainly implemented through the structural adjustment 
programme on economic management for renewed growth. Specifically, emphasis was on the legal, 
regulatory and supervisory framework for financial institutions, improvement in the efficiency of 
financial intermediation25, and improvement in the institutional framework of the financial system.  
Although Kenya’s banking sector is still considered to be lightly regulated (Mwega, 2014), there have 
been tremendous improvements both in the growth of financial variables and in the legal, regulatory and 
supervisory framework. A look at the trend in the ratio of assets to GDP of the different types of 
institutions shows they have been changing over time. Figure 3-1 shows that there was a decline in the 
ratio of NBFI’s assets to GDP from 1995. As explained earlier, this was due to the government’s 1995 
directive for NBFI’s to convert to commercial banks or merge with their parent institutions. Commercial 
bank assets have also been growing faster than those of the central bank, an indication of the growing 
                                                 
25 This was to be achieved by increasing competition in the financial sector. 
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importance of commercial banks compared to central banks. This has been used as an indicator of 
financial development (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009) 
Figure 3-1: Trends in the Ratio of Assets to GDP (%) 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database, World Bank 
Theoretically, financial depth should be positively related to economic performance (Neal, 1990). We 
examine one of the indicators that has been used to characterise financial depth, credit to the private 
sector, which is also used as an indicator of financial development in the present study. As Figure 3-2 
shows, credit to the private sector has been growing continuously, with a modest increase from just below 
20% prior to 1980 to almost 35% by 2014. Comparing the growth pattern of credit to the private sector 
and real per capita GDP growth, we see a general pattern where the two variables seem to move together, 







Figure 3-2: Ratio of Credit to the Private Sector from Banks to GDP (%) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
Figure 3-3: Growth in credit to the private sector from banks and real per capita GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
The stock market has also undergone structural and institutional changes over time. Prior to 1954, there 
was no formal financial market in Kenya, and trading in shares was conducted in an informal setting 
where professionals 26 met over coffee to trade. This was during the pre-independence period dating back 
to 1920s. Up until 1953, local participation was a paltry 5% (Ngugi 2003). The Nairobi Stock Exchange27 
was established in 1954 to facilitate access to long term capital by private investors, and to float 
                                                 
26 Lawyers, accountants, auctioneers, and real estate agents, mainly foreigners 
27 Currently the Nairobi Securities Exchange 
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government loans. Membership of registered28  stockbrokers was voluntary and was governed through a 
committee. As most of the trading was conducted by foreigners, funds repatriation was the norm. 
Taxation was used to discourage the practice (Ngugi, 2003). However, this was a disincentive for new 
listings, and therefore in 1985/86 the capital gains tax was abolished on the grounds that it was inhibiting 
capital and share mobility, and therefore stifling economic growth. To strengthen the regulatory 
framework, the Capital Markets Authority was established in 1990 through an Act of parliament, 
amended in 1994. The authority was tasked with removing impediments to trading, and providing 
incentives for long term investments for enhanced returns from equity (UNECA, 1996).  
The market has undergone reforms, geared to increasing participation, enhancing efficiency, reducing 
transaction costs, promoting liquidity and facilitating competitiveness. The manual trading system was 
automated, and a Central Depository System (CDS) was established to minimise trading settlement time 
and improve efficiency. Currently, there are 64 listed companies, up from 48 in 2005. There has been a 
tremendous increase in market capitalisation since 2000, as shown in Figure 3-4. This is an indicator of 
the size of the capital market and it shows that there has been a tremendous increase, especially from the 
early 2000 even the market is still characterised as small relative, to GDP. Trading volumes are still very 
low relative to GDP and most of the activity occurs after 2002, as shown in Figure 3-5. Negative events 
that occurred after the 2007 general elections led to a sharp decline in both series. These events include 
the post-election violence and the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. 
Figure 3-4: Stock market capitalisation (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database, World Bank 
                                                 
28 Clearance of brokers was obtained from the London Stock Exchange 
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Figure 3-5: Stock market value traded (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database, World Bank 
There has been remarkable growth in Kenya’s financial system since the pre-colonial period. However, 
as in many other developing countries, the financial system has not performed as expected in promoting 
economic activity (Honohan and Beck, 2007). This, has been attributed to the fact that, despite having 
the major elements of a well-developed financial system, the country’s financial system is still weak. In 
this regard, it fails to deliver adequate credit to the private sector for investment purposes, especially to 
small and micro enterprises which are the engines of growth for most developing countries (World Bank, 
2005).  
The above analysis has focused on variables that have been used to describe financial structure in Kenya. 
Two external events had a major effect on the development of stock market, but did not have a dramatic 
effect on the banking sector. These include the change in government in 2002 and the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis.  The change in government in 2002 could falsely indicate a move towards a more market-
based economy, while the financial crisis could indicate a move away from a market-based economy. 
However, they do not reflect policies specifically geared towards promoting one financial system over 
another. We therefore include dummy variables to control for these two events in our analysis.  
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3.4 Methodology, Estimation Method and Data 
3.4.1 Methodology and Estimation method 
Following Levine (1997, 2002); Allen & Ndikumana (2000) among others, we employ a linear equation 
that relates economic growth to the financial variables and other growth control variables29.  The baseline 
equation to be estimated is the following;  
 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑡 + 𝑡 (3-1) 
Where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 is real per capita GDP, FINt is the financial indicator, Xt represents the conditioning set of 
other growth variables including trade openness, government expenditure and the consumer price index 
while εt is the error term with the usual assumption, εt ~ iid(0, σ2).  
Equation (1) is estimated within the ARDL framework which is a major workhorse in dynamic estimation 
of single-equation regressions (Hassler and Wolters, 2006). 
The analysis proceeds by estimating the above equation using different proxies for the financial indicator 
variable, as used in Levine (2002); Beck et al. (2009); Tadesse (2002); Luintel et al. (2008). Specifically, 
we undertake the following three analyses:  
1. We test the independent role of banks in economic growth, where FIN is proxied by the 
ratio of credit to the private sector by deposit taking financial institutions to GDP (PCR). This 
variable is an indicator of activity in the banking sector. For a robustness check, we also use 
domestic credit (DCR) as a share of GDP 
2. We test the independent role of the stock market, where FIN is proxied by the value of 
stock traded as a ratio of GDP (MACT). This variable measures the level of activity in the market 
relative to economic activity. For a robustness check, we also make use of the value of market 
capitalisation as a ratio of GDP (MSIZE) 
                                                 
29 As in Allen & Ndikumana (2000), we do not define a production function as in other standard growth models, but 
rather model financial structure and economic growth linearly. As in Allen & Ndikumana (2000), our results cannot be used 
as a basis for inferences on the parameters of the production function.  
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To test the influence of financial structure on economic growth, we use two proxies for FIN. First, FIN 
is proxied by two components of financial structure, size and activity30 and then by a financial structure 
index31. A statistically significant coefficient on FIN in this analysis signifies that financial structure 
matters for growth. Specifically, a positive and significant coefficient implies that a market-based system 
is more important for growth than a bank-based system, while a negative and significant sign implies 
that a bank-based system is more important for growth than a market-based system (Levine, 2002; 
Luintel et al., 2008) .  
Establishing the determinants of growth is an open ended research agenda, and, as Levine & Renelt 
(1992) note, there is no consensus on a conditioning set of explanatory variables in growth regressions. 
Many growth-related empirical studies stress that, besides capital and labour listed in the Solow model 
(Solow, 1956), there are other factors that affect growth in a country. Levine & Renelt (1992) identify 
over 50 explanatory variables used in the literature, although most studies adopt only a small subset of 
these.  
We also select a subset of explanatory variables to form our conditioning set. As noted in the previous 
chapter, explanatory variables include fiscal policy variables e.g. government expenditure, investment 
(when growth rate in real per capita GDP is the dependent variable); trade policy indicators, e.g. exports, 
imports and exchange rate, monetary and political indicators, e.g. inflation, coups and revolutions, black 
market premium, among others. In Kenya, it was found that trade openness was the key determinant for 
the improvement in total factor productivity (Kumar, Pacheco and others, 2010). Guided by the literature 
and availability of quarterly data, we include inflation (INF), government expenditure (GOV) and trade 
openness (TRADE) as our conditioning set of variables.32 
                                                 
30
 (i) FS_Activity is the log of the ratio of stock market value traded/GDP to private sector credit from banks/GDP, (ii) 
FS_size is the log of the ratio of stock market capitalisation/GDP to private sector credit from banks/GDP 
 
31
In this study, we adopt the method used by Allen & Ndikumana (2000) to create a financial development measure, but 
in our case, the objective is to create a financial structure index. We use the aforementioned indicators from the banking sector 
and the stock market to generate the index defined as; 
  (3) 
FSt  is the financial structure indicator, FS¯ the sample mean of FSt  and m is the number of indicators used, in our case two, 
structure_activity and structure_size 
32 For annual data, we include gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in the conditioning set. 
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 Rewriting equation (3-1) and inserting our control variables gives us equation (2) below:  
 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 + 𝑡 (3-2) 
The above equation is estimated using the Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model approach to 
cointegration developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and Pesaran & Shin (1998) that allows us to depict both 
short-run and long-run dynamics in a single equation. This approach is applicable for stationary and non-
stationary variables. However, where they are not stationary, variables need not be integrated of a higher 
order than one. This means that this method can be used whether the variables are I(0), I(1) or mutually 
cointegrated. The procedure is thus based on two polar cases. That is, this method is appropriate where, 
on the one hand, we assume that all variables are purely I(0), and on the other hand, we assume the 
variables are purely I(1), to come up with critical value bounds. Based on the Wald or F-statistic, if the 
statistic falls outside the critical bounds, one can draw conclusions on whether the variables are 
cointegrated. If the statistic falls outside the lower critical bounds, the variables are not cointegrated, and 
if it falls above the upper critical bounds, the variables are cointegrated. The region in between the lower 
and upper bounds is one of inconclusiveness.  
One major problem that we may be confronted with is the endogeneity of the explanatory variables in 
our model. As has been shown in many empirical studies on finance and growth, the financial sector 
could arise as a response to the demands of the economic sector, so that it is not obvious that finance 
leads to growth. In such a case, our explanatory variables may not be strictly exogenous. However, as 
Pesaran (1997) notes, “...the ARDL approach is applicable even if the explanatory variables are 
endogenous, irrespective of whether they are I(1) or I(0)” (pg 183). This makes it applicable in our 
estimation.  
The optimal lag length is selected using the Akaike Criterion. Rewriting equation (2) and assuming an 
ARDL (1,1,1,1,1) gives us;  
 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿10𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝛿11𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛿20𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿21𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛿30𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡
+ 𝛿31𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛿40𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛿41𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑡 
(3-3) 
The error correction form of the above equation is written as;  
 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝜓[𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡 − 𝛽2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑡 − 𝛽3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 − 𝛽4𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡] − 𝛿11Δ𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡




















Structural breaks in the data: Macroeconomic data is susceptible to structural breaks, and we take this 
into account in our estimation. We follow Bai & Perron (2003), and endogenously determine the break 
points for each estimation. This is done by first estimating a break-point least squares from which we 
obtain the break dates33. These break dates are then included as time dummy variables to capture these 
breaks. The break years picked from the break least square estimation coincide with major events in the 
country. These are the years 2000 and 2002 for the annual data. While 2002 was a general election year, 
2000 captures the pre-election period, with changes anticipating the likelihood of removal of power of 
the incumbent government which had been in power for twenty four years. 
 For quarterly data, the time periods captured include 2003:Q1, 2004:Q2, and 2006Q2, which coincide 
with the lead up to and aftermath of reform of the constitution of Kenya in 2005. The other time periods 
captured are 2008:Q1 and 2009:Q3, which coincide with the post-2007 election violence, and the global 
financial crisis. 
Robustness check: To check the robustness of our estimations, we use several proxies for the financial 
indicator variables, as highlighted in the model specification and data section.  
3.4.2  Data  
We are restricted to quarterly data for our analysis of financial structure and the independent role of the 
stock market. This is because long-range annual time-series stock market data is not available for Kenya. 
However, annual bank data is available for a longer time period (1974 - 2014), and we use this data to 
check the robustness of the quarterly data results. The annual data is obtained from the World 
Development Indicators database of the World Bank, while quarterly data is obtained from the Central 
Bank of Kenya (CBK). For the stock market and financial structure variables, we make use of quarterly 
data from 2002 - 2014, obtained from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), as well as from 
the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE).  
                                                 
33 On relaxing the assumption that parameters do not vary across observations, it is important to establish the dates in the 
sample period when the parameters change. We assume that these dates are unknown apriori and therefore estimate them 
from the data. This entails running a break-point least squares regression equation in Eviews following Bai & Perron (2003)  
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Quarterly real per capita GDP is not readily available, and thus had to be calculated from quarterly real 
GDP data obtained from the quarterly economic reports of KNBS, and quarterly population numbers 
taken from the United Nations Population Fund (formerly United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 
UNFPA).  
Another feature of our dataset is the combination of both flow and stock variables, which can be 
problematic for calculating ratios of such variables.  To avoid these problems, we employ the method of 
Beck et al. (2000) to deflate such data (See Appendix B.1 for details).  
Descriptive statistics 
On average, annual credit to the private sector from commercial banks and NBFIs ranges from 17 per 
cent to 34 per cent, averaging 23 per cent. This is low, compared to figures for South Africa, which 
average 63.5 per cent. These compare favourably, however, with figures from Tanzania and Ghana at 
8.6 per cent and 10 per cent respectively34. Domestic credit, which is an alternative measure of bank 
development, has an annual mean of 28 per cent. From the quarterly statistics, we see that stock market 
activity is very low, at 8.7 per cent, signifying little activity relative to the size of the economy. Stock 
market capitalisation, on the other hand, averages 27 per cent.  
Table 3-1: Summary Statistics 
a) Annual bank data 




RPCGDP 11.1 11.3 11 0.1 41 
PCR 22.8 34.4 16.8 4.2 41 
DCR 28.2 34.8 21.7 3.6 41 
TRADE 58 74.6 47.7 7 41 
GFCF 18.9 25.1 15.4 2.1 41 
GOV 16.6 19.8 13.9 1.8 41 
INF 12.9 46 1.6 8.3 41 
b) Quarterly data 
  Mean Max. Min. Obs. 
RPCGDP 9.8 9.9 9.6 52 
PCR 24.0 31.2 20.6 52 
MACT 8.4 28.5 0.4 52 
MSIZE 26.6 41.3 7.1 52 
LNTRADE 12.4 13.3 11.5 52 
LNGOV 11.8 13.2 10.9 52 
INF 97.5 152.5 54.5 52 
                                                 
34 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS 
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The correlation coefficients shown in appendix B.3 show positive correlations between the real per capita 
GDP and both stock market and bank variables. However, we can only infer a positive association among 
the variables from these results, and therefore need to estimate if a positive linear relationship exists.  
3.5 Estimation results  
The unit root tests (see Appendix B.2) suggest that all variables are either I(0) or I(1).  The absence of 
I(2) variables allows us to proceed with the ARDL approach to cointegration.  The rest of this section 
presents the results of our examination of both the short-run and long-run relationship between the 
financial sector and economic growth. As explained earlier, we first take a look at how the bank and 
stock market variables independently predict growth, before presenting the results on the effects of 
financial structure on economic growth.  
3.5.1 Banking sector development and economic growth  
As in Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (1999); Levine (2002) and Rioja & Valev (2004), we use the ratio 
of credit to the private sector from deposit taking institutions to GDP as our measure of banking sector 
development. For a robustness check, we use domestic credit by banks (which includes credit to the 
government and the public sector). We proceed by first establishing the existence of a long-run 
relationship among the variables in the model, using the ARDL bounds approach to cointegration. The 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used for selecting the order of the lags. The bounds test confirms 
the existence of cointegration when we use the PCR or DCR variable (in the annual data), and when we 









Table 3-2: Long-Run Estimation Results 
Long-run regression results 
Dependent variable: Log of real per capita GDP 
 Annual data Quarterly data  
  (1974 - 2014) (2002 - 2014)  
Selected model:  (2, 2, 1, 1, 3, 3)  (1, 2, 0, 2, 2)   
LNPCR  0.0942  -0.2262**  
 (1.514)  (-2.3338)  
INF -0.0014  -0.0412*** 
 (-1.0488)  (-3.288) 
LNTRADE  -0.2022***  0.1358***  
 (-3.2214)  (3.65)  
LNGOV  -0.3929***  0.0824**  
 (-3.2832)  (2.00)  
LNGFCF  0.6930***    
 (7.672)    
D02  -0.0992**    
 (-2.6137)    
D00  -0.1123**    
 (-2.7755)    
D08Q1    -0.1210*  
   (-1.8667)  
D09Q3    -0.0959*  
      (-1.9176)   
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * signifies significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 3-2 presents the long-run estimates using both annual and quarterly data. Our annual data shows 
no significant effect of PCR on RPCGDP, implying that there is no long-run relationship between credit 
to the private sector by deposit taking institution and real per capita GDP. The results did not change 
when we used DCR instead (see appendix B.5 and B.6). However, quarterly data shows a negative and 
significant relationship between PCR and RPCGDP, implying that credit to the private sector has a 
negative effect on real per capita GDP. A 10 percent increase in credit to the private sector leads to a 2.3 
percent fall in real per capita GDP. Theoretically, it is postulated that banking sector development exerts 
a positive and significant effect on economic growth, with empirical studies confirming the same (King 
and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Rioja and Valev, 2004b). The short-run results (see table 3-3 below), however, 





Table 3-3: Short-run Estimation Results 
Error Correction Representation of the ARDL  
Dependent variable: Log of real per capita GDP 
 Annual data: Quarterly data 
  1974 - 2014   2002 - 2014  
Selected model:  (2, 2, 1, 1, 3, 3)  (1, 2, 0, 2, 2)  
D(LNRPCGDP(-1))  0.4409***   
 (5.885)   
D(LNPCR)  -0.09049***  -0.3971 ***  
 (-4.5474)  (-6.7774)  
D(LNPCR(-1))  -0.0509**  0.2571 ***  
 (-2.4288)  -(5.2) 
D(INF)  -0.0011***  -0.0014*** 
 (-4.9223)  -(3.8) 
D(INF(-1))    0.0017*** 
   -3.841 
D(LNTRADE)  0.0221  0.044*** 
 (1.182)  (2.85) 
D(LNGOV)  -0.0706*  -0.006 
 (-2.5825)  (-1.2867)  
D(LNGOV(-1))  0.0256  -0.0252*** 
 (0.924)  (-4.8043)  
D(LNGOV(-2))  0.1681***   
 (6.616)   
D(LNGFCF)  0.1260***   
 (5.923)   
D(LNGFCF(-1))  -0.0440*   
 (-2.0114)   
D(LNGFCF(-2))  -0.0842**   
 (-4.2551)   
D(D02)  -0.0388***   
 (-6.0001)   
D(D00)  -0.0327***   
 (-5.1973)   
D(D08Q1)    -0.0247***  
   (-3.6301)  
D(D09Q3)    -0.007 
   (-1.0857)  
C  4.0749***  2.7999***  
 (9.252)  (6.73) 
ECM  -0.3779***  -0.3546***  
  (-9.2404)  (-6.7221)  
Notes: t statistics in brackets. * signifies significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
Overall, the short-run results suggest that credit to the private sector has a negative and significant effect 
on real per capita GDP. This was evident with annual and quarterly data, as shown in table 3.3.  The 
results using annual data show that a 10 percent increase in credit to the private sector leads to a 0.9 
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percent fall in real per capita GDP instantly, and the decrease reduces in subsequent periods (0.5 percent 
after one lag). Likewise, quarterly data shows an instantaneous decline in real per capita GDP of 4 
percent, following a 10 percent increase in credit to the private sector, after which the effect is positive 
and significant, after one lag.  
This finding is in contrast to those of most previous studies, which find a positive and significant 
relationship. It is, however, not surprising to find a negative and significant effect in the case of Kenya. 
De Gregorio & Guidotti (1995), using the same measure of private credit to GDP to proxy for bank 
development, find a negative effect of finance on growth in 12 Latin American countries, which they 
attribute to financial liberalisation in a poor legal environment. These results are a puzzle given the 
positive effect of credit to the private sector on growth that they find using a different dataset35, leading 
to the conclusion that the effect of banking sector development on growth, although generally positive, 
changes according to region, time period, and levels of income of the country under study.   
Studies have also shown that the effect of credit to the private sector from deposit taking institutions on 
growth, is not uniformly positive across all countries. Even when positive, the size of the effect differs 
across countries, as shown by (Rioja and Valev, 2004a). In their study of 74 developing and developed 
countries, they find that countries that had not increased their credit to the private sector significantly 
recorded poor growth, for example Senegal and Haiti. This is in comparison with those who did, like 
Thailand and Cyprus. Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (1999) also note that a negative effect of finance 
on growth happens when the economy has experienced a banking crisis. Ram (1999), too, shows that 
correlational patterns between financial indicators and economic growth differ in inter-country studies 
In Kenya, the early 1990s were characterised by a financial sector that operated in a weak legal and 
regulatory framework. As a result, thirteen commercial banks and thirty one NBFIs were in serious state 
of financial distress. This included two of the four largest commercial banks at the time (UNECA, 1996), 
Reports also show that a large proportion of nonperforming loans was due to poor lending practices 
inherited from the past, and external influence, mostly on state influenced banks (CBK, 2007). This could 
explain the negative sign on the coefficient on credit to the private sector.  
Studies have shown that the presence of a large share of foreign banks could have a negative effect on 
financial deepening and inclusion (Beck, 2013). The reason behind this is that foreign banks have a 
                                                 
35 They use Barro’s (1991) cross country data on both developed and developing countries, and extend it by including 
credit to the private sector as an explanatory variable. 
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tendency to refrain from lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (see Mwega 2014), which 
form the majority of enterprises in less developing countries, thus limiting the effects of private sector 
credit on growth. In Kenya, the banking sector includes local and foreign banks, accounting for 32.2 % 
and 43% respectively of the banking sector’s net assets as at 2012 (Mwega, 2014).  
To test the stability of the models above, we use the CUSUM squared test of  Brown et al. (1975). This 
test is based on the constancy of the coefficients over time, and it looks at the cumulative sum of the 
recursive residuals. The model is said to be stable if the cumulative sum lies in the area between the two 
critical lines. While Brown et al. (1975) propose the use of CUSUM and CUSUM of squares for a 
stability test, Caporale & Pittis (2004) show that the CUSUM of squares is robust to the presence of 
endogenous regressors in both a stationary and a cointegration environment, unlike the CUSUM, which 
is only robust in a stationary environment. The latter is also unable to detect parameter instability when 
structural invariance fails. Thus the CUSUM of squares is more powerful than the CUSUM. Results 
(shown in Appendix B.8) show that the model is stable.  
3.5.2 Stock markets and economic growth  
We test the independent effect of stock market development on growth, using both stock market 
capitalisation and stock market value traded as proxies for stock market development.  These variables 
have been used extensively in previous studies to proxy for this purpose (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000; 
Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001; Beck and Levine, 2004). We begin by establishing the existence 
of a long-run relationship, using the ARDL bounds test approach. The results (shown in appendix B.4) 
point to the existence of cointegration when the stock market value traded variable is used. However, no 
cointegration is found when the market capitalisation variable is used.  
The long-run and short-run results are shown in table 3-3 and table 3-4 respectively. We report results 
using stock market value traded. The long-run results show a positive and significant effect of stock 
market development on growth. As Levine (1996) notes, the ability to trade and issue securities in the 
stock market is what facilitates long-term growth. It is therefore no surprise that we find a positive and 
significant long-run effect of stock market development on growth. A 10 percent increase in value traded 




Table 3-4: Long-run Results: Stock Market Development and Growth 
Long-run estimation results  
Dependent variable: Log of real per capita GDP  
Selected model  (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)  
MACT   0.0107**  
  -(2)  
LNTRADE   0.1564***  
  -(7.2)  
LNGOV   0.007  
  -(0.3)  
INF  -0.0022** 
  (-2.4941) 
D08Q1   -0.0928** 
  (-2.4952) 
D04Q2   (-0.0963**) 
  (-2.2471) 
D09Q3   -0.059*  
    (-1.9528)  
Notes: t statistics in brackets. * signifies significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
In the short-run, we still find a positive and significant effect, with a 10 percent increase in value traded 
leading to 0.03 percent increase in real per capita GDP.  Using both market capitalisation and value 
traded produced similar outcomes. Our results are similar to findings by Beck & Levine (2004), who find 











Table 3-5: Error Correction Representation of the ARDL Model 
 
Notes: t statistics in brackets. * signifies significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
3.5.3 Financial structure and economic growth  
Having established the independent role of banks and the stock market on growth, we now look at the 
effects of financial structure on economic growth. As stated earlier, we proceed by first estimating the 
effect of the components of financial structure on growth, before estimating the model with the overall 
financial structure index. The bounds test results (appendix B.4) are inconclusive when we include the 
financial structure components. Nevertheless, we proceed to estimate the long-run relationship, since we 
do not rule out its existence.  
Our interest is in the significance of the coefficients on the financial structure variables, to determine if 
financial structure matters. The long-run results show a significant coefficient on FSACT, implying that 
financial structure is important for economic growth. But as noted earlier, in order to conclude whether 
banks or the market matter more, we need to consider the sign of the coefficient. The bank-based view 
predicts a negative and significant relationship between the financial structure measures and growth, 
while the market-based view predicts a positive and significant relationship (see Levine 2002; Arestis et 
al. 2004). Our results show that, in the long-run, stock market activity is more conducive to growth than 























Error Correction Representation of the ARDL 
Dependent variable: log of real per capita GDP 
Selected model (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
D(LNMACTSA) 0.0037*
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showed a negative effect of banks and a positive effect of the stock market. The coefficient on FSSIZE 
is, however, insignificant, which implies that financial structure does not matter for growth.  
The short-run results, however, show significant coefficients on both FSACT and FSSIZE, leading to the 
conclusion that financial structure is influential in economic growth. However, the conclusion regarding 
which financial institutions are more conducive to growth differs for the two components. While FSACT 
leads us to conclude that banks are more important for growth than stock markets, FSSIZE gives the 
opposite information, that stock markets are more important than banks for growth.  These results are 
contrary to the findings of Levine (2002)  who finds no significant effect of financial structure 
components on growth. They are, however, in line with conclusions by Arestis, et al. (2004) in five    of 
the six countries evaluated, and Luintel, et al. (2008) in seven 36 of the fourteen countries they cover,  that 


















                                                 
36 Argentina, Brazil, Greece, India, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan 
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Table 3-6: Long-run Estimation Results using Financial Structure Indicators 
 


















































Long-run estimation results 
Dependent variable: Log of real per capita GDP 
73 
Table 3-7: Error Correction Representation of the ARDL Model 
 
Notes: t statistics in brackets. * signifies significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
Only the financial structure indicators are presented in the results. Complete results are shown in appendix B.7 
 
The ARDL bounds test for cointegration (appendix B.4) shows that a long-run relationship exists when 
we use the FSINDEX, given the significant F-statistic which leads us to reject the null hypothesis of no 
long-run relationship. This conclusion is further supported by the negative and significant coefficient on 


































Error Correction Representation of the ARDL 
Dependent variable: Log of real per capita GDP 
Selected Model (3, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 4, 4, 3)
D(LNRPCGDP2(-1)) -0.2689**
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Results on column (2) of table 3-6 show an insignificant coefficient on the FSINDEX, leading us to 
conclude that financial structure is not important for economic growth in the long-run. These results are 
similar to the short-run results shown in column (2) of table 3-7.  
Previous studies have found mixed results, with Levine (2002) and Beck & Levine (2002) showing that 
financial structure does not matter, and Arestis et al. (2004), Luintel et al. (2008)  concluding the opposite. 
Overall, our results are mixed. While the FSINDEX produced consistent results, both in the short-run 
and the long-run, the financial structure components produce conflicting results. As was noted earlier, 
empirical studies on the influence of financial structure on economic growth have not been conclusive. 
This has partly been attributed to the use of different measures of financial structure, as well as the 
different approaches used. However, it is possible that each component captures something unique about 
the financial structure. The index combines information from each component, and based on results from 
using the index, we can conclude that financial structure does not matter for economic growth in the 
short-run and the long-run.  
In the estimations involving the components of financial structure, trade openness is seen to have a 
positive and significant effect on growth, while inflation has a negative and significant effect, in line with 
theoretical predictions. However, government expenditure is seen to enter the estimation insignificantly. 
We also postulate that the 2007/2008 financial crisis would have had a negative effect on growth, and 
this is visible in the results, with the time period dummy variable entering the estimations with a negative 
and significant coefficient. Results using the FSindex give a different picture, with the selected model 
having a longer time lag. Overall, trade openness has an initial positive and significant effect, but a 
negative and significant effect on growth in the lagged periods. These results are shown in appendix B.7.  
3.6 Conclusion  
This study sought to establish both the short-run and the long-run relationship between financial structure 
and economic growth for Kenya. We used the ARDL bounds approach to cointegration to estimate this 
relationship. While the area of finance and growth has been widely researched, emerging issues continue 
to cast doubt on the widely held beliefs that there is a definite positive relationship between finance and 
growth. The recent global financial crisis drove researchers to question the positive link between finance 
and growth (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). Apart from the literature on finance and growth, special 
attention has been paid to the structure of the financial system and its determining effect on growth. The 
present study falls into this category. We sought to empirically investigate the relationship between 
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financial structure and economic growth in a lower-middle income country, Kenya. This study involved 
an evaluation of three scenarios. In the first, we considered the independent role of banks in economic 
growth. In the second, we investigated the independent influence of the capital market. Finally, we 
examined the role of financial structure in economic growth.  
The results show that, in the short run, banking sector development has a negative and significant effect 
on growth, independent of the influence of the capital market. The effect of stock market development 
is positive and significant in the long-run, but insignificant in the short-run, independent of the influence 
of the banking sector. The effect of development in the banking sector is mostly insignificant in the long 
run. This is attributed to poor lending practices in Kenya and external political influence on bank loans 
in the 1980s and 1990s (UNECA, 1996). The 1990s were also a period in which the financial sector was 
operating within a weak legal and regulatory framework. We, however, expect to observe a reversal of 
the negative effect of the banking sector on growth if we use quarterly data from a different time period. 
That is, a period characterized by a financially liberalized banking sector, but this is not the case. This 
anomaly can be explained by the large proportion of non-performing bank loans carried over from 
previous periods. 
We also considered the influence of individual components of Kenya’s financial structure.  Results show 
that financial structure matters in the long-run when we consider FSACT, but that financial structure 
does not matter when we consider FSSIZE. This leads us to conclude that stock market activity is more 
conducive to growth than activity in the banking sector, given the positive and significant coefficient. 
The short-run results, however, show significant coefficients for both FSACT and FSSIZE. Thus we can 
conclude that financial structure is important for economic growth. These conflicting results can be 
attributed to the different aspects of the financial system that each component captures. The overall 
financial structure index, however shows that financial structure is not influential, both in the short-run 
and long-run, given the insignificant coefficient estimate on FSINDEX. It is on this basis that we 
conclude that there is no economic value in promoting one financial system over another. Policy should 
instead be focused on promoting efficient allocation of credit to productive projects that have the 
potential to contribute to economic growth. Likewise, the Kenyan government should focus on expanding 
access to credit for small and medium enterprises that form the bulk of private enterprises in the country. 
These results show that different conclusions can be reached depending on the variables under 
consideration. As Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2001) note, though financial structure may seem to have no 
effect on economic growth, this does not imply that institutions are not important for growth. Rather, it 
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could be that the indicators used do not fully capture the role of banks and stock markets. A major 
limitation of the present study is the lack of annual historical data from the Nairobi Securities Exchange. 
We were thus compelled to use quarterly data which does not match historical annual data from the 
banking sector. This limited the analysis of the effect of financial structure on growth to 12 years, and 
the most vibrant period for the stock market in its 63 year history.  As a result, we miss valuable historical 
information that could have informed our analysis. Even though we find that the stock market is 
significant in influencing growth in the present period, we are not able to evaluate and compare data on 
the evolution of the country’s financial structure prior to the 2002 general election, which boosted 
investor confidence and led to increased activity in the market. 
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Appendix B   
B.1  Deflating data  
One feature of the dataset used in this study is the combination of both flow and stock variables. As 
Beck, et al. (2000a) note, one is bound to run into problems when getting ratios of such variables. They, 
however, provide a method to deflate such data, which we adopt for this study, as shown below: 
 
  (A1) 
• Where FININDet and FININDet−1 represents the respective financial indicator (in nominal terms) 
in the current and previous periods respectively 
• CPIet, CPIet−1 and CPIat are the end of period consumer price indices for the current and previous 
periods and average CPI at the end of the current period respectively 
• GDPet is GDP in the current period. 
Since we are making use of quarterly data, to fully characterize the ratio in a particular quarter, we take 
the average of the quarter (which entails dividing the numerator by 4) to avoid overstating the ratios.  
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B.2  Unit root test results 
 
 
a) Bank annual data
ADF PP
Variable None Intercept Trend & intcpt 1st diff None Intercept Trend & intcpt 1st diff Concl.
LNRPCGDP 1.3568 -1.0496 -1.666 -3.8083*** 1.4059 0.1001 -0.764 -3.8083*** I(1)
LNPCR 1.9782 -0.2007 -3.0227 -6.2305*** 1.3532 -0.3356 -3.0955 -8.555*** I(1)
LNTRADE -0.7046 -3.4586** -3.633** -1.2777 -3.4384** -3.6427** I(0)
LNGOV -0.5908 -1.3458 -2.9575 -6.0444*** -0.7882 -1.3413 -2.9719 -8.6608*** I(1)
LNGFCF 0.192 -2.7125* -2.6036 -5.3374*** 0.6335 -2.6156* -2.4806 -8.210*** I(0) or I(1)
INF -1.9908** -3.7418*** -3.8129** -1.9908** -3.7874*** -3.8666** I(0)
b) Quarterly data
Variable None Intercept Trend & intcpt 1st diff None Intercept Trend & intcpt 1st diff Concl.
LNRPCGDP 2.3167 0.0598 -3.9390** -8.0877*** 2.7425 0.2875 -3.9974** -8.2848*** I(0) or I(1)
LNBACT 1.5802 1.1347 1.7227 7.3*** -1.4623 -1.194 -1.6281 -6.9778*** I(1)
LNMACT -0.4211 -2.5982 -2.5897 -6.486*** -0.9945 -3.6297*** -4.0492** -15.2745*** I(0) or I(1)
LNMSIZE -1.1714 -3.293** 3.1845* 1.1587 -3.0504** -2.2822 I(0)
LNFSACT -2.7381*** -2.6836* 2.5986 -2.3648** -3.7225*** -3.7673** I(0)
LNFSSIZE -3.0345*** -3.5635**
 -3.2885*
 -2.7712***-2.989** -2.3781 I(0)
LNFSINDEX -1.3266 -2.6801* -2.4369 10.1370*** -1.6966 -2.7414* -2.6569 -10.3632*** I(0) or I(1)
LNTRADE -3.9922 -0.6911 -2.2998 11.3528*** -5.9629 -0.5248 -3.9639** -11.9490*** I(1)
LNGOV 4.6309 -0.0340 -3.0953 12.8423*** -3.934 -1.9121 -13.7421*** I(0) or I(1)
INF 3.7207 0.6162 -1.8936 5.2534*** 6.7834 1.1409 -1.8349 -5.2482*** I(1)
PPADF
79 












LNRPCGDP LNPCR LNTRADE LNGOV LNGFCF INF 
LNRPCGDP 1
LNPCR 0.621 1
LNTRADE -0.385 -0.340 1
LNGOV -0.493 -0.606 0.133 1
LNGFCF 0.431 -0.005 0.240 0.013 1
INF -0.157 -0.394 0.448 -0.018 -0.051 1
b) Quarterly data
LNRPCGDP LNMACT LNMSIZE LNFSACT LNFSSIZE LNFSINDEX LNTRADE LNGOV INF LNPCR
LNRPCGDP 1
LNMACT 0.392 1
LNMSIZE 0.663 0.808 1
LNFSACT 0.297 0.990 0.773 1
LNFSSIZE 0.468 0.834 0.967 0.827 1
LNFSINDEX 0.365 0.965 0.882 0.968 0.932 1
LNTRADE 0.974 0.390 0.662 0.295 0.470 0.367 1
LNGOV 0.919 0.333 0.601 0.242 0.406 0.307 0.930 1
INF 0.966 0.290 0.577 0.189 0.362 0.252 0.972 0.937 1
LNPCR 0.789 -0.066 0.168 -0.174 -0.086 -0.154 0.776 0.780 0.862 1
Lb Ub Lb Ub Lb Ub 
PCR 8.0510*** 2.26 3.35 2.62 3.79 3.41 4.68 Cointegrated 
DCR 5.1313*** 2.26 3.35 2.62 3.79 3.41 4.68 Cointegrated 
PCR 5.2236*** 2.45 3.52 2.86 4.01 3.74 5.06 Cointegrated 
MACT 2.0042 2.45 3.52 2.86 4.01 3.74 5.06 Not cointegrated
MSIZE 3.001* 2.45 3.52 2.86 4.01 3.74 5.06 Cointegrated 
FS_SIZE and FS_ACT 3.004 2.26 3.35 2.62 3.79 3.41 4.68 Inconclusive 





Conclusion F. stat Estimation using;
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B.5   Long-run Estimation results using DCR 
 
















Long-run estimation results 
Dependent variable: Log of real per capita GDP 
Selected model (2, 1, 0, 1, 3, 0) 
81 
B.6  Short-run estimation results using DCR 
 











































Error Correction Representation of the ARDL 
Dependent variable: Log of real per capita GDP 
(2, 1, 0, 1, 3, 0)
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B.7  Short-run estimation results using Fsindex 
Error Correction Representation of the ARDL  
Dependent variable: Log of real per capita GDP  
Selected Model  (3, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0)    (1, 2, 4, 4, 3) 
    
(1)     (2) 
  
D(LNRPCGDP2(-1)) -0.2689**    
  (-2.5872)    
D(LNRPCGDP2(-2)) -0.1978**    
  (-2.3871)    
D(LNFSACT)  4E-04     
  (0.16)     
D(LNFSACT(-1)) -0.0166***    
  (-4.4072)    
D(LNFSACT(-2)) -0.0129***    
  (-3.9438)    
D(LNFSACT(-3)) -0.0105***    
  (-4.570)    
D(LNFSSIZE)  0.0648***    
  (3.84)     
D(LNFSSIZE(-1)) 0.003     
  (0.09)     
D(LNFSSIZE(-2)) 0.0707**    
  (2.66)     
D(LNFSSIZE(-3)) 0.0678***    
  (3.06)     
D(LNFSINDEX)    -0.0059  
     (-1.4875) 
D(LNFSINDEX(-1))    -0.0052  
     (-1.3434) 
D(LNTRADE)  0.0658***  0.0571*** 
  (4.16)   (3.1786)  
D(LNTRADE(-1))    -0.0831*** 
     (-3.8102) 
D(LNTRADE(-2))    -0.0849*** 
     (-3.7177) 
D(LNTRADE(-3))    -0.1297*** 
     (-5.1604) 
D(INFLATION) -0.0009**  -0.0020*** 
  (-2.2036)  (-4.4016) 
D(INFLATION(-1))    0.0021*** 
     (4.121)  
D(INFLATION(-2))    0.0010*  
     (1.967)  
D(INFLATION(-3))    0.0015*** 
     (3.567)  
D(LNGOV)  -0.005   -0.0031  
  (-1.2157)  (-0.5164) 
D(LNGOV(-1))     0.0162** 
     (2.32)  
D(LNGOV(-2))     0.0268*** 
     (4.19)  
D(D08Q1)  -0.0449***  -0.0453*** 
  (-6.7664)  (-6.8438) 
D(D04Q2)  -0.021***  -0.0259*** 
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  (-3.0888)  (-3.7104) 
D(D11Q4)  0.0228***    
  (3.63)     
D(D09Q3)     -0.0427*** 
     (-4.6599) 
D(D06Q2)     -0.0326*** 
     (-4.3951) 
D(D03Q1)     -0.0130*  
     (-1.9433) 
C  3.0487***  5.1696*** 
  (7.17)   (7.593)  
CointEq(-1)  -0.409***  -0.6572*** 
    (-7.158)   (-7.5855) 
Notes: t statistics in brackets. * signifies significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level.   
84 
 
B.8  Model stability: CUSUM of Squares test results 
  
 CUSUM of squares from annual bank results  CUSUM of squares from bank quarterly results
 CUSUM of squares from stock market results  CUSUM of squares from financial structure components
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Finance plays a crucial role in the performance of firms by providing the necessary funds for investments. 
However, the financial structure in a country determines the financing choices that are available to firms. 
As Girma & Vencappa (2015) note, the financial system stimulates economic efficiency and offers more 
profitable growth opportunities. But for this to happen, firms should be able to access finance from the 
financial system. The sources of firm finance vary from one country to another, and are dependent on a 
number of factors, including costs, benefits, accessibility (Myers, 1984), institutional differences (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008), and the legal and financial environment (Porta et al., 1998; 
Allen et al., 2012). The choice of firm financing is a conscious decision made by firms (Mallick and 
Yang, 2011). Choices include acquiring debt, using equity, sourcing internal funds, obtaining trade 
finance, and informal funding (borrowing from friends and family), among others.  
Even though the effect of firm financing choices on firm performance has been broadly studied in the 
corporate finance field, there has not been consensus, and what has emerged are conflicting predictions, 
given the different conclusions of the different theories of capital structure 37 . For example, the 
Modigiliani & Miller (1958) “irrelevance theory” postulates that capital structure has no effect on firm 
performance. On the other hand, the agency cost theory by Jensen & Meckling (1976) posits that firms 
with higher debt levels have higher productivity, because higher debt levels reduce the agency cost of 
equity, thereby increasing firm value, as managers are constrained to act in the interest of shareholders. 
 Rahaman (2011) further notes that our understanding of the real effects of financial structure at a more 
disaggregated level is limited. The sources of firm finance are by-products of financial development in 
the country (Mallick and Yang, 2011). Theory states that countries with better developed financial 
systems ease external financing, especially the use of bank funds that are marked by information 
asymmetries between firms and banks. Other factors that determine firms’ decisions on which source of 
finance to utilize are highlighted in the corporate finance literature. These include conflict of interest 
between firms and providers of funds or between shareholders and managers of a firm, or between equity-
                                                 
37 Capital structure and financial structure have been used interchangeably in the corporate finance literature, in reference 
to firm financing. See for example Davis & Stone (2004); Wippern (1966); Salim & Yadav (2012) 
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holders and debt-holders within a firm. Another factor is market imperfections. Girma & Vencappa 
(2015) note that different types of finance have different properties, and their effect on firm productivity 
varies across firms. 
Firms of different sizes have access to different sources of finance. For example, large firms often have 
access to both bank and market finance in countries with financial markets, while small and medium size 
firms38 have limited access to market finance, given the stringent listing requirements. They instead have 
access to other forms of finance including (but not limited to) internal/retained funds, trade credit, 
borrowing from banks, family and friends, or owners’ equity. Likewise, the legal and regulatory 
framework in a country has a direct influence on the financial system. Studies have shown that countries 
with well-developed legal systems are more likely to have well developed financial systems. As a result, 
firms in different countries are faced with different financial environments. While some countries are 
able to provide external finance to firms, others must rely on internal sources of finance. Cross listing of 
firms in different financial markets has also broadened the sources of firm financing. Firms are negatively 
affected when they have limited financing choices and are forced to forego investment opportunities. 
Rahaman (2011) observes that firms resort to internal financing when faced with constraints in external 
financing. As these constraints are alleviated, firms move away from internal financing to reliance on 
external financing (Rahaman, 2011). Overall, a firm’s choice of finance source depends on its objective 
of minimizing the cost of finance while maximizing the value of the firm.  
Few studies look at firm financing and productivity, especially in developing countries. For example, 
studies by Allen et al. (2012) and by Girma & Vencappa (2015) look at firm financing in India. While 
Allen et al. (2012) find that bank and market finance are not associated with higher growth rates for 
firms, Girma & Vencappa (2015) find that bank and non-bank finance have a positive effect on the 
productivity growth of firms, with bank loans having the largest effect. They confirm that the size of a 
firm is important in determining how finance affects productivity growth. They find that large firms rely 
more on non-bank finance, and small firms rely more on bank finance. Financial structure determines 
the financing choices of firms. It is therefore important to go beyond analysing the effect of financial 
structure at the aggregate (economy) level and understand the effect of firm financing on firm 
productivity. 
                                                 
38 Which form the majority in developing countries, (Beck et al., 2008) 
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The overall objective of this study is therefore to investigate the effect of firm financing choices on firm 
productivity. The contribution of this study is therefore threefold. First, it provides empirical evidence 
using both parametric and non-parametric estimation methods. Second, it focuses on a region that has 
not been analysed in the context of firm financing and productivity and third, it makes use of a dataset 
that has not been fully exploited, made available by the World Bank.  Using data obtained from the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) for a sample of manufacturing firms in 26 countries in SSA, we 
consider firms that purchased fixed assets during the survey period. We are able to distinguish between 
internal sources of funds, bank loans, equity, informal sources of finance, as well as trade credit. We 
measure productivity as the firm’s total factor productivity (TFP). This will be estimated at firm level for 
each of the countries in the sample, using both parametric and non-parametric methods. The parametric 
method follows the standard regression analysis, while the non-parametric method follows the relative 
distribution approach by Handcock & Morris (1998). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
that combines both parametric and non-parametric estimation methods in analysing the effect of firm 
financing on firm productivity in SSA. We thus contribute to the existing literature by providing 
empirical evidence from SSA, a region that has not been studied due to data limitations.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 looks at the theoretical and empirical literature, 
while section 4.3 looks at firm financing in Africa. The data and methodology are presented in section 
4.4, while the results are presented in section 4.5. Finally, section 4.6 concludes the work undertaken. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Theoretical literature 
Firms’ financing decisions can be reviewed in the context of the theory of capital structure, which 
considers the decision between internal and external (debt and equity) sources of finance to fund 
investment projects. Even though our study extends beyond these two sources of finance, the theory of 
capital structure informs our analysis. Financing choice by a firm is a complex process and theories can 
only explain a facet of this complexity (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010). A number of theories have been 
developed that help explain the link between the choice of firm financing, and the effect on 
performance39.  
                                                 
39 There are several measures of firm performance. They include those fashioned from financial statements or stock market 
indicators, such as return on assets (ROA), and stock price returns, margins. Others include revenues, profitability, production 
efficiency, labour and capital productivity, and employment growth. In this study, we focus on productivity.  
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Ever since Modigiliani & Miller (1958) developed their Irrelevance Theory, financial economists have 
come up with alternative theories that explain a firm’s financial structure. The Irrelevance Theory states 
that financial policy is irrelevant for firm performance. The implication is that the cost of capital and the 
value of a firm do not change with a change in a firm’s leverage position40. This means that a firm’s 
financing decisions have no effect on the cost of capital or on the value or real operations of the firm 
(Yazdanfar & Ohman, 2015). This assertion is based on the assumption that a firm does not retain 
earnings, and all total earnings are paid out as dividends, nor does it pay corporate taxes. It also assumes 
the existence of perfect capital markets, and the absence of agency costs, moral hazard, and information 
asymmetry. Thus, one assumes that management acts in the best interest of stockholders, where common 
stock is a source of finance besides debt (Modigiliani & Miller, 1958). However, this theory has been 
criticized for it’s unrealistic assumptions, with the assertion that altering the assumptions could produce 
results that show that indeed, a firm’s financial structure matters (Stiglitz, 1988). 
Contrary to the above theory, the seminal work by Jensen & Meckling (1976), argues that a firm may be 
under the management of an outsider. They state that an outsider is bound to engage in activities that do 
not necessarily maximise the value of the firm, and these can be seen in the financing decisions a firm 
undertakes. In this setting, a firm is governed by contractual arrangements between the owner(s) of the 
firm as the principal(s), and the manager(s) as the agent(s). Such an arrangement brings with it agency 
costs, which arise because managers will not always act in the interest of the principal, especially if they 
are both utility maximizers. When the manager’s ownership claim on the firm is low, his incentive to 
increase the value of the firm decreases, and this could lead to reduced firm performance. Managers may 
also divert firm resources for their own gains, which may be in conflict with the interests of the owners. 
Principals must therefore incur monitoring costs to ensure agents do not divert from the core business. 
At the same time, agents can also bond themselves to the firm, so that they will not take any action that 
will harm principals, or will ensure that principals are well compensated. When firms are managed by 
their owners, theory states that they will behave differently, from a situation in which there is outside 
control, either from equity holders or debtors. In such situations, agency costs arise because of the 
existence of divergent interests between owner/managers and the shareholders. 
The use of debt to finance firm activities is seen to reduce agency costs, in that it reduces the amount of 
free cash available to managers to use for personal gain (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Creditors also 
                                                 
40 Leverage is defined as the ratio of debt to equity in a firm, on the assumption that these are the only two sources of firm 
finance 
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increase their monitoring of firms in such cases, and managers respond by increasing firm profitability 
to ensure there are enough funds to meet the legal repayments (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000). The use of 
debt, however, comes with the threat of bankruptcy. According to Grossman & Hart (1982), though, the 
threat of bankruptcy can ruin a manager’s reputation and to avoid this, a manager may ensure the firm 
remains profitable. This would improve firm performance. Contractual arrangements between owners 
and managers, should ensure that managers work hard to make the firm profitable. These firms are thus 
more likely to be characterised by high productivity.  
Another departure from the irrelevance theory is the trade-off theory of financial structure, which posits 
that there are costs and benefits to using debt to finance investments. The main departure of this theory 
from the irrelevance theory is the introduction of the notion of taxes which make debt more favourable 
because interest payments are tax deductible. According to Myers (1984), firms trade-off between the 
interest tax shields and the dead-weight bankruptcy costs introduced by debt. This means that a firm will 
consider whether to use debt or equity in its financial structure in a bid to arrive at an optimum mix that 
adds more value to the firm. Theoretically, it is postulated that high performing firms will opt for higher 
debt levels, up to the point where additional borrowing increases the probability of financial distress.  
An alternative to the trade-off theory is the pecking order theory. The departure of this theory from the 
irrelevance theory is the introduction of asymmetric information. This theory is based on the premise that 
a firm prefers internal sources of finance over external sources, in the presence of adverse selection 
(Myers, 1984). In this case, it is assumed that managers know the true state of the firm better than 
outsiders. According to this theory, the first preference in terms of finance is internal finance, followed 
by debt, then equity. Where internal finance is not adequate for a firm’s investment requirements, the 
firm will opt for low risk debt financing before resorting to equity finance. With adverse selection, the 
choice of finance acts as a signal to outside investors. When the manager believes the firm is overvalued, 
he will issue equity, as opposed to when the firm is undervalued. Likewise, when the probability of 
default is high, a manager may incur debt just before this information is available to others. 
The pecking order theory posits that the capital structure is designed to mitigate the inefficiencies in the 
firm’s investment decision caused by asymmetric information (Harris and Raviv, 1991). A firm 
characterised by little tangible assets relative to its value, and subject to severe information asymmetries 
will have a high debt value, compared to one with more tangible assets and less severe information 
asymmetries. This arises because of under-investment in new projects financed through equity, when 
investors believe that the firm is of low quality. Moreover, since the preferred source of finance is internal 
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finance, the theory predicts that most profitable firms will have lower debt levels, since they do not 
require external finance. Where external finance is required, debt finance is preferred to equity as debt 
acts as a signal to investors of the profitability of the firm. Debt also signals that the current stock price 
of firms that issue shares is undervalued. It is therefore expected that firms that rely on internal funds are 
more productive than those relying on debt and equity, because use of internal finance signals that the 
firm is of high quality. Likewise, firms relying more on debt to finance project are expected to be of 
better quality, thus more productive, because debt signals that a firm is profitable enough to be able to 
repay the debt.  
4.2.2 Empirical literature 
There is a large amount of empirical evidence, with varying conclusions, on the influence of firm 
financing on firm performance (Nucci et al., 2005; Rahaman, 2011; Berger & Di Patti, 2006; Margaritis 
& Psillaki, 2010; Allen et al., 2012). Performance in these studies is measured using different variables. 
These include profitability (Ramadan, 2015), ,financial ratios obtained from balance sheets and income 
statements that include among others, return on investment (ROE), earnings per share (EPS), stock 
market returns and their volatility, Tobin-q (Berger & Di Patti, 2006), and productivity (Gatti & Love, 
2008).These variables are obtained from financial statements, except productivity, which is estimated 
from the production process. These studies are based on the premise that the financing choices of firms 
can influence both managerial and firm behaviour, with implications for firm performance.  
For example, Nucci et al. (2005) provide evidence that profitable firms in Italy tend to borrow less, and 
mainly rely on internal finance. While this supports the pecking order theory of financial structure, it 
contradicts the trade-off theory. Berger & Di Patti (2006) on the other hand show that firms with higher 
debt than equity perform better than firms with lower debt than equity. The explanation for this is that 
higher debt levels reduce the agency cost of equity, thereby increasing firm value as managers are 
constrained to act in the interest of shareholders.  
Some empirical evidence also shows a negative relationship between productivity and certain sources of 
financing. For example Pushner (1995), using distributional analysis on Japanese firms, finds that firms 
with low leverage show above average levels of productivity. Their analysis follows from an examination 
of the distribution of productivity residuals within firms’ leverage ratios. The study also finds that firms 
with moderate levels of leverage seem to have less-within firm variation in productivity. This contrasts 
the hypothesis that higher leverage can discipline management to operate firms as efficiently as possible 
by ensuring high levels of productivity. This cannot be generalised to all countries, as firm financing 
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choice is dependent on the financial structure of the country, as well as the cost and accessibility of 
finance.   
High debt levels can have a negative effect on productivity because firms engaged in more innovative 
activities are not likely to be funded by banks if they lack tangible assets. These results hold in countries 
with developed financial markets, which offer an alternative to debt finance. In countries with 
underdeveloped or inactive financial markets, the option of equity becomes very limited (Nucci et al., 
2005). Lower debt levels are associated with higher intangible assets because innovative firms are more 
likely to make use of equity than debt. Equity finance does not require collateral in the form of tangible 
assets. These conclusions contrast with findings by Margaritis & Psillaki (2010). They find a positive 
and significant relationship between firm performance and leverage, in their study of French firms, in 
which they measure leverage as the debt to total asset ratio).This supports the agency cost hypothesis 
that higher leverage is associated with improved firm performance.  
However, it is not only debt that is associated with higher firm performance. In a study of both quoted 
and unquoted firms in the UK, Rahaman (2011) finds a positive effect of both external and internal 
finance on firm growth. They do, however, argue that firms with external credit constraints are most 
likely to use bank credit, with increased use of internal finance acting as a signal for future bank credit. 
They also show that small firms are more likely than large firms to use internal funds. The study 
concludes that the effects of firm financing on growth are statistically significant and quantitatively 
important, and that reliance on internal finance declines as constraints to external finance are eliminated, 
an indication that financial structure matters at firm level. Rajan & Zingales (1995) also reveal that firms 
relying on external finance grow faster, but that this requires a well-developed financial market. 
Another branch of related literature investigates the effect of bank influence on firm growth and financing 
choices, and finds that firms influenced by banks benefit from increased access to credit. These studies 
also find that debt has a negative influence on profitability, with no indication that bank influence on a 
firm promotes its growth or profitability (Agarwal and Elston, 2001) As noted, some studies postulate 
that firms that make use of bank loans perform better. They postulate that banks monitor firms and 
therefore it is expected that they will have stronger growth than those without bank relations, whose 
performance is not monitored. However, this was not the case in India, one of the largest growing 
economies in the world. Allen et al., (2012) find that bank and market (equity) finance were not 
associated with higher growth rates. They show that the single most important form of finance for Indian 
firms is non-bank and non-market external finance. They test the hypothesis that informal finance is 
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associated with start-ups which then shift to formal finance. They still, however, find persistence in the 
use of non-bank and non-market finance for both small and large firms. Thus, for developing countries 
like India, non-formal finance that is not dependent on legal institutions, and which is backed by 
mechanisms outside the formal financial system, may be more advantageous in promoting growth and 
productivity. Such findings show that, indeed, financial structure matters. Alternative forms of finance 
are a common feature of less developed countries which have underdeveloped financial systems to 
support bank and market finance. Instead, these countries are characterised by weak legal institutions, 
and extensive informal sectors supported by informal sources of finance. 
It has also been noted that there is a high correlation between firm growth and productivity (Lööf and 
Heshmati, 2002) and research has shown that finance plays a crucial role in enhancing firm productivity 
and productivity growth (Levine and Warusawitharana, 2014). These studies show that there is a positive 
link between external finance and future productivity growth. We note however the observation by 
Mallick & Yang (2011) that there is no unique and unambiguous equilibrium relationship between 
financial structure and firm performance. As observed in the literature, while some theories predict a 
negative relationship, others predict a positive relationship. Still other show no relationship between firm 
finance and firm performance. Most of these studies use regression analysis, postulating a linear 
relationship between leverage and firm performance, while controlling for firm characteristics that have 
been shown to have an effect on performance. 
From the above literature, it is evident that finance is an important factor in the performance of firms and 
the choice of firm finance is crucial. The role of firm financing choices on firm productivity is under-
researched, with most studies focusing more on the effect of leverage on firm performance. Besides, 
most studies derive firm performance from financial statements. In developed countries, firms that rely 
on equity are more likely to be more productive, but this is not necessarily the case in developing 
countries. Instead, firms in developing countries are more likely to benefit from an increase in access to 
credit in an economy that is more bank-based than one that is more market-based, because of limited 
access to formal financial markets. Given the stringent conditions for listing in a formal stock market, 
small and medium size firms in developing countries are locked out of the formal financial market. 
However, they resort to other forms of financing that, like equity and bank loans, have an effect on their 
productivity. The role of these additional sources of finance on firm performance is not widely 
researched, yet it has been shown that these sources can exert an influence on firm performance. 
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4.3 Firm Financing in Sub Saharan Africa41 
Firm financing patterns differ across countries, and this is due to differences in the development of banks 
and stock markets, as well as the differences in legal institutions (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999) 
These differences are considered to be more important than differences in industrial affiliation, which 
too, results to differences in financing patterns (Fan, Titman and Twite, 2012). 
Firms in Sub Saharan Africa are as diverse as the countries in this region. Furthermore, this diversity is 
also seen in the financial systems, and the extant literature on financial structure suggests that firm 
financing is dependent on the level of financial development in a country, the quality of institutions as 
well as the legal and financial environment (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008). The rest of 
this section provides an overview of the financial environment in SSA, aiming to highlight peculiarities 
and specific features of firm financing in SSA. 
4.3.1 Access and Sources of Finance 
In general, developing countries tend to have less-developed financial systems, with limited financing 
choices for firms. Yet, financial constraints have a direct implication on firm performance as well as 
growth. Surveyed firms from SSA were asked to state how financially constrained they are, and stark 
differences can be seen between large and small firms. It is expected that small firms face more 
constraints than large firms. Small firms are defined in the survey as those with between 5 - 19 employees, 
medium firms as those with between 20 - 99 employees, and large firms as those with over 100 
employees. From table 4-1, we see that a larger percent of respondents for small firms view access to 
finance as a major to very severe obstacle, compared to respondents from both medium and large firms 
(47%, 35% and 25% respectively). This is mirrored by the larger percent of responses from large firms 





                                                 
41 Based on pooled data from the World Bank Enterprise survey (WBES) collected between 2005 and 2013 for different 
countries in SSA. 
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Small firms 16.28 16.55 19.86 26.88 20.44 100 
Medium 
firms 
24.75 18.86 21.64 20.84 13.91 100 
Large firms 34 21.34 19.95 14.83 9.89 100 
Total 22.13 18.14 20.45 22.81 16.48 100 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 
Notes: The table represents responses to the question: How much of an obstacle is access to finance.  
Table 4-2 shows the percent of firms that have ties with a financial institution, and we see that fewer 
small firms (14%) have ties with financial institutions compared to medium and large firms (29% and 
41% respectively). This is not surprising, as small firms face major constraints in accessing finance. 
These findings echo studies that have shown that providing finance to small firms is considered a riskier 
undertaking than financing large firms. As Beck, et al. (2008) note, inadequate access to external finance 
is largely attributed to market imperfections, including high transaction costs and information 
asymmetries. What this means is that small firms are forced to resort to alternative forms of finance, as 
shown in table 4-3. 
Table 4-2: Bank ties by firm size 
Establishment has a line of credit or loan from a financial 
institution (% of responses) 
  No Yes 
Small firms 85.94 14.06 
Medium firms 70.71 29.29 
Large firms 58.96 41.04 
Total 76.27 23.73 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 
 
Many firms in Sub Saharan Africa rely on internal finance, which accounts for 73% of the total financing 
choices42. This is followed by bank finance, accounting for 14% of total financing needs. Complete 
reliance on equity was the least used option, at 3% of the total financing requirement. Collier (2009) 
notes that growing firms do not rely on retained earnings because growth squeezes cash flows. If 
productivity drives growth, then the conclusion is that firms in SSA are, on average, not productive and 
therefore are not growing, given their strong reliance on internal finance. 
Differentiating the sources of finance by firm size, we see that the pattern is somewhat different, even 
though the major source of finance for all firms is still internal funds. These results are shown in table 4-
                                                 
42 Results are shown in appendix C.2 
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3 below. A significant proportion of investment is financed from internal funds for all firms, with small 
enterprises utilising this option more than both medium and large enterprises 77%, 68% and 66% 
respectively). The second major source of finance is bank loans, and this was observed across all firms. 
Likewise, for all firms, very little investment is financed using equity finance (3% across all firms). This 
is not surprising, as Sub Saharan Africa is mainly characterised by small and mostly inactive financial 
markets, except Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, and South Africa. 
Between the two formal sources of external finance (bank and equity), we see that bank funds are the 
most utilised form of external finance, compared to equity finance for all firms. For example, 9% of 
investments of small firms are financed from bank loans compared to 3% financed from equity. 19% of 
the investments of medium and large firms are financed from bank loans, compared to 3% from equity. 
 











Small firms 9.29 3.32 77.28 5.89 4.23 100 
Medium firms 18.94 3.11 68.12 5.69 4.14 100 
Large firms 18.7 2.71 66.82 5.58 6.18 100 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 
The table represents the proportion of investment financed from the various sources  
Comparing sources of finance by country and firm size43, we see a huge cross country difference in firm 
financing. For example, small and medium firms in Lesotho rely heavily on bank loans, while large firms 
rely almost entirely on internal finance. Firms in Mauritius rely more on bank loans than internal finance. 
The use of bank finance in Nigeria is low for all firm sizes. Burkina Faso has a higher reliance on equity 
finance for large firms, while small and medium firms did not utilise equity finance.  No South African 
rely on equity finance. This large variation in firm financing is expected, as countries are characterised 
by diverse levels of financial development as well as by legal institutions of varying strength, which has 
been shown to have a large impact on how firms finance their investments. The significant use of internal 
finance is not a unique feature of SSA firms. For example, Beck et al. (2008) show that firms in Germany, 
the UK and the US use internal finance  for a significant portion of their investments. 
                                                 
43 Selected country results are shown in appendix C.3. 
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4.3.2 Legal and Institutional Framework 
The prevailing view is that efficient and effective legal institutions are instrumental in promoting 
developed financial systems. The law and finance literature emphasizes the need for a strong legal and 
regulatory framework that can protect the rights of financial players. It is theorized that when property 
rights are protected, and rules and regulations are enforced, a country’s financial system benefits and 
develops (Rajan and Zingales, 1996; Porta et al., 1998). Respect for the rule of law is thus crucial for 
well-functioning financial markets, as well as operational banking institutions. Allen, et al. (2012) posit 
that the lack of effective legal and other regulatory institutions is one reason financial markets have not 
played a more prominent role in the Indian economy. 
Studies on developing countries have shown that there is a difference between recorded legislation and 
practice. For example, Allen, et al. (2012) show that, while India has a long history of British common 
law44, the level of investor protection and the quality of legal institutions is below the average for former 
British colonies. They show that these are only slightly better than such protections and institutions in 
former French colonies. They attribute these differences to the slow and inefficient legal system and 
corruption in government. This is a common feature in many developing countries. 
To proxy for institutional framework, we look at the responses of the firms to the question “How much 
of an obstacle is corruption”. Literature on institutions shows that rent seeking behaviour by interest 
groups can turn legal institutions into barriers for efficient business operations. The responses are shown 
in table 4-4 below. 
Overall, we see that there are concerns about corruption, with 30% of respondents for large firms 
reporting that corruption is a major to severe obstacle. Likewise, 33% and 37% of respondents for 
medium and small firms respectively reported that corruption is a major to severe obstacle. We can infer 
that small firms are more affected by corruption than large firms. While corruption is not the only 
measure of inefficiency in financial institutions, it is an indication of a firm’s views about the legal and 
business environment in which they operate. Providing an enabling environment for business ensures 
that firms will survive, and offers a level playing field for firms to thrive. 
                                                 
44 Studies show that countries with legal systems inherited from English common law provide stronger legal protection 
than countries whose legal systems are of French civil law origin 
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Table 4-4: How much of an obstacle is Corruption (% of responses) 
  Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms 
No obstacle 26.43 28.49 28.95 
Minor obstacle 20.37 20.72 21.4 
Moderate 16.49 17.84 19.27 
Major 21.61 17.99 18.29 
Very severe 15.09 14.96 12.08 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey 
Notes: The responses have been averaged over all firms 
We also look at the responses to the question on “fairness and impartiality of the court system”. The 
literature suggests that banks and financial markets that are backed by legal institutions are more 
accessible to large and listed firms than to small and private firms in most countries (Allen et al., 2012). 
From the results on table 4-5, we see that respondents for large firms tend to agree or strongly agree more 
on the impartiality and fairness of the court system, compared to both small and medium firms. For 
example, 43% of the large firms agree that the courts are fair, compared to 36% and 32% of respondents 
for medium and small firms respectively. 
Table 4-5: Question: The court system is fair, impartial & uncorrupted (% of responses) 
  Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms 
Strongly disagree 23.99 22.66 20.22 
Tend to disagree 28.14 28.37 23.86 
Tend to agree 32.03 35.79 42.87 
Strongly agree 15.84 13.18 13.05 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey 
Notes: The responses have been averaged over all firms 
Firm financing in Sub Saharan Africa is a major concern for policymakers, as firms are important for 
economic growth. It is therefore crucial that barriers to finance are removed to aid financial development. 
4.4 Methodology, Model specification and Data 
 
4.4.1 Estimating productivity 
The traditional approach for analysing productivity is to estimate a production function (Ghosh, 2009). 
This is the approach adopted in this study. We quantify a firm’s productivity as the Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP), in line with studies that evaluate the effect of financing choices on firm productivity 
(Nucci et al., 2005; Girma and Vencappa, 2015). TFP is defined as the efficiency with which firms 
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convert inputs into outputs (Saliola and Seker, 2011) and is endogenously determined, using either the 
gross value of sales or the value added and input choices (Dabla-Norris, Kersting and Verdier, 2010). 
Variations in the specification of the equation depend on the inputs used, as well as on the dependent 
variable used. The starting point in all specifications is the general Cobb Douglas production function, 
with TFP estimated as the residual from the estimations. This is what is commonly referred to as the 
Solow residual. In this study, we use both gross sales and value added, and compare the results for 
robustness checks, and include only labour and capital as the factor inputs. 
The general specification is expressed as: 
                                                       
 𝑌 =  𝐾𝛼𝑘(𝐴𝐿)𝛼𝑙 (4-1) 
 
Where Y = Output; K = Capital; A = TFP; L = Labour; 𝛼𝑘, & 𝛼𝑙 are the factor shares for capital and 
labour respectively. Expressing equation (1) in logarithmic form gives us: 
 
 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝑘𝐾𝑖 + 𝛼2
𝑙 𝐿𝑖 + 𝑖 (4-2) 
 
Equation (4-2) is estimated for each country. Since the data was collected at country level, the values of 
the above variables were expressed in terms of the nominal local currency. To make the data comparable, 
we need to convert it to a numeraire currency. We therefore use the US dollar and convert amounts to 
the 2009 United States Dollar (USD) equivalent. To do this, we first convert the local currency into USD 
using the average exchange rate for the year in which the survey data was collected. We then deflate 
using the 2009 US GDP deflator. This method of deflation is similar to the method used by the World 
Bank (2015). 
Labour services are adjusted for human capital, following Caselli (2005). Our survey provides data on 
the average education level for full time production workers. Thus, human capital is measured as shown 
in equation (4-3) below. 
  





H is human capital 
L average number of employees  
s average number of years of schooling.  
φ(s) is assumed to be piecewise linear45. 
TFP is thus calculated as the residual from equation (2), given by 
  𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖  =  𝑦𝑖  −  𝑦?̃? (4-4) 
Where 𝑦𝑖 are the actual values and  ?̃?𝑖  are the predicted values. 
Endogeneity of factor inputs  
The traditional OLS estimation of equation (4) above assumes away any possible correlation between 
productivity shocks and the error term. As stated in the literature, unobservable firm level productivity 
shocks are positively correlated with the error term (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Firms choose both 
physical and human capital based on their levels of productivity, and this will be captured in the error 
term of equation (4-2). The methods that have been proposed in the literature to deal with endogeneity 
of factor inputs and productivity include the Olley & Pakes (1996) method, and the Levinsohn & Petrin 
(2003) method. However, as noted in Waldkirch (2014), these methods require time- series information, 
and this is not available in our data, making the use of these methods infeasible. 
To correct for this type of endogeneity, Schiffbauer & Ospina (2010) propose using the previous period 
values of labour and capital as instrumental variables. Our data contains data on the number of permanent, 
full-time employees at the time of establishment of the firm. We therefore use the initial labour to 
instrument for the current period’s labour. As noted in the existing literature, investment in physical 
capital is usually determined at the beginning of the production period. 
Thus, to instrument for physical capital, we use the net current book value of fixed assets, on the 
assumption that this value depends on the amount of capital held at the beginning of the production 
period. 
                                                 
45 Specifically, as in Caselli (2005), we have φ(s) = 0.134∗s if s ≤ 4; φ(s) = 0.134∗4+0.101∗(s −4)if 4 < s ≤ 8; φ(s) = 
0.134∗4+0.101∗4+0.068∗(s −8)if 8 < s 
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4.4.2  Methodology and data 
We use both a parametric and a non-parametric approach to determine the role of a firm’s financing 
choices in productivity. The parametric approach follows the usual regression estimation analysis, while 
the non-parametric approach looks at the distribution of productivity across the different firms using 
different financing choices. Both ought to tell the same story. 
4.4.2.1 Non-parametric estimation method 
The objective of non-parametric estimation is to examine the distributional differences between and 
within groups that go beyond a description of statistical summaries of the data. We follow (Handcock & 
Morris (1998) and compare the distribution of firm productivity corresponding to the different financial 
choices. This way, we are able to establish the stochastic dominance as well as a ranking for the compared 
distributions. This methodology has been used mainly to compare income distributions (Petrarca, 
Ricciuti and others, 2015). It has also been applied to the distribution of productivity of exporting vs non-
exporting firms for Spanish manufacturing firms (Delgado, Farinas and Ruano, 2002)and the 
productivity distribution of foreign owned vs domestic firms in the SADC region (Dunne & 
Masiyandima, 2016). The methodology is, however tailored to our application, using the distribution of 
firm productivity based on firm financing choices. 
Given the different sources of finance, we need to establish a reference group46 as well as a comparison 
group. This allows us to compare the productivity of users of one source of finance against the 
productivity of users of another source. The first step is to compute the Cumulative Distribution Function 
(CDF) of productivity, in which case our productivity measure, TFP, is as defined above. The sources of 
finance available in the data are as defined in section 4.3.1, which include bank loans, equity funds, 
internal funds, informal sources, and a hybrid of the sources. 
We denote the CDF of productivity for the reference group as 𝐹0(𝑦) and 𝐹(𝑦) for the comparison group. 
We choose bank funds as the comparison group and each category of the other sources will be used as 
the reference group. Let 𝑌0  and 𝑌  denote random samples from 𝐹0  and 𝐹  respectively. The grade 
transformation of Y to Y0 is defined as the random variable 
  𝑅 =  𝐹0(𝑌 ) (4-5) 
                                                 
46 Group refers to firms utilising a given financing option. 
101 
The realisation of R, is referred to as the relative data, r whose CDF can be expressed as; 
 𝐺(𝑟) = 𝐹(𝐹0
−1(𝑟)) (4-6) 
Where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. 
The relative data, r, which represents the proportion of values, is interpreted as the percentage rank that 
the original comparison value would have in the reference group. The relative distribution is therefore 
defined as the fraction of firms in the reference group to the fraction of firms in the comparison group in 
each decile of the distribution of productivity. F−1(r) is the quantile function of F0. The relative probability 








If the distributions of the reference and comparison groups are identical, the CDF of the relative 
distribution is a 450 line and the PDF of the relative distribution is the uniform PDF (Handcock & Morris, 
1998). From the above, we are able to graphically establish if there exists stochastic dominance in the 
productivity of firms financed from a particular financing option. The relative PDF, the density ratio, is 
the ratio of the fraction of firms in the comparison group to the fraction of firms in the reference group 
at a given level of productivity. 
4.4.2.2 Parametric estimation 
Given the lack of data for more than a single period for most of the SSA countries, we make use of a 
static model as use of a dynamic model is not possible47. 
We model a linear relationship between a firm’s productivity and its sources of finance, taking into 
account other firm characteristics that have an influence on productivity. We specify the equation as 
follows: 
 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑙 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜈𝑗 + 𝜂𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖    (4-8) 
                                                 
47 For some countries, data exists for more than one period. However, we are not in a position to exploit the panel aspect 
of the data because of too few time periods. 
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Where; 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 = productivity estimated from equation (2) above; 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  = The financial structure variable and it is identified as the proportion of investment 
financed from the various sources of finance. These sources include bank loans (from commercial 
banks and non-bank financial institutions), equity finance (including owners’ equity for private firms 
and public equity for publicly listed firms), internal funds, trade credit and informal sources which 
include borrowing from family, friends and other informal money lending sources. To classify a firm 
as bank financed, most of their investment must have been financed from bank loans, obtained from 
banks or from non-bank financial institutions. Equity financed firms as those with most of their 
investment financed from equity. Internally financed firms are those with most of their investment 
financed from retained earnings and the same applies for informal funds, which combines trade 
credit, borrowing from friends, family and other informal sources. However, where firm’s investment 
is financed by an equal share of a combination of sources, these have been classified as hybrid. 
𝑋 = Firm characteristics that that have been shown to have an effect on firm performance48. These 
include size of the firm, experience of their top manager, age of the firm, type of firm ownership, 
informal competition, operating capacity of the firm, and average education of production workers. 
We measure the size of the firm by the number of employees. Large firms are expected to be more 
productive than small firms (Girma and Vencappa, 2015). It is also expected that more experienced 
managers can steer a firm’s productivity better than an inexperienced manager. Well-established 
firms are expected to have survived the teething problems encountered by new firms. Older firms are 
therefore considered to be more productive. Foreign owned firms are expected to be more productive 
than government owned, or privately owned domestic firms (Waldkirch, 2014). To capture this, we 
use data on the type of firm ownership, which includes private domestic, private foreign, government 
owned and other (e.g. sole proprietorship). Studies have shown that exporting firms are more 
productive than non-exporting firms (Delgado, Farinas and Ruano, 2002). We therefore control for 
the level of exports by including a variable that captures the percent of exports in a firm’s sales. 
δl represents location
49 fixed effects on the assumption that firms located in one region share certain 
characteristics. It is also assumed that financial institutions are more likely to be concentrated in a 
region that is viewed to be more productive, making it easier for firms to access finance.  
                                                 
48 See Pushner (1995); Margaritis & Psillaki (2010) among others. 
49 Location refers to main business city. 
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To account for characteristics that are common to all the firms, but vary across time, we include time 
fixed effects represented by λt.  
𝜈𝑗  represents country fixed effects  
𝜂𝑠  accounts for industry fixed effects. 
4.4.3  Data  
The data used in this study is the Enterprise Survey data, collected by the World Bank. A standardized 
sampling framework was used for data collected from 2005, making the data comparable across 
countries. The data is cross sectional, and the unit of observation is the firm. We focus on the 
manufacturing firms in Sub-Saharan Africa for our analysis. Stratification was based on firm size, with 
more emphasis on small and medium firms. Our sample therefore consists of 43% small firms, 34% 
medium firms, and 23% large firms across Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Since only a subset of the data is used, the firms are filtered as follows: First, firms must have purchased 
fixed assets in the period under survey. Second, the firms must have data on financing choices for fixed 
assets. Third, firms must have data on the variables used to compute productivity, including net book 
value of assets to proxy physical capital and average years of school for a typical production worker, to 
proxy human capital. Countries for which these variables are missing are dropped. This leaves us with 
data from 26 countries. For the survey, interviewers were asked to give their opinion on the reliability of 
the data. The responses ranged from truthful, to somewhat truthful, to unreliable. Observations for which 
data was described as unreliable were dropped. 
All the major manufacturing industries listed in the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
revision 3.1. are covered in the data. To achieve a sufficient number of firms in each classification, we 
have combined some industries, based on similarities in the type of activity and factor intensity. This re-
classification is similar to Saliola & Seker (2011) but in our case, we combine textiles, garments and 
leather into one industry as well as Chemicals, Plastics and rubber. This gives us a total of five major 
industries. Industries that fall outside the five major categories are classified as other. As noted in Saliola 
& Seker (2011), the sample design of the enterprise survey was such that the selected industries were 
targeted to facilitate industry level analysis, which we employ in our study. 
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Table 4-6: Industry classification 
ISIC Code Industry Obs Proportion (%) 
15 & 16 Food & Tobacco 668 25.08 
17, 18 & 19 Textiles, Garments & Leather 384 14.41 
24 & 25 Chemicals, Plastics & rubber 314 11.79 
26 & 27 Non-metallic & Basic metals 212 7.96 
28 & 29 Fabricated metal & Machinery 376 14.11 
           - Other Manufacturing 710 26.65 
Total   2664 100 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 
These responses are based on data from firms that purchased fixed assets and whose productivity could be estimated based 
on data availability. As noted earlier, firms that did not have data on labor and capital, and therefore whose productivity 
could not be estimated were dropped. 
 
 
Descriptive statistics  
The sample comprises firms that purchased fixed assets during the survey period, as our outcome variable 
of interest is tied to firms financing choices. It is evident that a large proportion of the firms rely on 
internal finance, with banks being the second most popular option. With limited access to finance for 
many enterprises in SSA, the heavy reliance on internal funds by firms in the sample is not surprising. 
The “other” category comprises trade credit, and ,borrowing from informal sources and we see more 
reliance on this source of finance compared to equity finance. Stock markets in SSA are not well 
developed, and are characterised by low levels of activity compared to stock markets in other developing 
countries and globally. It is therefore no surprise that there is little reliance on equity finance.  
Table 4-7: Financing Choices 
Financing choices Obs Mean 
Bank Loan 379 15.02 
Equity 72 2.85 
Internal funds 1798 71.26 
Hybrid 121 4.8 
Others 153 6.06 
Total 2523 100 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 
Responses are for firms that purchased fixed assets and whose productivity could be estimated based on data availability. 
Firms with missing data on capital and labor were dropped as productivity could not be estimated.  
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As seen on table 4-8, the sample includes newly established firms that have been in operation for less 
than one year, and well-established firms, with the oldest having been in operation for 189 years. Average 
years of education for production workers is about 850 years, with some firms having unskilled workers. 
This could be explained by the growing population in SSA or the growth in the size of the labour force, 
coupled with low skills levels compared to other parts of the world. The average exports amount to 12 
percent, an indication that most of the firms surveyed sell to the domestic market.   
Table 4-8: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean   SD Min Max 
TFP (Using gross 
revenue) 
2,641 12.97 2.47 7.06 23.24 
TFP (Using Value 
added) 
2,641 12.7 2.35 6.64 21.9 
Age 3,043 18.92 16.96 0 189 
Average education 2,419 7.66 4.9 0 26 
Management experience 3,042 16.5 10.24 1 60 
Capacity 2,515 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Informal competition 3,015 1.76 1.38 0 4 
Size 2,961 1.81 0.79 1 3 
Exports 3,032 11.85 25.31 0 100 
Ownership 2,961 0.22 0.42 0 1 
 
 
Notes: Size: 1=Small; 2=Medium; 3=Large; Capacity=1 If a firm utilizes at least 50% of its capacity; Informal 
competition=0 if firms faces no obstacle from the practices of competitors in the informal sector, and it equals 4 for those 
facing very severe obstacles. Ownership=1 for firms with at least 10 percent foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. 
 
Correlation coefficients 
The correlation coefficients reported in table 4-9 below show that firms that rely more on bank funds and 
hybrid sources to finance most of their investments are associated with a positive TFP, compared to firms 
relying on equity funds, internal funds and informal funds (categorised as other). However, correlation 
coefficients are not enough evidence to confirm that bank financed firms are more productive than those 
using other sources of finance. This is because we have not controlled for other variables that could drive 
productivity. The positive correlation between productivity and firm age, management experience, 
capacity utilisation, firm size, and foreign ownership is expected, as well as the negative correlation 
                                                 
50 Represents completion of primary education. 
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between productivity and informal competition. Exporting firms are also expected to be more productive 
than non-exporting firms and this is also seen in the positive correlation between exports and 
productivity. Further analysis is, however, needed to confirm causation. 




4.5 Estimation Results 
 
As noted in the literature, financially constrained firms are likely to overlook productive investments 
because of lack of funding opportunities, and are therefore likely to be less productive. We expect that 
large firms, which face less severe obstacles in accessing finance, are more productive than small and 
medium firms.  As noted, too, in the literature, we expect that firms financing most of their investments 





TFP ( value 
added)





TFP (Using gross revenue) 1
TFP ( value added) 0.99 1
bank loan 0.17 0.16 1
equity fund -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 1
internal fund -0.13 -0.13 -0.71 -0.26 1
hybrid 0.07 0.07 -0.1 -0.04 -0.36 1
Others -0.05 -0.05 -0.1 -0.04 -0.34 -0.05 1
Age 0.4 0.4 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0 0.02 1
Average educ 0.04 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0 -0.06 0.08 1
Management exp. 0.19 0.19 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.31 0.01 1
Capacity 0.09 0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.1 0 -0.02 0.01
Informal comp -0.2 -0.18 -0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.07 -0.02
Size 0.71 0.71 0.15 -0.01 -0.15 0.06 0 0.36 0.09 0.17
Exports 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.02 -0.1 0 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.04






Informal comp. -0.04 1
Size 0.03 -0.18 1
Exports -0.04 -0.1 0.23 1
Ownership -0.04 -0.05 0.21 0.11 1
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4.5.1 Non-parametric estimation results 
The non-parametric results detailed below are based on a probability distribution analysis of the 
productivity of firms in relation to their choice of finance. This will give us a visual display of any 
heterogeneities in their productivity.  
The productivity distribution of all firms based on sources of finance are shown in figure 4-1. As stated 
earlier, firms that did not purchase any fixed assets during the sample period are excluded from the 
analysis. At a first glance, we see the productivity of firms relying more on bank funds is distinguishably 
higher than that of firms relying on internal funds, equity funds, informal sources, and hybrid sources of 
finance. This is especially so for firms at the bottom end of the distribution. At the upper end of the 
distribution, the productivity of firms financing most of their investment using a hybrid source of funds 
and other informal sources appears higher than firms relying more on bank, equity, and internal funds. 
This is surprising, as we expect firms using formal sources of finance to perform better.   
Figure 4-2a, which shows a comparison of the probability distribution of small and medium firms, 
indicates that, on average, firms that finance most of their investment using bank funds are more 
productive than firms using other sources of funds. Large firms, on the other hand, are on average more 
likely to have similar levels of productivity except for firms relying on a hybrid of sources of finance, as 
seen from figure 4-2b. These results clearly point to the heterogeneities that exist in the productivities of 










Figure 4-1 Probability distribution: All firms 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Probability distribution by firm size 
(a) Small and Medium Firms                                             (b) Large Firms 
 
The graphical analysis above is in line with the agency cost theory that postulates that firms that rely on 
debt perform better than firms relying on other sources of finance. The reasons for this is that banks are 
in a better position to monitor the performance of firms funded by them  (Levine, 2002), and also the fact 
that managers of firms with large amounts of debt fear bankruptcy as it damages their reputation, and 
therefore put more effort into ensuring firm profitability.  
However, we cannot make quantitative interpretations from the distribution analysis. To be able to make 
statistical inferences of the productivity distributions, we turn to the relative distributions. Firms relying 
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on bank funds have higher productivity, especially the small and medium firms. We thus proceed by 
comparing bank funded firms with firms relying on each of the other sources51.  
The relative distribution of the productivity of firms relying on bank funds and those relying on equity 
fund is shown in figure 4-3. The dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The first graph on the first 
row of figure 4-3 is for all firms, while the other 2 are disaggregated by firm size. The first graph shows 
that productivity of firms relying on equity funds falls below that of firms financing most of their 
investment with bank funds. Specifically, the 95% confidence interval of the first graph in row one shows 
that the productivity of firms relying on equity funds is approximately 2 to 3 times likely to fall below 
that of firms relying more on bank funds. Small and medium firms that rely on equity are 3 to 4 times 
less productive than similar sized firms relying on bank funds. The picture is different for large firms, 
with the graphs depicting less difference in the productivity of firms relying on equity and bank funds.  
Figure 4-3: Relative productivity distribution of Bank and Equity fund users 
 
 
We compare the productivity of firms using mainly bank funds with that of firms using mainly internal 
funds. We see that, similar to results obtained from comparing firms relying on bank funds and those 
relying on equity funds, the productivity of firms relying on bank funds is still higher. Here, we however 
                                                 
51 To limit the number of graphs, we only present results for the relative distribution of firms using banks vs those using 
equity funds, and firms using bank finance vs those using internal funds. The rest of the graphs are available on request. 
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show that the productivity of large firms relying on internal funds is, on average, two times below that 
of firms relying on bank funds at the bottom end of the productivity distribution. 
 
Figure 4-4: Relative productivity distribution of Bank and Internal fund users 
 
The above analysis suggests that there is a positive association between debt and productivity. Given the 
heterogeneities of countries in SSA, and the inclusion of South Africa in the analysis, one would expect 
firms in South Africa would dominate the results. However, excluding South Africa did not alter the 
results52.  
Many countries in SSA are characterised by low levels of growth and, as noted in section 3, the majority 
of firms face financial constraints, which limits their growth. It was noted that only about 14% of small 
firms have ties with financial institutions, compared to 41% of large firms. Banks have been shown to 
cherry pick customers and it may therefore be the case that firms relying more on bank funds are those 
with previous records of high profitability. The above analysis does not, therefore, give conclusive 
evidence that banks contribute to the productivity of firms. The parametric estimation enables us to 
further investigate this claim, by allowing us to control for other firm characteristics 
 
4.5.2 Econometric estimation results 
The results in table 4-10 are obtained from estimating the effect of firm financing choices on productivity 
using regression analysis. Columns (1) through to (5) represent different specifications of the model. In 
                                                 
52 Graphs can be made available on request 
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column (1), we do not control for any fixed effects and instead run a pooled OLS. In columns (2) to (4), 
we have controlled for country, location and industry effects respectively, while column (5) shows results 
when we control for all fixed effects.  
The results show that firms that finance a larger proportion of their investment using bank funds are more 
productive than firms that rely on other sources of finance. These results hold, even when we control for 
unobservable effects at country, location, and industrial classification levels. The assumption made in 
the literature is that banks are more likely to be concentrated in a location that has more productive firms. 
This has the possibility of leading to eventual relationship lending. Likewise, certain industries are more 
likely to be bank funded than others given the profitability associated with them. As Rajan & Zingales 
(1996) note, some industries are more dependent on external finance than others, hence the need to 
control for industry fixed effects. Time fixed effects control for the fact that the surveys were carried out 
during different fiscal years. 
Column (1) shows that the lower productivity associated with equity, internal and informal funds is 
significant, even when we do not control for any unobservable fixed effects. Column (2) shows that, after 
controlling for country and time fixed effects, the lower productivity associated with equity becomes 
insignificant. Similar results are observed when we control for location and time fixed effects; the 
coefficient on equity becomes insignificant. However, when we control for industry fixed effects, shown 
in column (4), the negative coefficient on equity is significant. In column (5), where we control for all 
unobservable fixed effects (country, location, industry and time fixed effects), the results show that the 
lower productivity is only significant for firms that source internal and informal funds. The loss of 
statistical significance of equity finance when we account for country and location effects implies that 
there are some common (unobservable) factors at the country or regional level which matter for both 







Table 4-10: Financial Structure and Total Factor Productivity for all Firms 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The columns represent results with various effects fixed as shown at the bottom of the table. The base category for the financing choices is bank funds. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Equity -0.915*** -0.266 -0.194 -0.653** -0.217
(0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
2. Internal funds -0.494*** -0.429*** -0.360*** -0.457*** -0.341**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13)
3. Hybrid -0.00228 -0.0715 -0.0176 -0.0223 -0.0329
(0.18) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
4. Others (Informal) -0.887*** -0.647*** -0.709*** -0.850*** -0.699***
(0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Age 0.0221*** 0.0164*** 0.0159*** 0.0157*** 0.0150***
(0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Management experience 0.00491 -0.0042 -0.00352 0.00797 -0.00182
(0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0043)
Average education -0.00412 0.0680*** 0.0626*** 0.0616*** 0.0641***
(0.0067) (0.0224) (0.0222) (0.0184) (0.0228)
1. Minor obstacle -0.629*** -0.145 -0.183 -0.303** -0.186
(0.1080) (0.1400) (0.1420) (0.1350) (0.1390)
2. Moderate obstacle -0.630*** -0.351** -0.366** -0.361** -0.371**
(0.1210) (0.1400) (0.1400) (0.1610) (0.1420)
3. Major obstacle -0.530*** -0.101 -0.123 -0.238* -0.14
(0.1080) (0.1230) (0.1200) (0.1220) (0.1170)
4. Very severe obstacle -0.481*** -0.183 -0.205 -0.227 -0.212
(0.1370) (0.1320) (0.1370) (0.1580) (0.1350)
exports -0.000627 0.00381* 0.00528** 0.00351 0.00544**
(0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0023)
capacity 0.411*** 0.296** 0.262** 0.375*** 0.247**
(0.1130) (0.1150) (0.1200) (0.1310) (0.1230)
1. Private foreign 0.00501*** 0.00404*** 0.00430*** 0.00320** 0.00346***
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013)
2. Government owned firms 0.00271 0.00546 0.00356 0.00766 0.00478
(0.0077) (0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0071)
3. Other (e.g. sole
proprietorship)
0.00205 0.00162 0.00259 0.0036 0.00243
(0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0047) (0.0037)
1. Medium size 1.820*** 1.463*** 1.390*** 1.539*** 1.323***
(0.0949) (0.1100) (0.1150) (0.1090) (0.1070)
2. Large size 3.720*** 3.053*** 2.927*** 3.183*** 2.840***
(0.1130) (0.1830) (0.1890) (0.1540) (0.1910)
11.35***
(0.1750)
Observations 1,842 1,452 1,448 1,443 1,439
R-squared 0.555 0.639 0.667 0.567 0.673
Country FE No Yes Yes
Location FE No Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financing options (base category=bank)
Firm ownership (base category = private domestic)
Size (base category = Small size)
Informal competition (base category= No obstacle
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Firm Financing Options on Firm Productivity. Dependent 
variable: TFP estimated from gross sales
Constant
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For a robustness check, we compare the above results with results obtained from different measures of 
TFP, as detailed in section 4.1. These results, using value added to measure productivity, are presented 
in appendix C.4. The results are comparable to those in table 4-10, which show that bank funded firms 
are significantly and consistently associated with higher productivity than firms funded from internal and 
informal sources, regardless of which fixed effects we control for. Whereas the above results are contrary 
to findings in chapter three that the stock market, rather than the banking sector has a stable and 
significantly positive effect on overall economic growth, we argue that the direct focus on the firm rather 
than the aggregate economy wide effects accounts for this difference. 
As shown in the distribution analysis, the productivity differences for large firms was less distinct, 
especially for bank vs equity fund users. We thus proceed by splitting the analysis for large and small 
and medium firms in order to establish if such differentials can be identified in the regression analysis. 
4.5.2.1 Firm financing choices and firm productivity: Large firms 
The results for large firms are shown in Table 4-11, while those for small and medium enterprises are 
shown in table 4-12. Overall, we see that the sign on the coefficient on equity is positive, though 
insignificant when we control for country and time fixed effects, and industry and time fixed effects. 
However, the productivity of large firms that finance most of their investment from bank funds is 
significantly higher than the productivity of those that finance investments using informal sources. These 
results are consistent when we control for country, location, industry and time fixed effects individually 
and collectively. Large firms are thus seen to exhibit different behaviour in this analysis, compared to 
the results that showed that firms that finance a their investments using internal funds have consistently 












Table 4-11: Firm financing choices and Total Factor Productivity for Large Firms 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In these results, we have controlled for other firm characteristics using the same control variables as those shown in table 9. They include 
age, management experience, average education of a typical production worker, informal competition, whether a firm is an exporter or 
not, capacity of the firm as well as the ownership structure of the firm, that is, if it is private domestic, foreign owned, domestic owned, 
government owned or other. 
 
 
4.5.2.2 Firm financing choices and productivity: Small and medium firms 
Comparing the results for small and medium firms with those of large firms, we see that, unlike large 
firms, small and medium firms that finance most of their investment using bank funds are more 
productive than firms that finance most of their investment from internal sources. These results are 
consistent across all specifications. Columns (1), (2) and (4)  of table 4-12 show that the lower 
productivity associated with equity funds is significant, when we do not control for any unobservable 
fixed effects, and when we control for country and time fixed effects, and control for industry and time 
fixed effects. The results also show that firms that finance most of their investment using internal and 





Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Equity 0.192 0.198 -0.0465 0.333 -0.0966
(0.4300) (0.4380) (0.3880) (0.4140) (0.3690)
2. Internal funds -0.377** -0.603* -0.513 -0.479 -0.528
(0.1640) (0.3560) (0.3710) (0.3070) (0.3750)
3. Hybrid 0.295 -0.0802 0.0276 -0.0424 -0.146
(0.2970) (0.4060) (0.4510) (0.3440) (0.4350)
4. Others (Informal) -0.787* -1.097** -1.066** -1.252*** -1.187***
(0.4440) (0.4380) (0.4370) (0.3960) (0.4390)
Observations 466 330 315 327 311
R-squared 0.245 0.417 0.469 0.364 0.499
Country FE No Yes Yes
Location FE No Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financing options (base category = bank)
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Firm Financing Options on Firm Productivity for Large Firms 
Dependent variable: TFP estimated from gross sales
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Table 4-12: Firm financing choices and Total Factor Productivity for Small and Medium Size Firms 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: In these results, we have controlled for other firm characteristics using the same control variables as those shown in table 9. They 
include age, management experience, average education of a typical production worker, informal competition, whether a firm is an 
exporter or not, capacity of the firm as well as the ownership structure of the firm, that is, if it is private domestic, foreign owned, 
domestic owned, government owned or other. 
From table 4-11, the overall observation is that, in SSA, firms that finance a large proportion of their 
investment using bank funds are more productive than firms that rely on internal and informal sources 
of finance. This is especially so for small and medium firms, which are the majority in SSA. 
Our results compare favourably with results by Levine & Warusawitharana (2014), who find that firms 
that rely on external finance have higher productivity growth than those that rely on internal finance. 
However, they use a broader definition of financial structure, and categorise financing choices into two 
broad categories of external vs internal funds. It differs from our analysis in that we further split external 
finance into either bank or equity finance. Our results also show that firms relying on internal funds are 
less productive than firms relying on bank finance, a form of external finance. However, this contradicts 
findings by Allen, et al. (2012) who maintain that, for India, bank and market finance are not associated 
with higher growth rates, and the single most important form of finance for Indian firms is non-bank and 
non-market external finance. Nevertheless, they note the importance of external finance (though not the 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Equity -1.603*** -0.428* -0.272 -1.095*** -0.289
(0.3220) (0.2570) (0.2590) (0.2820) (0.2560)
2. Internal funds -1.014*** -0.552*** -0.397*** -0.768*** -0.332**
(0.1250) (0.1440) (0.1370) (0.1830) (0.1290)
3. Hybrid -0.430* -0.174 -0.0896 -0.203 -0.0599
(0.2480) (0.2580) (0.2480) (0.2550) (0.2460)
4. Others (Informal) -1.303*** -0.534* -0.501* -0.881*** -0.447*
(0.2770) (0.2800) (0.2780) (0.2760) (0.2680)
Observations 1,376 1,121 1,116 1,116 1,111
R-squared 0.158 0.421 0.48 0.274 0.499
Country FE No Yes Yes
Location FE No Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financing options (base category = bank)
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Firm Financing Options on Firm Productivity for Small and 
Medium  Firms Dependent variable: TFP estimated from gross sales
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typical formal external53 finance) relative to internal finance. They further affirm that, for developing 
countries like India, non-formal finance that is not dependent on legal institutions, and which is backed 
by alternative mechanisms outside the formal financial system may better promote growth and 
productivity.  
These results give greater insight into the effects of firm financing choices on firm productivity than 
those obtained from the productivity distribution analysis. A shortcoming in the above analysis is its 
inability to account for causal effect running from productivity to choice of firm financing. It has been 
shown that some performance measures e.g. firm profitability, may influence a firm’s demand for debt 
(Pushner, 1995), and that, while equity markets are more arm’s length in their transactions with firms, 
banks closely monitor firms and identify promising entrepreneurs to fund. This means that only profitable 
firms have access to bank funds. This could explain the higher productivity among bank funded firms. 
However, Pushner (1995) subsequently notes that, while profitability may influence a firms demand for 
debt in the long-run, one does not expect a direct causal link between productivity and a firm’s financial 
structure in the short-run, despite the existence of a positive correlation between the two. Due to data 
limitations, in this study, we are not able to establish the long-run effects of firm financing choices on 
productivity and are thus limited to the short-run, given that we cover only one sample period per unit 
(firm). We also argue that, while duality may be a possibility, the dynamic nature of the business 
environment in SSA is not conducive to long-term ties between financial institutions and firms, especially 
small and medium size firms. Government54  influence on financial institutions has been shown to 
negatively affect firms’ access to credit, especially in SSA, where the legal and institutional framework 
is weak. It is for this reason that we have restricted our analysis to the one-way effect of firm financing 
choices on productivity.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This study sought to investigate the relationship between firm financing choices and firm productivity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, using firm level data obtained from the WBES. The analysis proceeded by 
estimating firm productivity as a measure of firm performance following the method by Ghosh, (2009). 
A linear Cobb-Douglas production function was assumed, and total factor productivity was inferred from 
the residual of the first order approximation of the linear production function. Both distribution analysis 
and regression estimation methods were then used to establish the relationship between firm financing 
                                                 
53 Bank and equity finance 
54 Where this refers to the government of the day 
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choices and firm productivity. The distribution analysis, a non-parametric method of data analysis by 
Handcock & Morris (1998) was used. We examined the relative distribution of productivity of firms 
based on the sources of finance they use to fund their investments. We find support for the agency cost 
theory of firm financing, which postulates that firms that rely on debt rather than other forms of finance 
are, on average, more productive.  
The distribution analysis showed that the productivity of firms relying more on bank funds is 
distinguishably higher than that of firms relying more on internal funds, equity funds, informal funding 
and a hybrid of the sources of finance. This is especially so for firms at the bottom end of the distribution. 
It was also observed that the differences in productivity of firms by their source of finance is more 
pronounced for small and medium firms, while there is no distinct difference between large firms relying 
on either bank funds or equity funds. The parametric results, based on regression analysis, also show that 
firms that finance most of their investments using bank funds are more productive, compared to firms 
that finance a significant proportion of their investments using other sources of finance. These results 
were mainly significant for small and medium firms, and they corroborate what the relative distribution 
of productivity shows. Like in the distributional analysis, the results from our regression analysis differ 
between small and medium firms and large firms. The productivity of bank funded small and medium 
firms is significantly and consistently higher than the productivity of firms funded from internal and 
informal sources, regardless of which fixed effects we control for. Large firms, on the other hand, showed 
less distinct results, with the productivity of firms relying on informal sources of finance being shown as 
consistently and significantly lower than that of firms using bank funds.  
Overall, it appears that firms in SSA financing most of their investments using bank funds are 
significantly more productive than SSA firms utilising internal and informal funds. While the 
productivity of firms utilising equity funds was neither consistently nor significantly lower, we do find a 
consistently negative sign in all estimations for small and medium firms, even though the level of 
significance was dependent on the fixed effects that we controlled for.  
One peculiarity of SSA is the under-development and under-performance of capital markets, coupled 
with stringent listing requirements. Small and medium firms are therefore less likely to rely on equity 
funds for their investment purposes, and instead opt for internal and informal sources of finance. From a 
policy perspective, countries in SSA would benefit from governments strengthening the banking sector 
and expanding access to credit for firms, rather than establishing capital markets, which could be left to 
a time when the banking sector is well developed.  
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We do, however, note that this study was limited to the use of cross sectional data because of the 
unavailability of panel data for a number of countries, which would have been useful in accounting for 
the dynamics in the analysis. The World Bank is expanding the availability of panel data, making it 
possible for future research to incorporate these dynamics and extend the analysis to the long-term effects 
of firm financing on productivity. 
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Appendix C   
C.1  Variable definition 
 
World Bank Enterprise Survey  
Variable Definition Source
Size of the firm is based on number of employees, where 5 - 19
= Small;
20 - 99 = Medium and >100 = Large
Export
This includes the value of exports of a firm, ranging from 0%
to 100%
WBES
Age Age of the firm WBES
Average education This is the average education for a typical production worker WBES
Management 
experience




Capacity utilisation =1 if a firm that use over 50% of its
capacity and zero otherwise
WBES
Ownership structure Has four categories as described below; WBES
(i) Private foreign
Represents % owned by private foreign individuals, companies
or organizations
(ii) Private domestic
Represents % owned by private domestic individuals, companies 
or organizations
(iii) Government Represents % owned by government/state
(iv) Other Represents % owned by Other e.g. sole proprietorship
Informal competition
Represents how much of an obstacle the practices of
competitors in the informal sector are and is coded 1(No




C.2  Firm Financing Patterns across Sub Saharan Africa 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 
Notes: Figures presented above are country averages for all firms 
 




1 South Sudan 2.5 5 87.5 2.5 2.5 100
2 Sudan 0 0 81.25 18.75 0 100
3 Angola 4.55 0 88.64 2.27 4.55 100
4 Benin 14.29 0 78.57 7.14 0 100
5 Botswana 24 8 56 2 10 100
6 Burkina Faso
14.29 2.86 74.29 5.71 2.86 100
7 Burundi 32 0 60 8 0 100
8 Central African Republic 0 5.88 88.24 5.88 0 100
9 Cote d’Ivore 2.13 0 85.11 10.64 2.13 100
10 Cameroon 20.31 1.56 54.69 14.06 9.38 100
11 Cape 24.14 10.34 62.07 3.45 0 100
12 Chad 2.86 2.86 88.57 2.86 2.86 100
13 Congo 0 0 100 0 0 100
14 DRC 0 0 96.08 0 3.92 100
15 Eritrea 6.25 0 87.5 6.25 0 100
16 Ethiopia 5.15 7.22 82.47 0 5.15 100
17 Gabon 6.25 0 93.75 0 0 100
18 Gambia 12.5 0 62.5 12.5 12.5 100
19 Ghana 12.71 2.76 72.93 6.08 5.52 100
20 Guinea 0 0 94.87 3.85 1.28 100
21 Guinea Bissau
0 0 86.96 13.04 0 100
22 Kenya 27.81 4.28 56.15 3.74 8.02 100
23 Lesotho 16.67 9.52 57.14 11.9 4.76 100
24 Malawi 20.31 1.56 73.44 3.13 1.56 100
25 Mali 5.26 0 92.11 2.63 0 100
26 Mozambique
3.39 0 91.53 3.39 1.69 100
27 Namibia 25 3.33 63.33 0 8.33 100
28 Niger 6.25 3.13 78.13 3.13 9.38 100
29 Nigeria
5.5 8.59 60.14 20.27 5.5 100
30 South Africa
23.35 0 67.07 3.59 5.99 100
31 Rwanda 26.92 11.54 42.31 0 19.23 100
32 Senegal 11.29 0 74.19 6.45 8.06 100
33 Tanzania
25.49 3.92 65.36 1.96 3.27 100
34 Togo 4.17 4.17 87.5 4.17 0 100
35 Uganda 11.02 3.94 78.74 1.57 4.72 100
36 Zambia 9.43 3.14 79.87 4.4 3.14 100
37 Zimbabwe 7.63 0.85 85.59 5.93 0 100
38 Liberia 17.86 0 78.57 3.57 0 100
39 Mauritius 51.9 0 37.97 2.53 7.59 100
40 Sierra Leone 2.5 2.5 92.5 2.5 0 100
41 Swaziland 11.11 0 82.22 2.22 4.44 100
Total 14.22 2.95 72.6 5.7 4.53 100
Proportion of fixed assets financed from the various sources (% of responses)
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C.3  Firm Financing Patterns by Country and Firm Size 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 
Notes: This tables only shows a sample of countries used in the analysis. The selection of country results to display was not 
based on any criteria. Results for other countries are available on request. 
 




Botswana 20 6.67 60 0 13.33 100
Burkina Faso 7.14 0 85.71 0 7.14 100
Ghana 8.74 2.91 78.64 4.85 4.85 100
Kenya 18.18 9.09 60.61 3.03 9.09 100
Lesotho 26.83 12.2 43.9 14.63 2.44 100
Nigeria 3.93 5.74 33.53 54.38 2.42 100
South Africa 17.28 0 74.07 3.7 4.94 100
Tanzania 3.17 3.17 88.89 1.59 3.17 100
Uganda 11.43 5.71 77.14 1.43 4.29 100
Zambia 6.94 1.39 83.33 4.17 4.17 100
Mauritius 46.88 0 37.5 6.25 9.38 100
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
All countries 8.88 3.08 68.58 16.03 3.44 100
Medium Firms
Botswana 27.27 9.09 54.55 4.55 4.55 100
Burkina Faso 21.43 0 64.29 14.29 0 100
Ghana 14.04 1.75 70.18 7.02 7.02 100
Kenya 33.8 2.82 54.93 1.41 7.04 100
Lesotho 24.32 8.11 51.35 13.51 2.7 100
Nigeria 3.57 4.76 31.55 58.33 1.79 100
South Africa 30.5 0 61.7 2.13 5.67 100
Tanzania 39.62 5.66 50.94 1.89 1.89 100
Uganda 5.41 2.7 86.49 0 5.41 100
Zambia 10 5.71 80 2.86 1.43 100
Mauritius 56.25 0 40.63 0 3.13 100
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
All countries 17.95 3.24 62.53 12.58 3.7 100
Large firms
Botswana 23.08 7.69 53.85 0 15.38 100
Burkina Faso 14.29 14.29 71.43 0 0 100
Ghana 28.57 4.76 52.38 9.52 4.76 100
Kenya 26.51 3.61 55.42 6.02 8.43 100
Lesotho 0 8.33 75 12.5 4.17 100
Nigeria 5.19 2.6 41.56 50.65 0 100
South Africa 18.75 0 68.75 5.36 7.14 100
Tanzania 43.24 2.7 45.95 2.7 5.41 100
Uganda 23.81 0 66.67 4.76 4.76 100
Zambia 17.65 0 64.71 11.76 5.88 100
Mauritius 53.33 0 33.33 0 13.33 100
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
All countries 17.46 2.93 63.97 9.92 5.73 100
Small firms
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C.4  Estimation results using value added 
 
                                                Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Equity -0.697*** -0.167 -0.11 -0.538** -0.13
(0.2610) (0.2330) (0.2280) (0.2420) (0.2220)
2. Internal funds -0.426*** -0.344*** -0.292** -0.392*** -0.273**
(0.0869) (0.1230) (0.1240) (0.1350) (0.1260)
3. Hybrid 0.0714 -0.00458 0.0455 0.0529 0.0364
(0.1770) (0.1970) (0.1810) (0.1880) (0.1820)
4. Others (Informal) -0.816*** -0.577*** -0.640*** -0.796*** -0.629***
(0.1970) (0.2160) (0.2130) (0.2160) (0.2120)
age 0.0205*** 0.0146*** 0.0139*** 0.0146*** 0.0129***
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Management experience 0.00434 -0.00438 -0.00356 0.00714 -0.0019
(0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0042)
Average education 0.0028 0.0593*** 0.0536** 0.0565*** 0.0552**
(0.0063) (0.0217) (0.0222) (0.0173) (0.0228)
Informal competition:
 1. Minor obstacle -0.572*** -0.126 -0.16 -0.296** -0.165
(0.1010) (0.1350) (0.1360) (0.1300) (0.1320)
2. Moderate obstacle -0.533*** -0.304** -0.328** -0.319** -0.335**
(0.1170) (0.1330) (0.1340) (0.1570) (0.1370)
3. Major obstacle -0.414*** -0.0503 -0.0693 -0.196 -0.0868
(0.1030) (0.1250) (0.1220) (0.1260) (0.1180)
4. Very severe obstacle -0.417*** -0.135 -0.169 -0.236 -0.178
(0.1310) (0.1330) (0.1380) (0.1690) (0.1360)
exports -7.90E-05 0.00348 0.00490** 0.00372* 0.00513**
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)
capacity 0.404*** 0.262** 0.229** 0.342*** 0.217*
(0.1070) (0.1050) (0.1100) (0.1260) (0.1130)
Private foreign firms 0.00464*** 0.00397*** 0.00414*** 0.00250* 0.00333***
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Government owned firms 0.00325 0.00635 0.00396 0.0071 0.0053
(0.0077) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0065)
other (e.g. sole
proprietorship)
0.00296 0.000926 0.00178 0.00401 0.00163
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0035)
Firm size: Medium 1.760*** 1.405*** 1.327*** 1.509*** 1.260***
(0.0904) (0.1070) (0.1120) (0.1130) (0.1030)
Firm size: Large 3.593*** 2.912*** 2.788*** 3.082*** 2.705***
(0.1070) (0.1720) (0.1780) (0.1480) (0.1800)
Constant 10.95***
(0.1680)
Observations 1,842 1,452 1,448 1,443 1,439
R-squared 0.555 0.657 0.683 0.576 0.689
Country FE No Yes Yes
Location FE No Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Firm Financing Options on Firm Productivity for all firms. 
Dependent variable: TFP measured using value added
Financing options (base category = bank)
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C.5  Relative distribution of productivity 
C.5.1 Relative distribution of productivity of bank and informal (others) funds users 
 
 
C.5.2 Relative distribution functions of productivity of firms using external funds (bank and 






Summary and Conclusion  
 
In recent years, the role of a country’s financial structure in economic growth has become the subject of a 
continuous debate within the finance-growth literature. Empirical work on the role of financial structure 
on economic growth offers no consensus, with studies either arguing that a bank-based or market based 
financial system is more conducive for growth, while others conclude that the structure of the financial 
system does not matter for growth.  
At the same time, most of the existing empirical work on the issue focuses on developed countries and 
regions. The very limited research on developing countries is mainly due to data unavailability. SSA in 
particular, is a region that has been neglected in the relevant literature, as stock markets in the region are 
young compared to those in developed countries. Financial reforms in SSA in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, included the establishment of stock markets as one of the requirements (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). 
This was aimed at promoting growth in the region, and expanding the sources of finance, especially to 
firms.  
The key question that this study aimed to address is whether financial structure has an effect on economic 
growth in SSA. We investigated this in three related studies. Chapter two looked at the influence of 
financial structure on economic growth in SSA, using recent data obtained from the Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD) on the characteristics of financial systems around the globe.  Because of 
cross country heterogeneities, we postulated that drawing conclusions based on panel data studies could 
lead to misleading conclusions for specific countries. This concern has also been raised in the literature 
(see Levine (1996); Luintel, Khan, Arestis & Theodoridis (2008)). This issue was addressed in the third 
chapter of the thesis, which provided evidence on financial structure and growth from Kenya. Kenya has 
a relatively well developed financial system by the standards of developing countries. Financial 
innovations, especially mobile banking, have contributed to the expansion of the provision of financial 
services aimed at promoting growth. While finance plays a crucial role in firm performance, the financial 
structure in a country determines the financing choices available to a firm. Having established the financial 
structure-growth relationship at a macro level, we considered the influence of firm financing choices on 
firm performance in SSA. This issue was addressed in chapter four. The establishment of stock markets, 
besides promoting overall economic growth, was aimed at expanding the sources of finance for firms. 
However, firms’ financing decisions depend not only on the availability of funds, but also on other factors 
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such as cost, benefits and accessibility, and these have an effect on firm performance. In this chapter, 
therefore, we adopted a microeconomic approach, by looking at the various sources of firm finance and 
their role in firm performance in SSA.  
Specifically, chapter two employed a dynamic panel estimation method in order to provide empirical 
evidence on the financial structure-growth relationship in SSA over the period 1980 - 2014. The study 
included fourteen countries from the region, based on the existence of a banking sector and a stock market. 
This was important, as it was the basis for the definition of financial structure. The results showed that, in 
the long-run, financial structure is not significant in influencing growth in SSA. Even after controlling for 
countries with better developed financial systems (Mauritius and South Africa), the results did not change 
and the main conclusion that financial structure does not matter for long-run growth still holds. Stock 
markets in SSA are not geared towards addressing the capital needs of the region. The SSA banking sector 
is also inefficient and underdeveloped. These factors could explain the finding that financial structure does 
not matter for growth in the region in the long-run.   
The short-run results, on the other hand, were rather mixed. After controlling for the level of financial 
development, the results indicate that financial structure matters in 5 of the 14 countries - Malawi, Nigeria, 
Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. What is interesting from these results is that financial structure does 
not matter in the case of Mauritius and South Africa, the two countries that were observed to have superior 
financial systems. These results point to the heterogeneous nature of the effect of financial structure on 
economic growth, a reflection of the differences in the banking sectors as well as the functioning of the 
stock markets.   
The mixed results owing to the different institutional features among the SSA countries pointed to the need 
for a country case study that allowed for a more detailed analysis of the financial structure-growth 
relationship, taking into consideration the country specific features. This was addressed in chapter three, 
which provided empirical evidence from Kenya. This study therefore sought to contribute to the existing 
literature that argues that panel estimates do not correspond to time series estimates. Three issues were 
addressed in this study. The first issue addressed was the independent role of the banking sector, the second 
issue was the independent role of the stock market, while the third issued addressed the overall effect of 
financial structure on economic growth. Using both annual data over the period 1974 – 2014 and quarterly 
data over the period 2002 - 2014, and employing the ARDL bounds approach to cointegration, the results 
showed that, while the stock market has a positive and significant effect on growth in Kenya both in the 
short-run and the long-run, the banking sector generally has a negative and significant effect on growth in 
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the short-run. However, the long-run results were inconclusive, using both quarterly and annual data. While 
results from the annual data showed no significant effect on growth, results from quarterly data showed a 
negative and significant effect.  
The negative effect of the banking sector on growth was attributed to poor lending practices in Kenya as 
well as to the historical political influence on bank loans (ECA, 1997) and weak legal and regulatory 
framework. It was, however, expected that we would observe a reversal of the negative effect of the 
banking sector on growth using quarterly data for a more recent time period (2002 – 2014), characterized 
by a financially liberalized banking sector. We did not see this, and the results can be explained by the 
carry-over of a large proportion of non-performing loans by Kenyan banks. 
Results on the overall effect of the financial structure on growth showed that financial structure does not 
matter in influencing growth in the long-run in Kenya. The conclusion from the short-run results based on 
time-series estimation methods corresponded to the conclusion drawn from short-run results obtained from 
the regional study, that is, that financial structure does not matter in the short-run. For Kenya however, we 
included components of financial structure that capture various aspects of the financial system, in order to 
provide a more detailed analysis. Our findings led us to conclude that it does not matter for growth whether 
Kenya is bank-based or market-based. A possible explanation for this finding could be the fact that though 
the stock market has been in existence for longer in Kenya (since 1954) than in most countries in SSA, it 
was only in 2013 that a market segment targeted at SMEs was launched, that enables these firms to raise 
capital from the stock market. Likewise, even though the banking sector is considered relatively well 
developed by the standards of developing countries, it is still underdeveloped by international standards. 
The literature has shown that a country’s financial sector development needs to get to a certain threshold 
before it can have a positive effect on growth (Owen and Temesvary, 2014). It is possible that Kenya has 
not attained this threshold. Policymakers in other countries could learn from this case study, as they seek 
to develop their financial sectors. More specifically, countries need targeted financial sector development 
that addresses the specific needs of the country. For example, in countries with relatively young stock 
markets, there is need to focus at the outset on market segments that target financing for SMEs alongside 
the main investment market segment.  
Chapter four used a microeconomic approach to address the effect of firm financing choices on firm 
performance, as measured by firm productivity. The key objective in this chapter was to investigate the 
differences in firm productivity based on the choice of firm financing. We analysed cross sectional data 
from 26 countries in SSA collected over the period 2005 – 2013.The results showed that, in general, firms 
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that rely more on the banking sector to finance their investment needs are more productive than firms 
relying on the other sources of finance, including equity, internal sources, informal sources and a 
combination of sources. The study made use of both parametric and non-parametric methods and the results 
from both methods consistently showed that productivity was significantly higher for small and medium 
enterprises that mostly use bank finance compared to firms which use other sources of finance. However, 
the results for large firms showed that those relying on informal and internal sources of finance were less 
productive than those utilising bank funds. The study did not find any significant effect on the productivity 
of firms relying more on equity funds or a hybrid of sources. One peculiarity of SSA is the under-
development and under-performance of capital markets, coupled with stringent listing requirements. As 
noted earlier, stock market segments that target SMEs are fairly recent in many countries, an indication 
that SMEs in the region have not had the opportunity to raise capital from the stock market. They are 
therefore less likely to rely on equity funds for their investment purposes and instead opt for bank loans, 
or internal and informal sources of finance. As the stock market segments for SMEs develop further, it is 
expected that there will be an increase in the availability of equity finance, allowing SMEs to have more 
growth opportunities in the future. 
Overall, there is no doubt that stock markets are beneficial in an economy. However, given that many 
countries in SSA are characterised by small and medium firms that are mostly not listed on the MIMs of 
the stock markets due to stringent listing requirement, there is need to develop alternative investment 
market segments that target SMEs for countries that have already established a stock market. There is also 
need to ensure the efficient delivery of banking services, especially to SMEs, as it appears that firms relying 
on bank finance are more productive. We, however, expect increased competition from the stock market 
as they open up opportunities for SMEs with high growth potential. 
This thesis was not without limitations. First, the fact that not all countries in SSA have established stock 
markets that have been in operation for a number of years limited the sample size to 14 countries, in a 
region that consists of 48 countries. Secondly, time-series evidence was only obtained from one country, 
and there is need for more country case studies for further evidence on the effect of financial structure in 
SSA. Thirdly, because of data limitations, we could not establish the dynamics of firm financing, and the 
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